Several years ago, the American Bar Foundation initiated a modest investigation into the feasibility of designing a computer that could automate the assembly of form legal documents such as wills, trusts, complaints, and the like. The investigation has since matured into a major research effort to design an entirely new kind of computational processor. A prototype processor has now been constructed, and it is undergoing field tests to determine whether it truly fulfills the specialized needs of the legal drafter.

This article briefly traces the history of the project, explaining the motivation behind it and describing the role of the participants. The article then introduces a new language—the principal result of the research effort—that may be used to draft both form documents and statutes, regulations, and other “instructions” defining how form documents are to be assembled. The new language, a subset of English, is fully comprehensible both to attorneys and to a properly designed computational processor. An attorney or paraprofessional may redraft form legal documents, statutes, and regulations in the new language and then feed them directly into the computer; no conventional programming is required. The computer asks questions couched in language taken from the forms and statutes, performs any necessary computations, and draws any necessary legal conclusions. The computer then returns client-customized legal documents ready for court filing. The article tells how the new processor may be set up to perform even the most complex drafting tasks—even complex tax-return preparation. Particular emphasis is placed on having the computer force the attorney or paraprofessional to proceed in a highly organized fashion with the development of a complex delivery system so that the computer, and not the attorney or paraprofessional, keeps track of the complex linkages between the elements of the system as it evolves.

In its concluding section, the article explores the possible impact of this new technology upon the legal profession and the public, and the author expresses his view that centralized systems set up by legal specialists to support the work of numerous nonspecialists may expand the areas in which the generalist may do competent work and may enable the general practitioner to buck the current trend toward specialization.

The author addresses himself to the problems of sex discrimination in pensions. He contends that there have been fundamental errors in the perceptions of those problems. Equality in pay—both of wages and of fringe benefits—requires equality in employer contributions, which produces actuarial equality in benefits. This is true for pensions, at least, both as a matter of statutory interpretation and as a matter of fundamental fairness, absent a compelling need that has not been and probably cannot be shown. He concludes that Manhart was wrongly decided but that in any event it should be given the narrowest possible interpretation and not be permitted to sire illegitimate progeny.

Because the holding in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona is narrow and because some lawyers remain opposed to advertising, the dispute over lawyer advertising continues. Many who favor restricting advertising contend that it will not benefit consumers. They argue that prices must either rise to cover the cost of advertising or, if prices do fall, that quality must also drop.

This article addresses itself to both charges. The first section is theoretical, demonstrating how advertising could lower the costs of producing legal services. Advertising increases the volume of services a lawyer can expect to sell. Greater volume, in turn, allows greater specialization in production, more effective use of systems management, and the substitution of paralegals and capital for lawyer inputs. The authors argue that each of these changes will lower costs, thereby lowering prices without necessarily reducing quality. The second section is empirical, comparing the prices and particularly the quality of services produced by a heavy advertiser, the Legal Clinic of Jacoby & Meyers, and the traditional firms in the Los Angeles market with which the clinic competes. Quality is defined both subjectively and objectively, and original data are presented indicating that the quality of service that the clinic supplies is at least equivalent, and on some measures better, than the quality of service that traditional firms provide.