Agricultural and wildlife trade is subject to sudden, disruptive import restrictions arising from concerns over sanitary and phytosanitary safety and the conservation of natural resources. These restrictions can create significant international price differences that encourage the smuggling of goods across borders. This article presents an equilibrium model of smuggling where the supply and demand for smuggled goods depend on interregional price disparities in the presence of a trade ban. In this model, smuggling is more prevalent when demand and supply among trade partners is more inelastic or when there are fewer total trade partners at the time a trade ban is enacted. Applications are presented for regionalization, destruction of goods in government eradication programs, price support, stockpiling, and the development of substitutes. Regionalization may increase smuggling under certain production and consumption patterns.

This article examines farmers’ preferences for various risk management information sources. Our results suggest that information from risk management experts, in-depth materials studied on their own, and popular press outlets tend to be preferred and are ranked highly by producers. Using a regression model to investigate farmer/farm attributes that affect preference for a particular risk management information source, we find that younger farmers with college education, higher leverage, assets greater than $1 million, risk-loving attitudes, and who have used professional services (marketing consultants) tend to prefer information from risk management experts, the Internet, and marketing clubs/other producers. On the other hand, producers who prefer self-study of educational materials and popular press information sources tend to be younger, with lower leverage levels, and have used fewer professional services.

Competition from new store formats including supercenters, warehouse clubs, and mass merchandisers has emerged as a major threat to traditional grocery chains. A primary objective of this paper is to understand how the store-level performance is related to the workforce composition of full-time and part-time employees chosen by the food retailer along with benefits and incentives provided to employees. The elasticity of complementarity for food retailers measures how changes in store size affect use of full-time and part-time employees. Larger store size increases the marginal value of labor, and firm hiring decisions shift to expanded use of part-time employees.

A primary change to crop insurance contained in the USDA's Farm Bill proposal is supplemental deductible coverage (SDC). SDC would allow farmers who purchase individual crop insurance coverage to purchase area-wide coverage in the amount of the individual policy deductible. This supplemental area-wide coverage would be similar to the existing Group Risk Plan policy, but with an accelerated indemnity schedule. Analysis indicates that SDC increases farmer certainty equivalents. The largest benefits are realized by farmers with high yield potential in counties with greater systemic risk. In general, optimal individual policy coverage levels modestly decrease when SDC is taken.