Few people consider the armed forces hesitant in their actions. Speed, decisiveness, efficiency, directness—such are characteristics often attributed to the military. Especially in areas where protection of military autonomy is concerned, quick action may be taken.

Recent African history suggests that members of the armed forces exhibit willingness to leap into active political involvement when challenges arise to their corporate interest. Since June 1965 fifteen African states have experienced coups d'etat. The decisive act of intervention, however, rarely is mirrored by an equally decisive act of withdrawal. Coups are clear-cut events, transitions to civilian governments far less dramatic or marked. As the time to return to the barracks approaches, doubts and hesitations seem to grow. Officers pause, uncertain whether they have accomplished what their intervention allegedly was to correct. They are caught in a dilemma, and as S. E. Finer noted, “whether their rule be indirect of whether it be direct, they cannot withdraw from rulership nor can they fully legitimize it. They can neither stay nor go” (1962, p. 243).

Once military intervention has occurred, voluntary disengagement of the armed forces from direct political involvement comes when withdrawal seems to enhance the military's corporate interest. Splits within the military, relatively restricted objectives, and the opportunity to transfer control to civilians whose outlooks, policies, and backgrounds resemble those of the ruling military group facilitate disengagement.

A considerable amount of attention has recently been focused upon the performance of military governments. (See, for example, Bienen 1971, Feit 1973, Welch and Smith forthcoming, Decalo 1973, Pinkney 1973.) The brief period in which military regimes have been in power in Africa has precluded the accumulation of sufficient data to verify some of the hypotheses presented in this literature. This article analyses the performance of the Amin regime in Uganda in its first thirty months in power. It suggests that the failure of the regime to make progress towards the economic and political development of the country is the result of (1) the disintegration of the government into a personal dictatorship, (2) the increasing reliance by the government upon coercive and diversive policies to maintain itself in power, and (3) actions of the government, particularly within the military itself, which have exacerbated ethnic divisions within Ugandan society in general.

The Amin coup of January 1971 was achieved with surprising ease given the deep divisions existing within the military subsystem in Uganda. After only a few hours of fighting, troops announced over Radio Uganda at 3.45 p.m., 25 January 1971 that Obote's government had been overthrown and that they had invited Idi Amin to head the new government. Amin's followers had outmanoeuvred troops loyal to Obote and presented them with a fait accompli. However, this relatively smooth transfer of power was to prove deceptive—Amin's government subsequently faced greater resistance to its acceptance, both internally and internationally, than was anticipated.