After a long spell of description and prescription, the study of local government in the English speaking Third World has begun to find a historical context (see, for example, Mawhood, 1983; Okpala, 1982; Rowat, 1980, 1983; Bonney, 1982). This is not surprising given the reality of the decline of local government everywhere. That local government escaped rigorous analysis for so long is due in part to the grounding of the study of local government in administrative practice; practitioner-scholars were committed to the principle of local government, and thus the questions asked revolved around how to make it work, rather than around its precise nature in the colonial and postcolonial context.

The purpose of this article is to explore the ideologies and political practices which illuminate the structure of local government in Kenya, and which in turn are rendered intelligible by that structure. Underlying this effort is the development of a new framework within which local government may be conceptualized: one that goes beyond the description of structures and the chronicling of events (often with little analytical link between the two), to contribute to a more comprehensive political economy of the post-colonial state. Such a political economy view the branches of the state, including local government, as sites of class competition: hence it considers knowledge of “subnational” political processes, and in particular of the local central competition manifest in local government politics, to be necessary for an understanding of class formation in the post-colonial state.

It is an article of faith in many African countries that education is not only a principle motor for development, but also an important instrument in assuring a more equitable distribution of wealth. In the eyes of policy-makers and the public at large, education and training permit a new generation to develop its talents and acquire the characteristics with which to find a well-deserved niche in the employment structure and thus contribute to the country's development. A central focus is on technical and vocational skills which are considered crucial in making people employable or otherwise enabling them to create their own work. Differences in jobs, along with differences in material and social rewards, are attributed to variations in skill levels. Ultimately these differences are associated with variation in ability and effort.

A more critical analysis of actual linkages between education, the labor market, and the employment structure reveals that often skill characteristics are rewarded differently, less because of variations in quality than because of structural conditions in the labor market. On the one hand important differences exist between enterprises which, depending on their mode of production, have a preference for specific worker characteristics and associate these with particular training arrangements. Different occupational or work-positions thus arise which carry diverging rewards and career prospects, even though the actual work done is similar. On the other hand there is ample evidence that factors like race, gender, and class strongly influence access to jobs, so that different social groups find their effective choices in the labor market severely restricted.

Patron/client relationships have fascinated scholars and students of the Third World for more than a generation. These relationships have emerged as an important paradigm in the literature on development and underdevelopment, to the point that there has recendy been a boom of work in this area (Schmidt et al., 1977). Patron/client relationships are usually conceived of as symbols of a persistent “tradition” impinging on, and/or retarding the transition to “modernity.” They are also presented as evidence of the limited theoretical and explanatory usefulness of class analysis. I shall seek to demonstrate, however, that while patron/client relationships are a useful heuristic tool to understand the politics of underdeveloped societies, they are neither a substitute for class analysis, nor should they be construed as an independent paradigm of their own. They should be used as complementary and not as contradictory variables to class, as a close examination of clientelism and patronage in Senegal shows.

The pre-colonial African culture of the Muslim brotherhoods (Foltz, 1977) and the rather liberal electoral patterns established by French colonialism in the eighteenth century (Johnson, 1971) imparted to Senegal patron/client relationships which have permeated its politics since independence (Schumacher, 1975). These relationships, which many scholars have considered to be part of the transitional mode of behavior characteristic of modernizing societies (Foltz, 1977; Lemarchand, 1977; Barker, 1973), represent serious road blocks to Senegalese development (Foltz, 1977; Schumacher, 1975; Cottingham, 1970; O'Brien, 1975).

The art of filmmaking in the last two decades has been enriched by the works of various African filmmakers. This relatively modern form of visual representation seems more amenable to understanding at all levels of the social and cultural strata of the African populace than one would expect from even the earliest forms of the visual arts. Although many remarkable works have been produced by African filmmakers, few of these works have focused on the largely illiterate African majority as the target audience: this is not without reason. Filmmaking is arguably the most expensive form of art in any medium. It is difficult not to approach the profession primarily as a potentially viable business venture, or to continue in the pursuit of artistic excellence without healthy financial support. The governments of French speaking African countries, however, readily fund film projects, thereby mitigating the problem of finance for their filmmakers. As a result, for Ousmane Sembène of Senegal, filmmaking has become a very prolific enterprise. Despite the financial assistance received from the government of Senegal, Sembène does not compromise his artistic inclinations for this patronage. He has even had a serious disagreement with the government over the title of one of his films, Ceddo, 1977 (Gabriel, 1982).

The second crisis of the world market economy in this century affected all countries according to their respective position within the international hierarchy (Rosier, Dockes, 1983: 222ff). The weakest economies, classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs), were hardest hit because their socio-economic profiles showed severe flaws during the preceding boom (Arnaud, 1984:91-100). They exported agrarian raw materials and, lacking an industrial basis, imported manufactured goods. Consequently, the low level of development limited the internal generation of surplus which made foreign assistance imperative and a major feature of the political economy (Hoogvelt, 1982). The share of African economies among the LDC countries is remarkably high (Sánchez Arnau, 1982:15ff). Those countries, however, which maintained close links with the former colonial metropolis suffered less than Tanzania which tried to establish an autonomous way toward social development.

Indebtedness was a characteristic feature of post-colonial reconstruction during the 1960s and 1970s. Foreign capital inflow was the most adequate means to build and to diversify the economy. Internal surplus generation remained severely restricted because of the colonial legacy. Hence, indebtedness was widely accepted among scholars and policy-makers as an unavoidable prerequisite for development. It was the dramatic shift from indebtedness to insolvency in the early 1980s that created alarm and jeopardized the international monetary system. The former commodity exchange lacked the necessary financial resources and a significant segment of the world economic system was about to be suddenly disaggregated.