Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 May 2014
The Anglo-Ashanti war of 1900, the seventh in a series which began in 1806, is a classic example of a war which was not wanted by the combatants but which was bound to occur if the question of the power struggle between Great Britain and Ashanti, in the Gold Coast, was to be settled once and for all. At the outbreak of the conflict the Ashanti confederacy was a mere shadow of its former self. The Asantehene who should have given the lead to his people was in exile. Thanks to the policy of British colonial officials, the confederacy had been broken up and many of its component parts persuaded to sign separate treaties by which they placed themselves under the protection of the British government. Militarily this was significant for it made any concerted action against the colonial government very difficult, if not impossible, and ensured that any dissident state could more easily be isolated and dealt with by the little military force at the disposal of the governor.
Further evidence of the unpreparedness of the Ashantis for this major conflict was given by F.M. Hodgson, the governor of the Gold Coast, who stated that up to the time of his departure from Accra (on his illfated journey to Kumasi) there was nothing to suggest that the Ashantis were planning a revolt. This attitude was also shared by the local government officials in Kumasi, who maintained a vast intelligence network in the area.