Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2021
Judging by public tone, style, and ideological emphasis alone, the casual observer of U.S. foreign policy is impressed by the novelty of the Carter Administration’s approach toward Southern Africa. Kissinger had stressed America’s tangible interests, sought alliances with ideological “enemies” to advance or at least to protect those interests, and operated a clever, manipulative and secretive diplomacy with calculated ambiguity. The Carter Administration now seems to espouse once more American ideals and principles, open diplomacy for announced clearly-stated objectives, and decision-making by consent. But what is really involved is a reversion to the active use of ideology and salesmanship to manage its political and economic interests. It is of a piece with “helping our little brown brothers” in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines, making the world “safe for democracy” and saving Vietnam from Communism.
1. See President Carter’s press conference text. The Baltimore Sun, June 14, 1977.
2. U.S. Mission to the United Nations Press Release USUN (77) May 27, 1977, Statement of Ambassador Andrew Young to South African businessmen, Johannesburg, South Africa, May 21, 1977.
3. See United Kingdom, Rhodesia, Proposals for a Settlement, with Annexes A, B, and C. U.N. Security Council document 2/12393 1 September 1977, pp. 23, 24.
4. See Arrighi, Giovanni, “Foreign Investment in Tropical Africa,” in African Social Studies: A Radical Reader, edited by Gutkind, P. and Waterman, P. (N.Y.), 1977, pp. 168-69Google Scholar.
5. See Conference Report to accompany H.R. 6884, International Security Assistance Act of 1977, July 15, 1977. Report 95-503 pp 23-25.
6. Zaire is also getting $20 million in foreign military credit sales and $2.5 million in military training.
7. See statement of Ambassador Young cited in footnote 2.
8. See Leys, Colin, Underdevelopment in Kenya (Berkeley), 1974, especially pp. 78–79 Google Scholar, 83-98.