At first sight this question may appear to be altogether superfluous and pointless, since it seems to call into doubt – as if there were still room for argument – what is assuredly the most certain axiom held by Christians, proven by so many testimonies in Holy Scripture, by so many examples from different ages and so many pyres of pious martyrs. For whence, you may say, have arisen so many great tribulations of the pious, if not from this single cause: that they have always considered that God should be obeyed simply and absolutely, but kings only in so far as they command nothing against the law of God? Why otherwise the opinion of the apostles, /2/ that God should be obeyed rather than men? Again, since the sole will of the one God is forever just, but that of others can frequently be unjust, who may doubt that the former alone should be obeyed without any reservation, but the latter always with some reservation?

But clearly today many princes exist who, although professing the name of Christ, boldly arrogate to themselves immense power which is not derived from God; and there are many obsequious flatterers who worship them as if they were earthly gods.

Since this is not a parallel-text edition of the Vindiciae, I have not felt at liberty to depart, in the interests of elegance, very far from a literal rendering of the original. I have therefore remained more or less faithful to its style: postglossatorial, with the odd, slightly stilted, rhetorical flourish, often paraphrased from a classical source. What this approach loses in terms of readability should be compensated for in terms of authenticity and accuracy. I have tried to achieve as much consistency as possible in translating important terms, even if this might jar the English reader somewhat on occasions. I hope thereby to make the structure of the author's thought more readily apparent. In many cases I have also inserted the Latin words and phrases in the text in square brackets, but have not always done so if a recent instance makes it obvious what the original term must be. Where I have had to render a Latin word with an English one normally used to translate another key Latin term, I have also given the original in brackets. I have added a glossary of the most important terms and phrases, mainly those of Roman law, so that readers who are not well versed in its technicalities can follow the twists and turns of the author's argument. These terms are marked with daggers in the text and notes, except where the frequency of their use would render the device redundant.

Because we are here concerned with the legitimate authority of a prince, I have not the shadow of a doubt that this question will be hateful to tyrants and evil princes. For they think that whatever they desire is permitted to them. It is not surprising if they can in no way endure the voice of reason and law. But I hope that it will be acceptable at least to good princes, who know that a magistrate – whatever authority he may possess – is nothing other than the living law. Nor indeed if anything be said harshly against tyrants, will it do any damage to good princes, as if it had any relevance to them at all. Tyrants and kings, unjust and just princes, are diametrically opposed. Thus it is so far from being the case that what is said against tyrants should detract in any way /76/ from kings, that on the contrary the more it does detract from the former, the more glory accrues to the latter; nor can the former be denounced without the latter being praised. I am indifferent to whatever the former may feel. I do not write for them, but against them.

For further details see M. Lossen, ‘Ueber die vindiciae contra tyrannos des angeblichen Stephanus Junius Brutus’, Sitzungsberichte der königlichen Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, phil. hist. Klasse, 1 (1887), pp. 247–54; A. Gerber, Niccolò Machiavelli. Die Handschriften, Ausgaben und Ubersetzungen seiner Werke im 16 und 17 Jahrhundert. Eine kritisch-bibliographische Untersuchung, 3 vols. (Gotha, 1912–13), III, pp. 60–75; Beza, De Iure, pp. 11 n. 12, 21–3. Where the Vindiciae and De Iure Magistratuum constitute a separately paginated supplement to Il principe, I have found several examples of their being bound independently of the Machiavellian material (1595, 1600, 1608). Presumably one of the aims of these editions was to provide a pretext for disseminating the monarchomach treatises.

LATIN

1580: Nicolai Machiavelli Princeps. Ex Sylvestri Telii Fulginatis Traductione diligenter emendata. Adiecta sunt eiusdem argumenti, Aliorum quorundam contra Machiavellum scripta depotestate & officio Principum, & contra tyrannos. Basileae Ex officina Petri Pernae: M.D.XXC. [The Vindiciae and the De Iure Magistratuum form a separately paginated supplement. The title page of the former reads: Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos: sive, de Principis in Populum, Populique in Principem, legitima potestate, Stephano Iunio Bruto Celta, Auctore, M.D.LXXX. Another version of Il principe incorporates some different prefatory matter, and does not identify the publisher on the title page, but the same printing of the Vindiciae and De Iure Magistratuum is appended to it.]

The Calvinist scholar and pastor Simon Goulart, who published the most notable collection of propaganda material relating to the St Bartholomew massacre, including many Huguenot pamphlets, died in Geneva in 1628. He had first gone there in 1566, and had lived there since 1571. A professor of theology named Théodore Tronchin wrote the funeral oration. As an instance of Goulart's great reputation for learning, he reported that King Henri III, who was always ‘curious to know what was being said and written throughout his realm, so that in this way he might participate in the thoughts and counsels of all’, and who, on reading the Vindiciae, ‘most anxiously desired’ to discover the author's identity, made no progress in his investigations, and eventually turned in despair to Goulart, ‘from whom he believed nothing about the printing trade to be hidden’. According to Tronchin, Goulart knew the answer to the king's question, but kept the secret. It says something for the notoriety of the book that it is still impossible to give a definitive answer, despite the fact that most of the scholarly attention which the book has received over the last three centuries has been devoted to solving this celebrated literary conundrum. Before rehearsing the evidence again, I want to attempt to answer a different and arguably more important question: why had the king's interest been so aroused?

At first sight this question seems difficult and troublesome: and all the more so because, in as much as it would appear to be superfluous under pious princes but perilous under impious ones, scarcely any one has touched upon it other than very lightly. We must investigate on the basis of fact whether it be lawful to resist a prince who is abrogating the law and destroying the church of God, or hindering its restoration. Holy Scripture will determine the matter for us, if we stand by its judgement. For if, as will easily be proved from Scripture, this was licit for the whole Jewish people, and was even enjoined upon it, then no-one, I believe, will deny that exactly the same is manifestly established with regard to the whole Christian people of any kingdom.

This must be the first consideration: that God chose from all /33/ peoples the people of Israel to be His special people; and sealed a covenant [foedus] with it, that it should be the people of God. This is demonstrated throughout Deuteronomy.

I suppose, that a member of parliament, in the reign of King William or Queen Anne, while the establishment of the Protestant Succession was yet uncertain, were deliberating concerning the party he would chuse in that important question, and weighing, with impartiality, the advantages and disadvantages on each side. I believe the following particulars would have entered into his consideration.

He would easily perceive the great advantage resulting from the restoration of the Stuart family; by which we should preserve the succession clear and undisputed, free from a pretender, with such a specious title as that of blood, which, with the multitude, is always the claim, the strongest and most easily comprehended. It is in vain to say, as many have done, that the question with regard to governors, independent of government, is frivolous, and little worth disputing, much less fighting about. The generality of mankind never will enter into these sentiments; and it is much happier, I believe, for society, that they do not, but rather continue in their natural prepossessions. How could stability be preserved in any monarchical government, (which, though, perhaps, not the best, is, and always has been, the most common of any) unless men had so passionate a regard for the true heir of their royal family; and even though he be weak in understanding, or infirm in years, gave him so sensible a preference above persons the most accomplished in shining talents, or celebrated for great atchievements?

As no party, in the present age, can well support itself, without a philosophical or speculative system of principles, annexed to its political or practical one; we accordingly find, that each of the factions, into which this nation is divided, has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that scheme of actions, which it pursues. The people being commonly very rude builders, especially in this speculative way, and more especially still, when actuated by party-zeal; it is natural to imagine, that their workmanship must be a little unshapely, and discover evident marks of that violence and hurry, in which it was raised. The one party, by tracing up government to the Deity, endeavour to render it so sacred and inviolate, that it must be little less than sacrilege, however tyrannical it may become, to touch or invade it, in the smallest article. The other party, by founding government altogether on the consent of the People, suppose that there is a kind of original contract, by which the subjects have reserved the power of resisting their sovereign, whenever they find themselves aggrieved by that authority, with which they have, for certain purposes, voluntarily entrusted him. These are the speculative principles of the two parties; and these too are the practical consequences deduced from them.

Having endeavoured to remove one species of ill-founded jealousy, which is so prevalent among commercial nations, it may not be amiss to mention another, which seems equally groundless. Nothing is more usual, among states which have made some advances in commerce, than to look on the progress of their neighbours with a suspicious eye, to consider all trading states as their rivals, and to suppose that it is impossible for any of them to flourish, but at their expence. In opposition to this narrow and malignant opinion, I will venture to assert, that the encrease of riches and commerce in any one nation, instead of hurting, commonly promotes the riches and commerce of all its neighbours; and that a state can scarcely carry its trade and industry very far, where all the surrounding states are buried in ignorance, sloth, and barbarism.

It is obvious, that the domestic industry of a people cannot be hurt by the greatest prosperity of their neighbours; and as this branch of commerce is undoubtedly the most important in any extensive kingdom, we are so far removed from all reason of jealousy. But I go farther, and observe, that where an open communication is preserved among nations, it is impossible but the domestic industry of every one must receive an encrease from the improvements of the others. Compare the situation of Great Britain at present, with what it was two centuries ago. All the arts both of agriculture and manufactures were then extremely rude and imperfect.

It is a question, whether the idea of the balance of power be owing entirely to modern policy, or whether the phrase only has been invented in these later ages? It is certain, that Xenophon, in his Institution of Cyrus, represents the combination of the Asiatic powers to have arisen from a jealousy of the encreasing force of the Medes and Persians; and though that elegant composition should be supposed altogether a romance, this sentiment, ascribed by the author to the eastern princes, is at least a proof of the prevailing notion of ancient times.

In all the politics of Greece, the anxiety, with regard to the balance of power, is apparent, and is expressly pointed out to us, even by the ancient historians. Thucydides represents the league, which was formed against Athens, and which produced the Peloponnesian war, as entirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of Athens, when the Thebans and Lacedemonians disputed for sovereignty, we find, that the Athenians (as well as many other republics) always threw themselves into the lighter scale, and endeavoured to preserve the balance. They supported Thebes against Sparta, till the great victory gained by Epaminondas at Leuctra; after which they immediately went over to the conquered, from generosity, as they pretended, but, in reality from their jealousy of the conquerors.

Whoever will read Demosthenes's oration for the Megalopolitans, may see the utmost refinements on this principle, that ever entered into the head of a Venetian or English speculatist.