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1678 results in South-East Asian government, politics and policy

Page 47 of 84

  • Bipolarity and the Future of the Security Order in East Asia

  • William T. Tow
  • Book:
    Bipolarity and the Future of the Security Order in East Asia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    22 July 2016, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • ASEAN is in danger of becoming marginalized as East Asian security becomes increasingly shaped by such volatile flashpoints as a nuclear North Korea and a South China Sea increasingly dominated by quarrels over sovereignty and maritime security.

  • • Accordingly, the notion of “ASEAN centrality” is now being seriously challenged and is unlikely to prevail against the growing bipolar security environment shaped by China and the United States.

  • • ASEAN and other Asia-Pacific states could gravitate toward one of five alternative order-building scenarios: (i) A Sino-American condominium that defines and accepts each other's geopolitical sphere of influence; (ii) The replacement or substantial revision of the United States’ bilateral alliance system with the expansion of multilateral norms and instrumentalities; (iii) The gradual predominance of an “Asia for Asians” concept led by China but endorsed by a substantial number of Southeast Asian states; (iv) Effective balancing and hedging by smaller states and “middle powers”, leading to eventual great power acceptance of a regional power equilibrium; (v) An intensification of regional “community building” via an amorphous but wide-ranging series of economic, ideological and strategic compromises to make war unthinkable and to strengthen regional interdependence.

  • • However, none of these five scenarios is likely to predominate in a literal sense. Instead, the “realist” explanation for understanding security in the region is the most accurate forecast for understanding an East Asian security environment that is becoming increasingly disorderly.

  • • ASEAN can still play a constructive — if not central — role in shaping East Asia's strategic environment by working with China and the United States to strengthen confidence-building in regional security politics and to encourage their respect for strategic constraint.

The Internal Effects of ASEAN External Relations
  • Ingo Venzke, Li-ann Thio
  • Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 August 2016
  • Starting with a typology of ASEAN external agreements, the authors go on to provide an original reading of plurilateral agreements as 'joint' agreements. The book then offers both a clarification of the effects - direct or indirect - of external agreements within the legal orders of ASEAN Member States, and an explanation of the effects of external agreements within the legal regime of ASEAN. The authors conclude with a discussion of the role of ASEAN centrality and the role of the secretariat in shaping it.

  • The State of Local Politics in Indonesia: Survey Evidence from Three Cities

  • Diego Fossati
  • Book:
    The State of Local Politics in Indonesia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    01 June 2016, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • Decentralization reforms in Indonesia have empowered local government with substantial powers. Local politics therefore constitutes a privileged arena for the study of democratic consolidation in this country.

  • • Research on local Indonesian politics is based almost exclusively on case-study analysis and qualitative work. As a result, while we have accumulated considerable knowledge on political elites, we know little about ordinary voters.

  • • This paper analyses a rich, original dataset with survey data from the cities of Medan in North Sumatra, Samarinda in East Kalimantan, and Surabaya in East Java. These three surveys, fielded shortly after the implementation of local direct elections on 9 December 2015, offer an unprecedented opportunity to learn about how various aspects of local politics are experienced by voters.

  • • After an introduction on local direct elections and the three field sites, I focus on the main themes emerging form survey data, namely evaluation of local government, experience of electoral campaigns, and voting behaviour.

  • • Findings reveal commonalities and differences in local politics across the three cities. Voters in Medan, Samarinda and Surabaya are rather similar in their evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of local government performance, in their experience of electoral campaigns, in how they account for voting choices and evaluate candidates. However, they also differ in their satisfaction with and trust in local institutions, and in their degree of political interest, participation, and knowledge.

  • • The paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of the finding for our understanding of Indonesian politics.

  • Thailand's Hyper-royalism: Its Past Success and Present Predicament

  • Thongchai Winichakul
  • Book:
    Thailand's Hyper-royalism
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    13 March 2019
    Print publication:
    01 June 2016, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • Thailand's political impasse in the past decade is partly attributable to the royalist dominance of the parliamentary system, a dominance developed and strengthened under the cultural condition of hyper-royalism.

  • • Hyper-royalism is the politico-cultural condition in which royalism is intensified and exaggerated in public and everyday life. It is sanctioned by legislation that controls expressions about the monarchy in the public sphere.

  • • Hyper-royalism began in the mid-1970s as a measure to counteract perceived communist threats. Despite the fact that these threats had disappeared by the early 1980s, hyper-royalism persisted and was strengthened to support royalist democracy.

  • • Hyper-royalism generates the concept of the ideology of modern monarchy — a charismatic king who is sacred, righteous and cares for his people, and who is indispensable to Thailand — and the belief that royalist democracy is best for Thailand.

  • • Hyper-royalism also generates the illusion that the monarchy is divine, thanks to visual performances and objects, especially through television and majestic pageantry.

  • • Accordingly, the ideal monarch is found in King Bhumibol. Given the mortality of Bhumibol, however, future prospects of hyper-royalism and royalist-guided democracy are grim. Thailand's political future is highly uncertain.

  • Foreword

  • Diego Fossati
  • Book:
    The State of Local Politics in Indonesia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    01 June 2016, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • Foreword

  • Thongchai Winichakul
  • Book:
    Thailand's Hyper-royalism
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    13 March 2019
    Print publication:
    01 June 2016, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asiaseries acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • Thailand's Hyper-royalism: Its Past Success and Present Predicament

  • Thongchai Winichakul
  • Book:
    Thailand's Hyper-royalism
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    13 March 2019
    Print publication:
    01 June 2016, pp 1-36

  • Summary

    “I shall reign by dharma for the benefit and happiness of all Siamese people”.

    — King Bhumibol's First Pronouncement at his coronation on 5 May 1950

    Thailand's political crisis which began in the mid-2000s has involved every important institution in the country including the monarchy. But it is not simply the crisis of royal succession as some have argued (Marshall 2014). The succession problem itself might not have become an explosive issue had the real stake not involved the entire political establishment.

    Fundamental to the conflict is tension between two structural forces. On the one hand, rural villagers and the urban lower middle class have, as a consequence of rural societal changes and the enhancement of electoral politics since the late 1980s, emerged as a political force favouring electoral democracy. On the other hand, not only has the current political system been unable to accommodate this emerging force, it resisted its demands. The obstinate regime is the “royalist-guided democracy” (or royal democracy for short), an ostensibly democratic polity but one which the electorate and elected authority do not have substantive power since true power remains in the hands of the monarchy. Its formal name, “the Democratic Regime with the Monarchy as the Head of the State”, is a revealing euphemism for a political system in which the formal parliamentary system is subsumed under the unelected and undemocratic power of the monarchy. But since royal democracy relies heavily on the charisma of the monarch, the coming succession is the trigger of the abovementioned fundamental conflict.

    By “monarchy”, I mean a social institution and entity that is active in cultural, social, economic, and political life. Duncan McCargo (2005) shows that the monarchy “institution”, as it is often called, is a network of non-monolithic groups and people whose varying interests rely on, and who derive legitimacy from their association with the king and members of the royal family. It is a “network-monarchy”. The network is not harmonious, as the material and intangible interests of its members, and their ideas and visions for the future of the monarchy may be different. As a matter of fact, factional competition has spilled out into open politics. Yet the groups and people in the network share a common interest in sustaining the royal democracy political system and in the royal hegemony under King Bhumibol. The monarchy, in this sense, is a larger entity than the king.

  • The State of Local Politics in Indonesia: Survey Evidence from Three Cities

  • Diego Fossati
  • Book:
    The State of Local Politics in Indonesia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    01 June 2016, pp 1-45

  • Summary

    Since the implementation of decentralization laws in 2001, local governments have maintained a crucial role in advancing social welfare in Indonesia. Indonesian districts, cities and provinces currently enjoy substantial autonomy in several fields, ranging from development policy to public works, environmental protection, and the provision of social services such as education and healthcare. Understanding how local politics works is therefore of primary importance in appreciating the state of democracy in Indonesia.

    For several years after the breakdown of the New Order regime, a critical view of Indonesian politics prevailed in the literature. From this perspective, democracy in Indonesia is systematically prone to oligarchic domination and elite capture, with meaningful democratic advancement being thwarted by powerful local interests (Hadiz 2010; Hadiz and Robison 2005; Winters 2011). More recently, however, scholars have studied the emergence of new actors in Indonesian politics, showing that democratization has provided unprecedented opportunities for civil society mobilization and political change (Aspinall 2013; Mietzner 2013a ; Rosser 2015; Pepinsky 2013).

    Against this mixed picture of the democratization process, the introduction of local direct elections for district heads and governors in 2005 has received particular attention. While local direct elections, known in Indonesia as pilkada, are overwhelmingly supported by Indonesians (Gabrillin 2014), scholarly work has highlighted their limitations, casting doubts on their ability to enhance accountability (Erb and Sulistiyanto 2009).

    New research has provided valuable insights into pilkada elections, but this is almost exclusively based on case-study analysis and qualitative work, and the findings have not been triangulated with the help of alternative approaches. This bias in the literature has had an important, unfortunate consequence for our understanding of Indonesian local politics: while we know a great deal about political elites, we know very little about voters. We have a fairly clear picture of interactions among key political actors, of the role of political parties, of the importance of political finance, and of how local leaders mobilize ethnic and religious identities to their own advantage. We know little about how common people acquire information on local politics, use this information to orient their voting choices, evaluate candidates, participate in political campaigns, and assess the performance of elected politicians, local government and local institutions.

  • Introduction: overview and research rationale

  • Robert Beckman, National University of Singapore, Leonardo Bernard, National University of Singapore, Hao Duy Phan, National University of Singapore, Tan Hsien-Li, National University of Singapore, Ranyta Yusran, National University of Singapore
  • Book:
    Promoting Compliance
    Published online:
    05 March 2016
    Print publication:
    19 May 2016, pp 1-11

  • Summary

    This is a special year for ASEAN. On August 8, 2007, ASEAN celebrated its 40th anniversary. In November, the ASEAN Summit will be held in Singapore. One of the key deliverables of the Summit is the adoption by the 10 ASEAN Leaders of the ASEAN Charter. It has the potential to transform ASEAN into a stronger, more united and effective organisation … [I]t will grow a culture of taking our obligations seriously. In the past, only about 30 percent of ASEAN's agreements were implemented. We will put in place a system of compliance monitoring and, most importantly, a system of compulsory dispute-settlement for non-compliance that will apply to all ASEAN agreements.

    Tommy Koh, Walter Woon, Andrew Tan and Chan Sze Wei Singapore Team for the drafting of the ASEAN Charter

    The adoption of the ASEAN Charter on 20 November 2007 was a momentous turning point in the 40-year history of the organisation. Through this treaty, ASEAN member states inaugurated the maturation of their grouping into a formal international organisation with legal personality, codified regional norms and set in place a firm legal and institutional framework to bring about the ASEAN Community. Achieving this lofty ambition for the rule of law and institutions to reign meant that regional commitments required better adherence. To that end, the ASEAN Charter stipulated compliance monitoring and dispute settlement mechanisms to enhance implementation levels of ASEAN instruments. These changes, enunciated in the ASEAN Charter, were the culmination of ASEAN's gradual evolution, catalysed into being by the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) tasked with advising on ASEAN's new trajectory and drafted into existence by the High Level Task Force (HLTF). In particular, the EPG pushed for the institutionalisation of ‘effective monitoring, compliance and dispute settlement mechanisms’. It is significant that adherence to the rule of law and institutions is deemed so crucial to ASEAN's transformation that while the HLTF did not incorporate all the EPG recommendations, those pertaining to compliance monitoring and dispute settlement were.

    As the organisation's reputation and achievement of the ASEAN Community hinges on member states’ adherence to commitments, the rationale behind this book is to test whether ASEAN's faith in dispute settlement and monitoring mechanisms as a means to better compliance is justified and the extent to which they can facilitate this process.

  • 3 - Compliance monitoring mechanisms in ASEAN

  • Robert Beckman, National University of Singapore, Leonardo Bernard, National University of Singapore, Hao Duy Phan, National University of Singapore, Tan Hsien-Li, National University of Singapore, Ranyta Yusran, National University of Singapore
  • Book:
    Promoting Compliance
    Published online:
    05 March 2016
    Print publication:
    19 May 2016, pp 101-159

  • Summary

    Unlike the Council of Europe or the EU, where efforts were made very early to develop strong compliance monitoring mechanisms in many respects of their cooperation, ASEAN's efforts to monitor member states’ implementation of regional commitments evolved very slowly, lacking the relative speed and comprehensiveness of ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms. Without a secretariat or other forms of regional institutions in ASEAN's early years, none of the ASEAN instruments adopted between 1967 and 1976 prescribed institutional monitoring of the implementation of and compliance with ASEAN instruments. This task was left rather amorphously to whoever might be concerned or in charge. For instance, in 1972 and 1975 ASEAN adopted two agreements concerning the rescue of survivors of ship and aircraft accidents, but these agreements merely provided that their implementing bodies should be the ‘competent authorities’.

    Fast forward to the post-ASEAN Charter situation today, the Secretary-General has de jure compliance monitoring powers but is, unfortunately, de facto emasculated. As the EPG Report emphasised, the real problem facing ASEAN, legally and institutionally, is compliance with and effective implementation of ASEAN instruments. ASEAN must establish a culture of honouring its promises and carrying them out on time in order to be taken seriously as a credible international actor. Regional compliance monitoring is heavily intertwined with how member states view ASEAN as an organisation and the types of institutional capacity with which it is invested.

    The role of the ASEAN Secretariat in compliance monitoring

    It is remarkable that ASEAN, as a regional organisation, even for the purposes of maintaining peaceful relations among member states existed for a decade without a centralised administrative body. In contrast, the Council of Europe, the Organization of the American States, and the Organization of African Unity – now replaced by the African Union – all have had their secretariats since their establishment in 1948, 1949 and 1963 respectively. In its first decade, ASEAN's administration was served by a standing committee and the national secretariats of the five original members. The lack of a centralised secretariat in the early years of ASEAN may not be unintentional. Pracha Guna-Kassem, a Thai diplomat who was present at the signing of the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, argued that if ASEAN had tried to establish a centralised secretariat in the beginning, it would have destroyed the nascent ASEAN by setting off a competition between its members over the location of the Secretariat.

  • Appendix 1 - CIL’s observation on dispute settlement clauses in selected ASEAN agreements adopted prior to the ASEAN Charter

  • Robert Beckman, National University of Singapore, Leonardo Bernard, National University of Singapore, Hao Duy Phan, National University of Singapore, Tan Hsien-Li, National University of Singapore, Ranyta Yusran, National University of Singapore
  • Book:
    Promoting Compliance
    Published online:
    05 March 2016
    Print publication:
    19 May 2016, pp 195-233

  • Summary

    Introduction

    Between July and August 2012, CIL conducted an observation on seventy-eight agreements concluded between ASEAN member states, focusing on their DSCs. The observation classified the types of DSCs that ASEAN has utilised since it was established in 1967 until the ASEAN Charter entered into force in 2008, and also identified if there is a standard clause applied to each type of DSC. Moreover, the classification of types of ASEAN DSCs also analysed whether ASEAN favoured a particular type of DSC in agreements produced by the ASEAN Economic, Socio-Cultural and Political-Security Communities.

    CIL intentionally limited its observation to agreements (main and stand-alone) adopted prior to the entry into force of the Charter in 2008. The observation did not include protocols or other instruments of amendment, nor did it include implementing protocols or instruments unless those instruments contained DSCs different than those established under the mother agreements or if such protocols or instruments are listed under the Appendices of ASEAN's instruments on economic dispute settlement mechanisms: the 1996 Protocol and the 2004 Protocol.

    CIL identified six types of DSCs. The first type highlights the absence of DSCs in some ASEAN agreements. The second type relates to DSCs that refer disputes to consultation or negotiation (or amicable solution). The third type is DSCs that refer to DSMs outside of the ASEAN Framework. The fourth type applies solely to ASEAN economic agreements, which refer disputes to the 1996 Protocol, or to the 2004 Protocol, which supersedes the 1996 Protocol. The fifth type of DSC relates to clauses that refer disputes between parties to agreement-based DSMs. Finally, the sixth type reflects clauses that utilise layered dispute resolutions.

    List of selected ASEAN agreements

    The observation was conducted on DSCs in seventy-eight ASEAN agreements adopted prior to the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter in 2008. The agreements consist of ten political-security agreements; fifty-nine economic agreements; five socio-cultural agreements; three ASEAN Secretariat-related agreements; and one agreement concluded with an international organisation. Seventeen of these agreements were concluded with parties from outside of ASEAN (external relation agreements), fifteen of which are economic, one political-security and one cooperation in general matters.

  • 2 - Dispute settlement mechanisms in ASEAN

  • Robert Beckman, National University of Singapore, Leonardo Bernard, National University of Singapore, Hao Duy Phan, National University of Singapore, Tan Hsien-Li, National University of Singapore, Ranyta Yusran, National University of Singapore
  • Book:
    Promoting Compliance
    Published online:
    05 March 2016
    Print publication:
    19 May 2016, pp 58-100

  • Summary

    Due to its turbulent beginnings, ASEAN's preoccupation with regional dispute management never truly diminished. Instead, dispute settlement modalities took on increasingly sophisticated roles in response to geopolitical and economic influences. This Chapter examines the evolution of ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms pertaining to hard security issues and economic challenges, as well as the region's focus on reinforcing the rule of law and the strength of its institutions, and the extent to which such mechanisms are effective in fulfilling ASEAN's aspirations.

    Phases in the development of ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms

    The early phase: promotion of regional peace and security

    Generally, in this phase of regional peace maintenance and conflict avoidance, ASEAN lacked a clear and systematic practice on the inclusion of dispute settlement clauses in its instruments. Most ASEAN instruments adopted in the period from 1967 to 1991 did not include such provisions and there are no clear reasons as to why it is so. This was also the case with ASEAN agreements signed with external parties prior to 1992. This could be because state parties deemed these ASEAN agreements to be political confidence-building measures instead of legally binding treaties.

    The TAC, signed in conjunction with the Bali Concord I on 24 February 1976 at the First ASEAN Summit, perfectly encapsulates ASEAN's attitude towards dispute settlement mechanisms in its early years. The TAC is the principal security treaty of the region and by signing it, state parties not only affirmed that the peaceful settlement of disputes was a ‘fundamental principle’, but also had recourse to a mechanism to resolve any situation that could destabilise regional peace and harmony. As non-regional states are permitted to be signatories, the TAC is the only regional mechanism that can be used for disputes arising between an ASEAN state and a non-ASEAN state. Accession to the TAC by non-ASEAN states has become an important indication of their commitment to engage in the region; it is also a requirement for joining the East Asia Summit. To date, many non-ASEAN countries have acceded to the treaty, including Australia, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, the United States of America, South Korea and Timor-Leste.

    The 2001 Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the TAC set out several steps that state parties should follow in the event of a dispute. First, state parties are to resolve their dispute through negotiation.

  • 1 - The normative and theoretical underpinnings of ASEAN compliance behaviour

  • Robert Beckman, National University of Singapore, Leonardo Bernard, National University of Singapore, Hao Duy Phan, National University of Singapore, Tan Hsien-Li, National University of Singapore, Ranyta Yusran, National University of Singapore
  • Book:
    Promoting Compliance
    Published online:
    05 March 2016
    Print publication:
    19 May 2016, pp 12-57

  • Summary

    The rise of norms and substantive dispute settlement and monitoring mechanisms

    The post-Second World War geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia in the 1960s was extremely fractious. Intra-regional tensions ran high over border disputes and proxy support of secession movements, while intra-state power struggles erupted against former colonial powers and between non-communist and communist factions. These manifested in near-conflict and undeclared armed conflict situations, such as Singapore's bitter separation from Malaysia in 1965; the Philippines’ territorial claim over North Borneo in 1963; Indonesia's confrontational foreign policy (Konfrontasi) against Malaysia, and later against Singapore, between 1963 and 1966; and tensions between a purportedly communism-inclined Indonesia and the comparatively more democratic and capitalist-minded countries of Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore throughout the 1960s. Against this background, and with two failed attempts to establish a regional organisation behind them, these five countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – finally signed the ASEAN Declaration, establishing ASEAN, in 1967. Although the express purpose of ASEAN was to promote economic, social and cultural cooperation, managing the tinderbox of regional security exigencies was in fact ASEAN's primary objective. This remained so in ASEAN's first decade. This is indicated, for instance, in the statement of the then Foreign Minister of Thailand, Chatichai Choohavan, in 1973: ‘[t]he immediate task of ASEAN … is to attempt to create a favourable condition in the region whereby political differences and security problems among Southeast Asian Nations can be resolved peacefully’. Prior to the First ASEAN Summit in 1976, member states were not concerned with developing ASEAN's structure as a regional organisation, with proper dispute settlement and compliance monitoring functions. Thus the First ASEAN Summit in 1976 initiated the structural development of ASEAN with the establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN member states concentrated on two practical priorities: (1) eliminating member states’ security concerns, both from within and without Southeast Asia, as well as strengthening intra-regional trust; and (2) forming and consolidating regional principles and rules of conduct to manage intra-regional disputes.

    The establishment of ASEAN was thus a strategy to institutionalise the region's reconciliation process. To that aim, ‘the forging of a structure of a special relationship’ was a practical solution to manage and overcome regional disputes and more deep-seated contentions among member states.

Page 47 of 84