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1714 results in South-East Asian government, politics and policy

Page 32 of 86

  • The ‘Battle Royal’ – The UMNO Elections of 1987 (1988)

  • from MALAYSIA
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 411-430

  • Summary

    UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) has occupied a unique position and has played a crucial role in the growth of the post-war Malaysian social system, particularly in the political sphere. Since its formation in 1946, it has been the single most influential institution to have shaped not only the political contours but also the overall social terrain in Malaysia. Since independence in 1957, it has remained the backbone of the Malaysian Government until today.

    Central to any discussion of UMNO is its leadership. This is unavoidable because whatever happens within the leadership, particularly at the top among its national leaders — whether there is consensus or conflict amongst them — determines to a large extent UMNO's internal stability and hence to a great extent that of the country too. This was amply demonstrated, for example, when a leadership crisis which occurred in UMNO in the mid-1970s led to a series of other crises within the National Front coalition with the political situation in Malaysia becoming very tense during that period. At that time, UMNO was experiencing a “changing of guards” at the top initiated by the late Tun Abdul Razak in the early 1970s after he took over the premiership and the UMNO presidency from Tunku Abdul Rahman. It was under him that the now famous New Economic Policy (NEP), aimed mainly at “eradicating poverty” and “restructuring society” within Malaysia, was introduced. This policy clearly favours the Malays and other indigenous groups collectively known as bumiputera (literally, “son of the soil”), especially in the economic and educational spheres. As Razak saw it then, the successful implementation of this pro-Malay affirmative action strategy could only be carried out by the better-educated and technocratically oriented leaders. Therefore, the 1974 general election witnessed the rise of an élite group of Tun Razak's protégés, mostly hand-picked by him, some of whom became politicians and Cabinet ministers overnight. Amongst them were Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Musa Hitam, both expelled from UMNO by Tunku Abdul Rahman for “insubordination” after the 1969 general election, and Tengku Razaleigh, considered by many then as a “Malay economic genius”.

    This move by Tun Razak was resisted by the pimpinan lama, or “old leadership”, within UMNO and subsequently a crisis erupted within UMNO's national leadership which affected the grass-roots leadership as well.

  • Kampuchea 1979–81: National Rehabilitation in the Eye of an International Storm (1982)

  • from CAMBODIA
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 215-226

  • Summary

    On 25 March 1979, Jean-Pierre Gallois of the Agence France Presse (AFP), the first Western journalist admitted to Kampuchea after the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime, filed this report from Phnom Penh:

    The Cambodia that survived Pol Pot is like a dismembered body that is trying to come back to life. Its economy is shattered, its communications severed. Millions of hectares of rice paddies have been temporarily abandoned. A population of refugees is returning home along pitted roads and highways or assembling in the suburbs of empty and dilapidated cities.

    Phnom Penh, which two non-communist journalists have been allowed to visit for the first time since January 7, is in the image of the rest of the country. There is no drinking water, no telephone, no mail service, no transport, no registry office, no money, no markets, hardly any electricity, hardly any schools, hardly any medical dispensaries. The city is so quiet that bird-song has a sinister ring to it. Its residents survive like nomads by eating roots, wild fruit, leaves and fish, and sometimes rice and flour distributed by the authorities.

    The new government has no effective political control of the country and cannot guarantee the security of its citizens throughout the territory. Phnom Penh unofficially admits that all the southwest of the country lies beyond its administration, and that the situation is only secure in the capital itself and in the provinces east of the Mekong. The region bordering Thailand lies completely outside its control.

    In Phnom Penh itself, there are three Vietnamese advisers for every Cambodian official, ten Vietnamese soldiers for every Cambodian one.

    City dwellers returning home, particularly workers, are still grouped outside the towns waiting… Neither the new Cambodian government nor their Vietnamese allies seem at present willing to give these returning refugees a responsibility in the running of the country's affairs…

    Cambodia cut in two, with a non-existent economy and a phantom government still presents a picture of darkness. Only faith and hope can save the Cambodian people from extinction.

    About one and a half million people, of a population of seven million or more, had perished in the Pol Pot period from 1975 to early 1979, including up to 500,000 deaths by execution and the rest from starvation, disease, and overwork.

  • The Revolutionary Situation in Thailand (1975)

  • from THAILAND
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 637-643

  • Summary

    Downfall of the Military Régime

    In September 1973 one hundred Thai people from many walks of life — university students, farmers, labourers, ex-members of the dissolved elected Parliament, artists, writers, government officials, medical doctors, and professors — signed their names to endorse a statement petitioning the military government for a democratic constitution. On 6 October, some members of this group went about distributing leaflets and copies of their demand for a democratic constitution at a few public spots. Thirteen of them were immediately arrested and charged with illegally holding a political assembly of more than five persons, committing communist acts, and insurrection. On Tuesday 9 October, the second day of the final examinations at Thammasat University, thousands of Thammasat University students walked out of their examinations and forced the university to be closed. They began a vigorous campaign against the military régime and demanded an immediate and unconditional release of all the arrested members of the constitutionalist group, which included students and one professor from Thammasat University. They staged a sit-in on the Thammasat University campus for five consecutive days and nights, taking turns to make continuous anti-government speeches. During the rally, they were joined by nearly 100,000 high school, vocational school, and university students from Bangkok and many provinces. Arriving by bus or on foot, they came equipped with national flags, loudspeakers, placards, and leaflets, some of which they had distributed along the way.

    At Thammasat, students were organized into teams of tactical planners, donation collectors, food distributors, speech makers, negotiators, militiamen, as well as bottlebomb makers. At noon on the fourth day of the rally, the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), acting on behalf of all students, served an ultimatum to the military government to release the prisoners unconditionally and proclaim a democratic constitution within six months. The ultimatum required that the military government act within twenty-four hours; otherwise, the students would take ultimate action. At 7.00 p.m. the same evening, the government announced that it would release the prisoners on bail and agreed to have a new constitution ready within one year, but the students refused to accept the government's move and continued demonstrating at Thammasat University through the fourth night.

  • Burma in 1988: Perestroika with a Military Face (1989)

  • from MYANMAR
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 477-493

  • Summary

    CONTEXTS FOR CHANGE

    Nineteen eighty-eight marks a system break in Burma's modern history. To understand the significance of the events of the year we should set them in two different contexts. One is the context of states with command economies and Leninist parties which have undertaken perestroika with or without glasnost. The polar reform cases include the Chinese model, with economic liberalization starting in agriculture and politics being restrained after an initial opening, and the Soviet model, with economic liberalization attempted across the board and political openness encouraged as a spur to the perestroika process. These models offer only a partial context for our understanding of Burma since in both instances the movement can be characterized as reform rather than revolution: while there are significant redistributions of power and authority among state institutions and between state and society, and there are changes in external relations as well, still the basic legitimacy of the system remains in place, élite replacement is moderate, and the level of violence and coercion is low.

    The other context is Burma's own cycles of reform and revolution during the last half century as shown below. (The numerologically inclined will note a periodicity of about a dozen years — actually 13.67 plus or minus 0.83 years.)

    THE POLITY IN 1988

    While the operative effects of any changes in direction for the economy during 1988 were obscure, political changes verged on revolution. The level of violence was high, the legitimacy of the regime collapsed, and the ruling élite, while maintaining its core institution, the army, went through a complete change of personnel at the top. Before analysing these fundamental changes, the chronological line of action will first be set out.

    Chronology of the Crisis

    The system break of 1988 began in March with a tempest in a teashop which grew into a full-scale student riot and brought on full-scale police repression. In contrast to the previous fall's student protests over demonetization, this series of riots spread to downtown Rangoon. The stage for public protest had been set by spiralling inflation and a shortage of fuel for transport, which left some areas of the country, and particularly the cities, short of rice.

  • Indonesia's Armed Forces: Rejuvenation and Regeneration (1982)

  • from INDONESIA
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 275-282

  • Summary

    On 5 October 1981, Indonesia's Armed Forces, ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia), celebrated its thirtysixth anniversary with a massive display of military pomp and muscle. At the Cilegon naval centre, on the shores of West Java, in front of an audience of thousands, 20,000 members of ABRI took part in a war-like exercise that featured a fly-past of fifty planes including American built F-5E “Tigers”, A-4 “Skyhawks”, and OV-10 “Broncoes”, and a naval parade of thirtyseven vessels showcasing Indonesia's two NATO class submarines and the French Exocet surface-to-surface missile systems of the Navy's new corvettes and fast-attack craft. Combat troops stormed ashore in a mock amphibious landing, putting their newly acquired Western-made armour on the beach. Similar, albeit more modest, demonstrations of Indonesia's military hardware took place at Medan, North Sumatra, and Ujung Pandang in South Sulawesi.

    Although at one level of analysis obviously a show of force in a troubled regional international environment, this year's ABRI display again illuminates the central position that the Armed Forces occupy in Indonesia's national life. In the words of Defence Minister and ABRI's Commander, General Mohammad Jusuf, Armed Forces Day was meant to underline ABRI's role in “strengthening national resilience and enhancing the unity of the country and people” (Straits Times, 5 October 1981). From the point of view of ABRI's leadership, this is a critical task in an atmosphere in which the traditional cleavages of race, ethnicity, and religion are exacerbated by the social and political antagonisms engendered by uneven patterns of economic change, perceived inequalities in income distribution, and corruption — in 1981 heated up by the run-up to the 1982 general elections to be followed by the presidential selection process in 1983.

    The military portion of “national resilience” is conceptualized in the formulations of the People's Defence System, HANKAMRATA (Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta), which seeks to unite functionally the wider society with the Armed Forces in the territorial defence of the wawasan nusantara — the indivisible unity of the land and sea elements of the archipelago. The doctrine explicitly relates the economic, political, social, and psychological factors of national development to the tasks of defence.

  • Myanmar: No Turning Back (2012)

  • from MYANMAR
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 507-519

  • Summary

    The year 2011 was one of change for Myanmar. It was the year of the country's administration becoming “civil” in the eyes of many in the country and the world at large. A civilian government, albeit with a military past, was sworn in on 30 March 2011. President Thein Sein's inaugural speech to the parliament, outlining priorities for economic renewal, sustainable development, poverty alleviation, human rights and good governance, and recognizing the plight of ethnic minorities involved in armed conflict, was initially dismissed by many as “just words”.

    Six months later, however, observers within and outside the country were recognizing the steps outlined in this inaugural speech when changes started showing in Myanmar's political and economic scene. These changes include the freedom of movement (and speech) of Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, the loosened restrictions on the media, a law allowing workers the right to strike, amnesties for prisoners (including political prisoners), and steps taken towards economic reform. The pace set by the government on this road to reform seemed almost exhilarating to citizens and observers used to setbacks and stonewalling from the authorities in the past. The pace continued to surprise as 2011 progressed, peaking with the National League for Democracy (NLD) rejoining the political process, the agreement by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to Myanmar's bid to be the ASEAN Chair in 2014, and the landmark visit of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to the country.

    Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has described the reform process in Myanmar as irreversible. Optimists and critics share concerns on whether the “flickers of progress” described by U.S. President Obama will develop into a steady flame. Having cited the reforms as a key reason for its decision to give Myanmar the ASEAN chair for 2014, ASEAN, too, has much at stake.

    Reviewing developments in Myanmar in 2011, the picture that emerges shows the beginning of a convergence of interests, the first in decades, between the militarybacked government, the polity in Myanmar, the forces for democracy symbolized by Aung San Suu Kyi, and the international community.

    The Year in Review

    The year 2011 saw a newly elected “civilianized” government in Myanmar. It had come to power in what many around the world had largely decried as sham elections in November 2010.

  • The Downturn in the Singapore Economy: Problems, Prospects and Possibilities for Recovery (1986)

  • from SINGAPORE
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 601-621

  • Summary

    Our economy is in the process of transforming itself from a low-wage, low productivity regime to a high-wage, highproductivity regime. The process is well under way.…

    We are like a man on a flying trapeze, who has let go of one swing and is now sailing through mid-air. He cannot stop now. He must make it to the next swing if he is to recover safely. In the same way, we too have no choice but to press on with our economic restructuring (Straits Times, 27 July 1985, p. l).

    The above remarks were made by the then Minister of State for Trade and Industry, and head of the government-appointed Economic Committee, in connection with a sharp downturn in the Singapore economy. They reflected the government's perception of the acute precariousness of the city-state's economic position. The rate of economic growth declined from 8.2 per cent in 1984 to −1.7 per cent in 1985. Domestic demand declined by 3 per cent and trade also contracted by 4 per cent during the year. A total of 90,000 jobs were lost and the unemployment rate had risen to 6 per cent at the end of the year. Observers also expect that the depressed economic conditions would continue over the next two to three years.

    In the course of 1985, the government introduced several measures in an attempt to steer the economy back on to its original course. That course had been set earlier when the government announced its strategy for economic re-structuring in 1979. That strategy was intended to promote a general upgrading of the economy, so as to move out of low-wage, labour-intensive activities and into skill- and higher technologyintensive activities in manufacturing and services. It was believed that the latter activities would be capable of sustaining higher wages for the work-force, and would also be less vulnerable to trade competition and protectionist restrictions. Consequently, it was believed that Singapore would be less likely to encounter economic difficulties.

    Why then did the strategy “fail” to avoid the present economic difficulties? Was it due to some unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances, or could the cause be attributed to some inherent aspects of the strategy itself? What are the prospects for a viable and sustained economic recovery?

  • The Diplomatic Emergence of China and Its Implications for Southeast Asia (1975*)

  • from THE REGION
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 3-8

  • Summary

    China's startling and still recent emergence from isolation into world diplomacy has left other countries rather breathless. There seems to be a high degree of coincidence between several developments that have contributed to this unexpected change in policy. Firstly, there was the ending of the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution in China itself, and a return to greater normality in internal and external policies. Secondly, there was the strenuous attempt of the Nixon Administration to end American involvement in Vietnam and place U.S. policy in Asia, including China, on a new footing. Thirdly, there was the inevitable but much delayed admission of China to the United Nations in September 1971, where she took her place as a permanent member of the Security Council. These three developments, occurring in rapid succession, undoubtedly heightened the impact of the arrival of China on the world stage. In the subsequent period, other countries have been engaged in readjusting, in their several ways, to the new circumstances.

    By far the most important of these developments, in terms of its implications for the future shape of international relations and the strategic balance in Southeast Asia, has been the rapprochement between Peking and Washington. This factor alone has contributed immensely to the new and alarming (or exciting, depending on the point of view) fluidity in Southeast Asian affairs today. The old guidelines and the old alliances are rapidly being replaced by as yet largely untried experiments in regional diplomacy. New assessments are still being made of what really constitutes the national interest, based on new analyses of Chinese and American intentions in the area. China's role in the United Nations and her own internal stability are still relevant factors to be taken into consideration, but when it comes to a realistic political appraisal, these things pale beside the American withdrawal from the Asian mainland and the consequent looming of China's economic and military potential. No longer is the dividing line simply between two opponents, communist and non-communist. There is the now familiar element of Sino-Soviet rivalry, and the chrysalis of Japanese power, to be used in a way that may not continue to be confined simply to the economic sphere.

  • Southeast Asia in 2002: From Bali to Iraq — Co-operating for Security (2003)

  • from THE REGION
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 112-125

  • Summary

    Introduction

    The region's recovery from the destabilizing effects of the 1997/98 Asian economic/ financial crisis had been patchy, and although by 2002 most gross domestic product (GDP) levels had edged back to pre-crisis levels, per capita incomes had not and unemployment was on the rise. The 3.5 per cent growth in Indonesia was achieved over a low baseline. Its path towards economic restructuring, sustained economic recovery, and political stability remained tortuous.

    On the road to economic recovery two developments set back confidence and fuelled uncertainties. The Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (commonly referred to as “9/11”) opened a new phase of international insecurity. How the United States would pursue the war against global terrorism and with what impacts on the Muslim world fuelled uncertainty. The more open regional economies focussed on the consequences for global travel, business confidence, and the international economy. In retrospect neither the United States nor the most open regional economy, Singapore, was too seriously affected. Within a year both economies had rebounded with Singapore in the third quarter of 2002 seemingly headed for a 4 per cent growth. In 2002 the Malaysian economy grew by 4.2 per cent while the fastest regional growth rate of 7 per cent was recorded by Vietnam. However, the terrorist bombings in Bali on 12 October 2002, which killed 202 people, many of them foreign tourists including 88 Australians, dampened expectations of a rebound as Southeast Asia initially acquired an undifferentiated image in the minds of foreign investors and in travel advisories as an insecure region.

    American concerns that parts of maritime Southeast Asia with their local history of Muslim militancy and rebellion against central authority were vulnerable to penetration by the Al-Qaeda network in search of a “second front” resurfaced following the Afghanistan campaign which commenced in October 2001 and resulted subsequently in the destruction of the Taliban regime and disruption of the Al- Qaeda network. The year 2002 began with regional anticipation of the political fallout of the war against international terrorism and ended with nervous tension over the imminence of war in Iraq.

  • Malaysia: Political Transformation and Intrigue in an Election Year (2009)

  • from MALAYSIA
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 460-474

  • Summary

    The year 2008 will be remembered as a watershed for the Malaysian political system and for the forward trajectory of Malaysian democracy. This election year saw a refurbished coalition of oppositional political forces, the People's Pact (Pakatan Rakyat), deprive the ruling National Front (Barisan Nasional) coalition of its twothirds majority of seats in Parliament. Even more significantly, four state governments fell, making it a total of five governments in Opposition hands. I suggest here that this development has created a de facto two-party system for a maturing Malaysian democracy. Economically, Malaysians will be facing a severe downturn though not a technical recession. The year also saw the denouement of a leadership crisis within the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) leading ultimately to the anticipated departure from the political stage in March 2009 of the fifth Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The political terrain remains fraught with pitfalls for premier-in-waiting Najib Abdul Razak and for Opposition Leader, Anwar Ibrahim, who awaits his sodomy trial.

    The Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi already had more than his fair share of a baggage of problems to deal with even before his tenure headed into 2008. Let me briefly recollect. After 25 November 2007, five HINDRAF lawyers remained in detention under the draconian ISA, while one was at large. The V.K. Lingam video exposé in September 2007 and the Royal Commission inquiry into it in January 2008 remained much in the public consciousness, so too the Altantuya murder trial which had dragged on from 2007. Inter-faith fractures which had surfaced since 2005 remained largely unresolved and so too internal squabbles within the ruling coalition parties. Most sensationally, the MCA Minister for Health had to resign because of the circulation of a sex video by his detractors. Finally, the economy was not in great shape with petrol prices and inflation spiking and Mahathir still sniping from the sidelines. Yet speculation was rife by early 2008 that an early election would be called presumably to salvage the premier's beleaguered situation, more than one year in advance of the mandatory five years. In a CNN interview Abdullah did admit that a fresh mandate was necessary for him to address a host of new issues and to make good his unfulfilled anti-corruption agenda.

  • The Question of the “Overseas Chinese” (1976)

  • from THE REGION
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 20-31

  • Summary

    During the years which saw maximum Chinese withdrawal from international affairs together with maximum United States military commitment to Southeast Asia, the years 1965–71, there was very little journalistic or scholarly interest in the Chinese communities living in Southeast Asia. It was not until after June 1971, when President Nixon announced that he was going to visit Peking, that anxious questions once more began to be regularly asked about the future role of the “Overseas Chinese”. All the fears of the 1950s concerning these Chinese were quickly revived and a large variety of questions were asked. Most of them centred on two related problems with wide ramifications. Firstly, will the Chinese in Southeast Asia be the targets of subversion? Secondly, will they be encouraged to resist assimilation and reassert their Chineseness?

    On both these, opinions were divided. There were many who felt strongly that the diplomatic reemergence of China necessarily meant trouble for Southeast Asian countries with Chinese minorities, although some concentrated more on the consequences of American military withdrawal than on what the Chinese planned to do. Others were confident that the time for such fears was over. Most of the Chinese had settled down and made their peace with the new nationalist governments that had emerged since 1945. Most of them were economically well-off and too committed to the more or less laissez faire economics of the region to want to destroy them. Where there was danger, it would come from the growing discontent among the indigenous poor and the political awakening of the indigenous young. Thus one view concentrates on the intentions of China and the other on the effectiveness of Southeast Asian governments. There should also be a third which looks more closely at the reactions of the local Chinese. Although no great threat need be expected from them, there will be changes among them in some specific ways, for example, regarding citizenship among those who have been nationals of the Republic of China in Taiwan and regarding the new perspectives on issues of loyalty and assimilation. These changes will depend on the current policies of Southeast Asian governments, the numbers of Chinese and the degree of assimilation already achieved in each country, and not least on the attitudes of individual Chinese about their countries of adoption.

  • The ASEAN Economic Miracle Unravels (1999)

  • from THE REGION
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 79-90

  • Summary

    In 1998, the Asian economic miracle seemed like a distant dream for the economies of Southeast Asia, with the string of bad news being blamed on excesses committed during the years of strong growth. The countries reeled from the continued withdrawal of capital from the region, the disintegration and collapse of confidence in domestic financial sectors, policy- and psychology-induced demand contractions, the interdependent weaknesses in the international value of their currencies, and political conflict and a significant erosion of the social consensus over economic policy.

    The Southeast Asian economies faced these problems in common, but the impact varied according to the level of development, specific features in their financial systems, the nature of the governments’ responses to the crisis, and the impact of the crisis on political stability.

    The withdrawal of capital from the region in 1998 constituted the biggest shared factor among the Southeast Asian economies. The level of capital outflow, initiated by the Thai economic crisis of July 1997, increased in 1998 for the four most severely affected ASEAN economies — Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand — plus South Korea, with net capital outflows accelerating from US$1 billion in 1997 to $28 billion in 1998. In 1996, there had actually been net inflows of $103 billion.

    The fickle nature of short-term portfolio investments was much in evidence during 1998. There was a brief slowdown of capital outflow from the region in the first quarter of 1998, but the levels accelerated as evidence of a deep recession in Japan became inescapable and the yen weakened, Russia's teetering economy saw the offering of interest rates on short-term Russian bonds reach 80 to 100 per cent, and Indonesia's thirty-year political arrangements disintegrated with President Soeharto's resignation in May.

    In August, the Russian economic programme collapsed and a general retreat from portfolio investments in all emerging markets ensued. The premium on developing country debt shot up to unprecedented levels of 10 to 15 percentage points by October 1998. Brazil lost at least US$20 billion dollars in international reserves between the Russian collapse and the start of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic rescue package in November 1998; this package collapsed in mid-January 1999. Between 1997 and 1998, private capital flows to the emerging economies fell from US$260 billion to US$152 billion in favour of industrial country equity markets.

  • American Military Withdrawal from Thailand (1976)

  • from THAILAND
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 644-648

  • Summary

    American troops came into Thailand twice, in 1961 and 1963. They were contingents of Marines sent to this country when communist Pathet Lao forces advanced towards the Mekong River which serves as a border between Thailand and Laos. The objective was to deter the aggressive communist side from seeking excessive military and political gains in Laos. When the communist forces retreated, the Marines as well as other SEATO forces from the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand which joined the U.S. troops in 1963 were repatriated. The U.S. left only a contingent of Army Engineers to help build the strategic road from the naval base of Sattahip to Northeast Thailand.

    Why did the U.S. want to send its armed forces into Thailand?

    Since I am not an American and privy to the deliberations which led to such a decision, I can only guess at the reasons which a foreigner like myself can detect. As I see it, the reason is not of a selfish nature. The U.S. did not hope to derive any particular benefit from such a move. To my mind, the U.S., in those days, must have felt a sense of mission, a certain responsibility for safeguarding peace and preventing war, particularly aggressive wars. In other words, the U.S. was conscious of its role as “world policeman”, since it has been blamed for allowing wars to break out because it failed to take the necessary actions or to take part in the activities of international organizations like the League of Nations. As a result of those accusations, some of them unfounded, the U.S., since World War II, took it upon itself to bar the road to aggressors and to extinguish the flames of international conflicts. The despatch of U.S. Marines came within the purview of that mission.

    Later on, perhaps around 1965 (the exact date is unknown to me as the talks or negotiations were conducted in secret between the then Prime Minister, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, and the American authorities), the U.S. sent its military personnel, drawn mostly from the Air Force, and war equipment into Thailand. As it was learnt later, this action was necessary because of greater U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The military aircraft and the use of air-bases in this country were needed to support U.S. operations in Vietnam.

  • An Overview of the Philippines (1974)

  • from THE PHILIPPINES
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 543-547

  • Summary

    On 23 September 1972 President Marcos invoked martial law under the country's Constitution to meet what he termed “the threat of a violent overthrow of our Republic” and “to reform the social, economic and political institutions in our country.” Simultaneously there was an almost total clampdown on the press, television and radio stations, and the mass arrest of prominent citizens, among them opposition politicians and publishers. The declaration of martial law was quickly followed by a number of vigorous measures aimed at controlling the possession of weapons and weeding out the corrupt and incompetent within the government service, and bringing certain basic industries and communications under state control. It is noteworthy that although the communist threat was the justification for martial law the initial measures of martial law rule could also be seen as having been aimed at breaking the power of the oligarchy such as the arms’ ban, detention of political opponents, appropriation of private property, seizure of newspapers and the initial ban on foreign travel.

    The immediate reaction of political observers to the imposition of martial law was that it was a move on the part of President Marcos to perpetuate his power indefinitely and suppress all criticisms against his rule which had been mounting since his re-election in 1969. The ordinary Filipino however, tired of the increasing violence and anarchy in Manila during the months preceding September, and burdened by serious food shortages and spiralling prices following devastating floods in June 1972 was more anxious to see the implementation of much needed reforms in the country and the reconstruction of what President Marcos has proudly proclaimed as the New Society.

    One of the first to benefit from martial law was the armed forces. On 30 September 1972 President Marcos announced increased rates of monthly pay for the enlisted personnel of the Philippine Armed Forces, increased monthly pay for commissioned officers and promotions for a number of officers. While reforms and improvements in the armed forces had for long been recommended, the Presidential Order coming almost immediately after martial law had the appearance that it was made with the aim of ensuring military backing for the President. Since the imposition of martial law the armed forces have been brought increasingly to the fore with increased political and administrative responsibilities.

  • ISIS in Indonesia (2015)

  • from INDONESIA
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 353-360

  • Summary

    A steep decline in terrorist acts in Indonesia in 2014 should have been good news, especially because it underscored that police vigilance was high and extremist capacity was weak. But a third factor was also involved that was not such good news: more extremists were focused on getting to Syria and joining what they believed was a more important jihad than any they could wage at home. By late 2014, about 100 Indonesians, possibly more, were believed to have left to fight in Syria, some with their wives and children, and most to join the Islamic State.

    Violent Extremists in Indonesia in 2014

    By early 2014, Indonesia's jihadist community was divided between those who supported violence inside Indonesia, with the police as the primary target, and those who believed that at least for the moment, violence at home was counter-productive. The former generally supported the Islamic State and its predecessor, the Islamic State in Greater Syria and Iraq (ISIS). The latter were more likely to support IS's main rival in Syria, the al-Nusra Front, and its allies.

    Prominent in the first group was Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), a group of some thirty armed men led by Santoso alias Abu Wardah in the hills outside Poso, Central Sulawesi. Santoso had run a series of military-style training camps in Poso beginning in 2011, and graduates and supporters are now scattered across Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB). Despite being effectively under police siege during the year in his jungle camp, Santoso managed to smuggle out videos periodically to YouTube and radical websites. While neither he nor any other group managed any bombings in 2014, the few attacks on police during the year were all linked to MIT. Santoso was the first Indonesian to publicly pledge loyalty to the Islamic State after its leader, Abubakar al-Baghdadi, announced the establishment of the new caliphate on 29 June 2014 (1 Ramadan).

    The pro-violence group also included remnants of Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB), many members of which had previous ties to an old Darul Islam network led by the now-imprisoned Abdullah Umar. It included some but not all members of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's organization, Jamaah Anshorul Tauhid (JAT), and many followers of the imprisoned cleric Aman Abdurrahman who had no specific organizational affiliation.

  • Myanmar 1990: New Era or Old (1991)

  • from MYANMAR
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 494-506

  • Summary

    The political impasse between an entrenched military regime and a restive civilian opposition that followed the massive demonstrations and protests throughout Myanmar in 1988 remained unresolved at the end of 1990. Despite the holding in May of the first multi-party general election for thirty years, with victory by its most outspoken critics, the National League for Democracy (NLD), the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) government remained in an apparently unassailable position. But faced with sporadic protests and other expressions of discontent and alienation, the military's ability to develop a new and publicly acceptable political order appeared uncertain. In the meantime, however, the economic reforms begun in 1988 continued to gather pace, though without the clear policy guidelines which might have restored confidence more rapidly. In the midst of this domestic political and economic uncertainty, foreign economic and political pressures on the government were unrelenting from major Western governments including Japan, the United States, and the countries of the European Community, though relations with most neighbouring countries continued to be strengthened. The events of the year which have led to such a mixed and contradictory summary of the condition of Myanmar are easier to identify than the causes, which remain a subject of passionate disputation.

    Domestic Politics and the Election

    That the election would be the central political event of the year, holding the promise of the amelioration of the nation's major political problems, was the expectation of all. As the head of the government, General Saw Maung, said in a speech to an SLORC co-ordinating meeting on 10 January,

    The reason why the rule of law and order and the prevalence of peace and tranquillity is being given so much emphasis is because the Pyithu Hluttaw [People's Assembly] election to be held this year is not an ordinary one. It is an election of historic significance, a veritable milestone in the annals of history marking the change from one era to another, from one system to another and a turning point in our history itself.

    Despite widespread scepticism expressed inside and outside the country that elections held by the military could be “free and fair”, and that only an interim civilian government, as demanded in 1988, could be entrusted with election management, there was general agreement that the elections themselves were conducted honestly.

  • Vietnam, ASEAN and the Indochina Refugee Crisis (1980)

  • from VIETNAM
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 738-761

  • Summary

    The problems posed by the exodus of people from Indochina were of critical concern to all the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members in 1979. Thailand, the first ASEAN state to be seriously affected by the post-1975 outflow, had had to receive tens of thousands of overland refugees, primarily from Laos. By comparison with the influx from Laos into Thailand, the scale of the outflow from Vietnam in the first three years after 1975 was relatively small; about 35,000 “boat people” had arrived in ASEAN states by mid-1978. After mid-1978, however, the serious refugee situation in Southeast Asia was aggravated further by a mass departure of people from Vietnam, in a process that became the focus of worldwide attention and concern.

    The exodus of Indochinese refugees after 1975 was, of course, only one instance of a series of movements of people in Southeast Asia in recent decades. Since World War II, there have been many such mass movements of people in the wake of political change and internal conflicts — movements which have occurred both within countries (most notably, the mass creation of refugees inside the Indochina states during the Second Indochina War), and between different states (the exodus of people, predominantly Catholics, from the northern to the southern zone in Vietnam in 1954, and the movement of Muslims from Southern Philippines to Sabah from the late 1960s and from Burma to Bangladesh in the late 1970s). All these population movements involved extensive social and economic disruption and human suffering. The Indochina refugee movements after 1975, however, became the focus of regional concern, and international attention and diplomatic activity of a kind not directed towards other refugee situations in Southeast Asia in recent years.

    Partly a result of the legacy of thirty years of conflict and partly stemming from internal policies pursued by the Indochina states and from the tensions generated by the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, the Indochina refugee exodus has been a source of enormous human and political problems. For the refugees themselves, it has involved intense suffering and often death, particularly during the voyages in overcrowded boats across the often dangerous waters of the South China Sea.

  • Thailand: A Reckoning with History Begins (2007)

  • from THAILAND
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 678-701

  • Summary

    Introduction: Wat Thepsirin, 12 November 2006

    On the clear, sunny afternoon of 12 November 2006, a sliver of Bangkok's great, good, and merely loyal gathered at Wat Thepsirintharawat Ratchaworawihan to participate in the royally sponsored cremation rites for General Kriangsak Chomanan. Thailand's prime minister during 1977–80, Kriangsak had passed away in late 2003. Three years on, his cremation offered a rare, even reassuring moment of calm and order during a year of disorientating and discouraging developments for Thailand.

    Thais present at Wat Thepsirin included a number of those who had shaped recent history. Former Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal (Retired) Siddhi Savetsila attended the cremation. So did former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai and several of the leading technocrats of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Dhanin Chearavanont of the Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group was also present — perhaps in recognition of Kriangsak's engagement with the People's Republic of China, where CP was an important early foreign investor, during his tenure as premier.

    For all their reminders of yesteryear, the rites had a particularly timely aspect, too. Not least, they came less than two months after a military coup in Bangkok, executed on 19 September 2006. In his time, Kriangsak had been no stranger to coups. He was a leading participant in the October 1976 coup that ended Thailand's three-year experiment with open democratic politics. A year later, the extreme rightist orientation of judge Thanin Kraivixien's government led Kriangsak to lead a further coup, this time without prior royal approval, and to assume the premiership himself. During his years in office, Kriangsak moved to limit the political influence of the rightwing, pro-monarchist mass movement, the Village Scouts. Determined to place the Thai monarchy truly above politics and convinced of the need for a systematic approach to the challenges facing the country, he consulted with the King only minimally. This determination is said to have earned him the lasting dislike of the palace.

    With no member of the royal family present, and in the King's stead, Privy Council president General (Retired) Prem Tinsulanonda presided over the 12 November cremation rites. His role was not without irony.

  • Cambodia and Regional Diplomacy (1982)

  • from CAMBODIA
  • Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
  • Book:
    Turning Points and Transitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 May 2019
    Print publication:
    21 November 2018, pp 201-214

  • Summary

    At bottom, resolution of the seemingly intractable Cambodian conflict depends on responses to a series of difficult politicomilitary questions:

  • (1) Is Vietnam's military control of Cambodia a harbinger of additional aggressive intent against Thailand, including possible annexation of the latter's sixteen northeastern provinces heavily populated by ethnic Lao? Worrisome is the fact that Hanoi's most stunning political successes since 1954 have been achieved through military victories, namely, the First and Second Indochina Wars and the more recent invasion of Cambodia and successful defence against China's 1979 border assault.

  • (2) Has the Soviet relationship to Vietnam embodied in the 1978 Friendship Treaty and actualized through Moscow's subsidation of both the Socialist Republic of Vietnam's (SRV) economy and occupation of Cambodia (and Laos) led to Hanoi's political subordination? Noteworthy in this regard is the regular use of Vietnamese air and naval bases by Soviet Pacific Fleet components as they steam from the Sea of Okhotsk through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. While Vietnamese spokesmen insisted through 1979 that the Soviets had not received base rights, Hanoi has had virtually nothing to say on this subject for over a year.

  • (3) Is China's continued military aid to the Khmer Rouge (through Thailand) part of a policy to re-establish a Cambodian client state presumably after the Vietnamese are forced out? The maintenance of PRC military pressure on Vietnam's northern border combined with a growing Khmer Rouge guerrilla force of about 35,000 in western Cambodia appears calculated to “bleed” Vietnam and sap its ability to counter China's dominant position on the Asian mainland. On the other hand, Beijing's policy also serves to drive Hanoi into even closer security arrangements with the Soviet Union.

  • (4) How does the Sino-Soviet/Vietnam confrontation over Cambodia's future affect ASEAN's long-term hopes for a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia? Does China's de facto deterrent threat on Thailand's behalf threaten to split ASEAN's diplomatic unity over the region's preferred future, pitting those states which perceive Beijing to be the major long-term threat to stability (Malaysia and Indonesia) against those who fear a Soviet-Vietnamese entente (Singapore and Thailand)?

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