INTRODUCTION

Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam’s national liberation hero, once said, “Land is the house, sea is the door. How can we protect the house without guarding the door?”. Throughout history, foreign powers cracked open “the door” to Vietnam through sea-borne attacks multiple times. As such, defending Vietnam’s maritime space is of utmost importance, especially since Vietnam’s land borders have been secured through the conclusion of border treaties with Laos (1977), Cambodia (1985) and China (1999).

Vietnam prioritizes the maritime frontier also for reasons beyond historical experience. It is a maritime nation with a coastline of 3,260 km and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of more than 1 million km²—three times the size of its land area. Many of Vietnam’s 3,000 islands and archipelagos are of economic, security and strategic significance. Half of the Vietnamese population resides in 28 coastal provinces, and 80 per cent live within 160 km of the coastline. Economically, Vietnam relies on the South China Sea, which encompasses vital arteries of international commerce through which an estimated one-third of global shipping passes. The South China Sea’s abundant marine resources, including oil reserves, gas, minerals, fisheries, and renewable energy, sustain Vietnam’s galloping economy. The marine economy and coastal cities account for nearly half of the country’s GDP.

Vietnam is a South China Sea disputant and claims sovereignty over the entirety of the Paracel Islands (Hoang Sa) and the Spratly Islands (Truong Sa). There have been voluminous studies done on Vietnam’s perspective on this topic for two main reasons. First, Vietnamese strategists and leaders consider the South China Sea dispute their country’s most pressing national security threat, not least because of China’s recent militarization of disputed features and maritime coercion. Given Vietnam’s power asymmetry, geographical proximity, and troubled history vis-à-vis China, leaders in Hanoi are wary of Beijing’s intentions. Second, scholars and policymakers alike are interested in how small and medium-sized states like Vietnam cope with the intensifying great power competition in the Indo-Pacific, which manifests prominently in the highly contested South China Sea.

However, non-traditional security concerns have also been high on the Vietnamese leadership’s agenda.

• • While the South China Sea dispute remains Vietnam’s top security concern, the country also confronts a variety of growing non-traditional threats, such as illegal fishing, maritime violence, smuggling, ecological degradation and climate change.

• • These issues adversely affect Vietnam’s external relations, socio-economic development, marine ecosystems and political stability, while engendering and exacerbating regional tensions.

• • In response, at the national level, Vietnam has focused on building a blue economy and strengthening its law enforcement capacity.

• • At the international level, Vietnam has participated in a variety of bilateral and multilateral cooperative mechanisms. However, these efforts have been impeded by internal and external factors, such as corruption, inadequate capacity and lack of budget, as well as ASEAN’s institutional limitations and sovereignty sensitivities.

• • To better confront these multifaceted maritime issues, Vietnam will need to (1) formulate a comprehensive national strategy for maritime security; (2) streamline the overlapping responsibilities of maritime security agencies; (3) enhance its maritime domain awareness; (4) ensure proper policy and investment to improve climate resilience and coastal development; and (5) optimize its approach to multilateralism.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

Islamic Religious Practices

This subsection looks into the influence of Islam on society, especially in the context of Indonesia being a Muslim-majority country. Muslims constitute 91.1 per cent of the sample, and their responses are what we examine here.

The majority of Muslim respondents “often” or “always” carry out their obligatory acts of worship, such as fasting during the month of Ramadan (93 per cent), performing the obligatory daily prayers (80.2 per cent), and observing Friday prayers (47 per cent, but if we only consider men, the figure rises to 83.7 per cent). Meanwhile, in terms of paying tithe (zakat mal) and giving alms, 53.8 per cent and 70.9 per cent “often” or “always” observe these practices respectively. In contrast, due to the high cost of performing the haj and umrah, more than 90 per cent of Muslim respondents have never performed these pilgrimages.

The majority of Muslim respondents (69.8 per cent) are of the opinion that all Muslim women should wear the Islamic headscarf or hijab, while 22.3 per cent leave the decision to the individuals, and 8 per cent feel that Muslim women do not have to wear the hijab. Interestingly, the view that Muslim women must wear the hijab is slightly more likely to be held by female than male respondents, and by rural respondents and respondents of low and medium income (Figure 21).

In terms of practice, 61.9 per cent of Muslim women respondents claim that they usually wear the hijab, while 34.9 per cent wear the hijab depending on the situation, and only 3.3 per cent do not wear the hijab (Figure 22).

The majority of Muslim respondents (88.6 per cent) agree that implementing Islamic law will bring benefits to society, especially in terms of strengthening moral values (62.5 per cent), although this latter figure has dropped from 67.2 per cent as per the INSP2017 (Figure 23). Other perceived benefits, such as the spread of Islam (11.8 per cent), increasing public security (8.9 per cent), and helping to eradicate corruption (5.4 per cent), approximate the level of responses for the INSP2017. Meanwhile, 11.4 per cent of respondents are convinced that the application of Islamic law brings very little or no benefit.

Perceptions of Foreign Countries and ASEAN

Following the INSP2017, the INSP2022 also surveys Indonesians’ perceptions of other countries. However, considering the geopolitical situation and recent trends, the list of foreign countries/regions has been updated to include Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, European Union (EU), South Korea, India, and Vietnam (replacing Thailand). Regarding countries that respondents admire, Figure 18 shows that Muslim countries—Saudi Arabia (95.7 per cent) and Turkey (90.1 per cent)—top the list. With the addition of the Muslim countries, Singapore (89.1 per cent) is relegated to third place from first in 2017. In view of the ongoing armed conflict in Europe, it is notable that Russia (86.8 per cent) is more admired than the US (81.8 per cent) and EU (86.5 per cent). Among the reasons why Indonesians admire Russia more than the United States and European Union are anti-American and anti-Western sentiments, based on the perception that America and the West have treated Muslims unfairly, as evidenced in their foreign policy in the Middle East and with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In contrast, Russia is viewed as more Muslim-friendly. As with the INSP2017, China (78.2 per cent) remains the least admired by respondents. In considering religion as a variable influencing respondents’ admiration for Muslim-majority countries, we find that there is no significant difference in the cases of Turkey and Malaysia. However, regarding Saudi Arabia, Muslims are more likely to express admiration (96.2 per cent) than non-Muslims/others (90.2 per cent).

Respondents are also asked which countries are important for Indonesia. In this regard, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Turkey and Japan are more likely to be considered important countries for Indonesia. Interestingly, ASEAN is considered less important than the EU but more important than the US, China and India.

China’s Impacts

In the context of the global rise of China, respondents are asked if they think the rise of China will have a positive or negative impact on neighbouring countries such as Indonesia. While the INSP2017 shows that those who think the rise of China will have a positive impact on Indonesia (41 per cent) are slightly more than those who think it will have a negative impact (39 per cent), the INSP2022 finds a reversal in the trend, wherein respondents who perceive a negative impact (34.1 per cent) exceed those who perceive a positive one (27.1 per cent) (Figure 19).

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

The survey covers a wide range of issues, from politics to the economy, foreign relations, and social issues such as the role of Islam and perceptions of Chinese Indonesians. Not all questions are reported in this article, but we have given an overview of the key initial findings.

President Jokowi has a high approval rating of 71.8 per cent, and this comes from almost every segment of the socio-demographic spectrum. Exceptions include the Minangkabau, Sundanese, Betawi, Bugis and Malay ethnic communities, which is unsurprising since they constituted the strong support base of Jokowi’s rival Prabowo Subianto in the 2019 presidential election.

Public trust in state institutions is also high. As is the prevailing trend in post-Reformasi Indonesia, the Armed Forces garner the highest level of trust (89.6 per cent). This is followed by Provincial Governments (83.1 per cent), District/City Governments (81 per cent), the Central Government (80.4 per cent), and the President (78.7 per cent). Indonesians tend to be active in participating in voting, where voting in Regional Heads elections, the Legislative Election and the Presidential Election range from 89.4 per cent to 91.5 per cent. Participation in other political activities is much more limited, ranging from 3.2 per cent to 16 per cent for participation in political campaigns, volunteering for candidates, participation in demonstrations or protests, and contributing to a candidate’s campaign, etc.

One of the hot-button issues in Indonesia currently is President Jokowi’s plan to build a new national capital (IKN). While respondents who are aware of the IKN development programme are large (80 per cent), only 41.9 per cent agree with the programme, and those who rate the programme as urgent are much fewer (28.6 per cent). This indicates that the timing of the project is a concern for Indonesians, especially since the Indonesian economy is still recovering from the impact of the pandemic.

In general, Indonesians are optimistic about the economy. More respondents are likely to think that the current economic condition is better compared to the previous year, and a majority (60.1 per cent) think that the outlook of the economy in one year’s time will be better.

Background of the Study

It has been more than two decades since the beginning of the Reformasi (Reform Movement) era marked by the fall of President Suharto. Experts are generally divided into two camps that hold sharply different views about Indonesia’s achievements during that period. The first scholarly camp holds a gloomier view, observing that the old corrupt political oligarchic forces have persisted in sabotaging the country’s democratic structural reforms, taking the country back to the practices of the New Order era when corruption, collusion and nepotism were the political and business order of the day. According to this group, there is hardly any significant difference between the New Order and Reform eras. Meanwhile, the other scholarly camp provides a rosier picture of the democratization process in Indonesia. Government officials have also repeatedly made claims that Indonesia has indeed taken big strides forward politically and economically since the end of the New Order.

But what is the public’s own perception of the reform achievements? We do not have information on public perceptions from the authoritarian era due to the political and academic restrictions on public opinion research at that time. What we can do is compare public opinion in the reform era from time to time to check how satisfied the public has been with ongoing developments in Indonesia. Moreover, in a democracy, public opinion surveys and the feedback they provide for public officials serve as one of the foremost methods for improving governance.

Back in 2017, the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS) commissioned the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) to undertake the first Indonesia National Survey Project (known as the INSP2017), which collected data on the attitudes and behaviour of Indonesians with respect to key issues in the economic, socio-cultural and political spheres. In this latest INSP undertaken in 2022 (INSP2022), besides retaining questions that continue to be relevant to issues in the three main areas, we have also adopted new issues and fielded the corresponding questions. This nationwide survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews with 1,620 respondents across all 34 provinces of Indonesia, from 21 to 28 July 2022.

ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute has commissioned a second nationwide survey in Indonesia as a follow-up to the first similar project in 2017 called the Indonesia National Survey Project (INSP). Its broad aim is to enhance understanding of political, economic, and social developments in Indonesia. Its key findings are as follows:

• • The approval rating of President Joko Widodo hovers around 71.8 per cent, at least before the September 2022 announcement on the fuel subsidy cut. His major infrastructure push as his flagship development programme still garners the most positive assessment. However, poverty, unemployment and cost of living remain key flashpoints that the government should be concerned with.

• • While respondents are generally aware of the plan to relocate the national capital and are more likely to agree rather than disagree with it, most have reservations about its urgency and the financial burden that such an undertaking implies.

• • Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey are the most admired by Indonesians, followed by Singapore. In view of the ongoing armed conflict in Europe, it is notable that Russia is more admired than the US and EU.

• • Where the rise of China is concerned, respondents who perceive a negative impact exceed those who perceive a positive one, which is a reversal of the trend found in the 2017 survey. At the same time, negative opinions towards China’s Belt and Road Initiative is also more strongly evident than positive opinion.

• • While Indonesian Muslims are generally devout practising Muslims, the majority do not harbour aspirations to make Indonesia an Islamic state, preferring instead the cultural inclusiveness currently in place.

• • Reservations about the political role of Chinese Indonesians continue to persist, and a majority do not support members of this community taking up key political positions.

• • Respondents are largely aware of climate change, environment and energy transition issues, and support government policies addressing them. However, the major challenge is seen to be in the promotion of lifestyle changes that will reduce damage to the environment.

Approval Rating of President Joko Widodo

Around 71.8 per cent of respondents are quite or very satisfied with the performance of President Jokowi, which is slightly higher than the 68 per cent that was recorded for the INSP2017. This is despite many criticisms about authoritarian tendencies and democratic regression under Jokowi. The majority across almost every socio-demographic group and region are quite or very satisfied with Jokowi, except for the Minangkabau ethnic group (Figure 1). Notably, Jokowi’s approval rating among non-Muslim respondents is very high at 91.6 per cent, which indicates his ability to unite non-Muslims as a voting bloc. Unsurprisingly, the majority of those who voted for the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), a conservative Islamic party, and the Prabowo-Sandiaga pair in the 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections respectively, disapprove of Jokowi’s performance (Figure 2).

Trust in Institutions

Respondents are asked how much they trust different institutions in Indonesia. Their answers show that the Armed Forces (TNI) remains the most trusted (89.6 per cent), followed by Provincial Governments (83.1 per cent), District/City Governments (81 per cent), the Central Government (80.4 per cent), and the President (78.7 per cent). Comparing with the INSP2017, we note that the level of trust has dropped slightly for the Armed Forces, Central Government, and General Elections Commission. The level of trust in the Provincial and District/City Governments has improved slightly along with Civil Service, while trust in the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has decreased significantly from 83.1 to 72.7 per cent (Figure 3). The decline in public trust in the KPK is inextricably linked to revisions to the KPK Law passed in 2019, which weakened the KPK and reduced its independence, as well as KPK leaders’ involvement in scandals. Another interesting observation is the significant improvement in the trust level towards Parliament (DPR) and political parties from 55.4 per cent to 62.6 per cent and 45.8 per cent to 54.6 per cent respectively when compared to INSP2017 data, albeit these two institutions still rank at the bottom of the list.

Political Participation

Citizens generally do participate in elections. When asked if they ever participated in elections, the reported rate is 91.5 per cent for Regional Head elections, 90.4 per cent for the Legislative Election, and 89.4 per cent for the Presidential Election.

Climate Change, Environment, and Energy Transition

As climate change and environmental issues take the spotlight globally, Indonesians have also become increasingly aware of them. The INSP2022 added a series of questions related to awareness and knowledge of climate change and environmental issues, as well as attitudes towards energy transition as a means of addressing these issues.

Respondents are asked for their perception of the frequency of certain environment-related events that have an impact on their lives, and the majority observe that extreme weather (72.6 per cent), crop failure (66 per cent), floods (63.6 per cent) and pollution (57.3 per cent) have become more frequent in recent years (Figure 29).

In terms of attribution, certain events are more likely to be considered by the majority to be natural occurrences, such as extreme weather (70.2 per cent), erosion (68.2 per cent), and crop failure (63.4 per cent) (Figure 30). Events that are more likely to be considered wholly or partially man-made by the majority of respondents include pollution (72.6 per cent), floods (68.2 per cent) and difficulty in hunting or fishing (55 per cent). Notably, none of the events is considered by a majority of respondents as being wholly man-made. Even where pollution is concerned, only 30.5 per cent of respondents consider that to be entirely caused by human actions.

The majority of respondents (85.2 per cent) consider climate and environmental problems as urgent problems that need solving. They think that the main parties who should be responsible are the national government, business industry and individual citizens. For this reason, the majority of respondents agree or strongly agree with the government’s efforts to overcome climate and environmental problems by requiring private companies to participate in funding the solution to environmental problems (85.7 per cent) and imposing a single-use plastic tax (60.8 per cent).

The survey also finds that the majority of respondents support measures that can address climate and environmental problems. These include using cleaner energy sources (75.5 per cent), the use of electric vehicles (63.0 per cent), using solar power instead of electricity generated by the State-owned Electricity Company (Perusahaan Listrik Negara, PLN) (61.9 per cent), and reducing the use of fossil fuels (57.2 per cent) (Table 5).

Evaluation of the Economy

It is important to note that responses related to the evaluation of economic conditions, based on the survey taking place at the end of July 2022, were made in the context of an economy still recovering from the impact of COVID-19, but before the September 2022 announcement of fuel subsidy cuts by President Jokowi, which resulted in increases in fuel price and consequently, inflationary pressure on the price of goods all over the country. In this context, respondents were asked to evaluate the current condition of the Indonesian economy, the condition of the economy as compared to the previous year, and the expected condition of the economy in one year’s time. The data show that 41.5 per cent of respondents perceive the current economic condition as average, 33.4 per cent perceive it as bad, while only 25.1 per cent perceive it as good. However, 38.7 per cent of respondents think that the current economic condition is better compared to the previous year, exceeding those who think that there has been no change (28.8 per cent) and those who think that it is worse (32.4 per cent). When asked about the outlook for the economy in one year’s time, 60.1 per cent think that it will be better, exceeding by a large margin those who think that there will be no change (27.5 per cent) and those who think that it will be worse (12.3 per cent) (Figure 9). Thus, while respondents may seem slightly pessimistic about the current state of the economy, they are more optimistic in comparing the economy to the previous year when the COVID-19 pandemic was hitting the global economy hard, including Indonesia, and when forecasting the performance of the economy for the year to come.

The survey also asked respondents to evaluate their current household economic condition, compare it to the previous year, and give their forecast for the year to come. Overall, their responses are more optimistic than their assessment of the national economy. The survey found that 29.9 per cent of respondents perceive their current household economic condition to be good, higher than those who perceive their household economic condition to be bad (22 per cent).