Mass democracy went into abeyance with the demise of the Roman Republic. With the revolutions in America and France in the late eighteenth century, the masses asserted their political presence with a vengeance. Although both revolutions began moderately enough, they quickly diverged. In America, patronage became the predominant means of winning and keeping power. In France, in contrast, politics was soon dominated by a series of demagogues, from Danton to Robespierre. Rather than looking to ideology, this chapter proposes that the difference was due to the lower cost of patronage as a means of political incorporation in America compared to France. American elites had more than a century of working in the limited franchise democracy of British America prior to its "democratization." In France, in contrast, French elites had no such legacy on which to build. French institutions instead precluded the building of political parties, rendering direct appeals to the masses, especially those in the capital, cost-effective. The recurrent cycle of populism in France was interrupted only with Napoleon’s combination of popular appeal with the reimposition of centralized, executive power: a popular dictatorship.

The standard explanation for Trump’s 2016 victory is that it was the culmination of a long-term right-wing capture of the Republican Party. However, in 2016, the most consistently right-wing candidate was Ted Cruz. Trump was unusual in that he was the candidate of no faction. Rather, Trump’s low-cost populist strategy, in which he relied on mass rallies and social media, was effective because the factions who backed his opponents could not coalesce to keep him out. Trump won the GOP primary with an historically low share of the vote. This chapter also shows that Trump was not the first to successfully pursue such a strategy. In the wake of the reforms of the early 1970s, a little-known Jimmy Carter was similarly able to capture the Democratic nomination in 1976 on the basis of a low-cost direct-communication strategy. The Democratic Party adapted then to keep future populists out. Whether the Republican Party will do so after Trump remains unclear.

Chapter 3 analyzes how economic decay and aspirational neoliberalism justify anti-Bangladeshi xenophobia in Assam. This xenophobia relies on the view that East Bengalis have historically – at least since colonial times – been a source of "economic threat," real or imagined. The segregation of Bengali Muslims in Lower Assam sustains the perception of their outsider, even illegal, status, maintaining this view of the economic threat. While Assam’s desire for national self-determination characterized its relationship with mainland India in the initial decades since (Indian) independence, in recent years fractious politics and separatist movements found resolution in anti-Bangladeshi sentiments, as it served as the common cause that would unite the various ideologically opposed sections of society. The most recent example of this is the mobilization surrounding khilonjiya or indigenous interests in the context of population registration (NRC) and the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (2019). They underscore how anti-establishment claims fit alongside nationalist ideas of strict border control and the expulsion of those deemed foreign, i.e., Bangladeshi. In effect, anti-Bangladeshi sentiments become the glue that holds together the Indian nation state.

Ancient Greece, especially Athens, provides the best documented early example of mass democracy. With the democratic reforms of the fifth century, populism – the direct mobilization of the masses – becomes an effective path to power. This chapter looks at several examples from fifth- and fourth-century Athens, which demonstrate the use of demagoguery as an efficient, if much derided, alternative to patronage-based politics. Ancient Rome provides a somewhat different context. As a republic, Rome gave the masses a more limited and indirect role in politics. Typically, politics was a purely elite affair. Yet for those elites who found the normal insider path blocked to them, direct appeals to the masses could prove effective. However, given the limited formal role for the plebs in Roman politics, this direct mobilization could often lead to violence.

Politics is first and foremost about power. Short of the recourse to violence, politicians can follow one of three strategies in the quest for power: a programmatic, patronage, or populist strategy. This book proposes that this choice is grounded in economic trade-offs. Politicians will follow a populist strategy when it represents a more efficient use of their resources than alternative strategies.

Populism is a political strategy that relies on the use of a personalistic political organization and mass communication to mobilize support in the quest for power; it will be most successful when it is more cost-effective than the alternatives of programmatic political party building or the distribution of patronage. The costs involved in this trade-off come in two forms: direct costs and indirect (or transaction) costs. In politics, very often transaction costs – search, bargaining, and enforcement costs – are the higher ones. Populists lower the costs of mobilizing support by communicating directly with voters instead of working through intermediaries such as party professionals or political brokers. The populist strategy will be most effective when two conditions are met. First, potential voters or supporters must be available for direct mobilization. This means that they must be relatively free of existing party attachments. Second, the opposition should be divided. Most populists win with the backing of a mere plurality rather than a majority. The more the opposition is split between multiple contenders, the more economically viable is the populist strategy.

This chapter brings into conversation some common themes from across the chapters to comment on the general state of Bengali Muslims and discuss implications of the analysis presented in the book.