There is widespread agreement that something dramatic has been happening to the international economy over the past two decades: rapid and radical changes in production technology and industrial organization, a major restructuring of work markets, and consequent large scale changes in the policies of economic management at the international, national, and regional levels. At the same time there is a great deal of confusion about how to characterize these changes, the mechanisms at work, and the policy implications for different groups of economic and political actors. One way of accomplishing these tasks is to postulate a change of basic manufacturing organization from a “Fordist” pattern that prevailed in the years of the long post-1945 boom to a “post-Fordist” successor in the later 1970s and 1980s. Many people habitually conflate a variety of approaches to industrial change under this heading, such as flexible specialization, regulation theory, disorganized capitalism, or diversified quality production. The resulting problem is that significant differences of approach are concealed by a superficial similarity between the proponents of flexible specialization and a set of apparently similar but underlyingly divergent ideas. The purpose of this paper is thus to set out the distinctive properties of flexible specialization as a theoretical approach to the analysis of industrial change and examine its relationship to problems of empirical evidence.

FLEXIBLE SPECIALIZATION: TECHNOLOGICAL PARADIGMS AND POSSIBLE WORLDS

Despite their apparent similarities, flexible specialization and post-Fordism represent sharply different theoretical approaches to the analysis of industrial change.

Early in the 1984 presidential primary season in the United States, it was clear that the sitting President, Ronald Reagan, would easily win the Republican nomination and that former Vice President Walter F. Mondale was the front-runner for the Democratic nod. Democratic voters who knew that they disliked Mondale faced a coordination problem: If all of them could agree on a single alternative to Mondale, from among the halfdozen or so candidates languishing in single digits in the opinion polls, they could conceivably deny Mondale the nomination; but if they failed to agree on a single alternative, then Mondale would almost surely win. Although anti-Mondale Democrats shared a dislike of Mondale, they differed substantially in their preferred alternative. Thus, even putting aside the complexities of the American primary process, it was by no means clear ex ante that anti-Mondale Democrats could coordinate on an alternative. In the event, although Gary Hart emerged as the focal alternative to Mondale and enjoyed a large and rapid run-up in the polls, his candidacy faltered and Mondale secured the nomination.

Early in the 1990 presidential campaign in Peru, it was clear that Nobel Prize-winning novelist Mario Vargas Llosa was the front-runner. Peruvian voters who knew that they disliked Vargas Llosa faced a coordination problem: If all of them could agree on a single alternative to Vargas Llosa from among the half-dozen or so candidates trailing in the polls, they could conceivably deny Vargas Llosa the presidency; but if they failed to agree on a single alternative, then Vargas Llosa would almost surely win.

The Single European Act (SEA), as signed and quickly ratified by twelve sovereign national governments, and the Maastricht Accord (MAA), as signed and ratified with great difficulty by these same governments, have greatly accelerated European integration. There seems little doubt that they are going to change the pace and even the direction of that process, but what will be their joint impact upon the way in which capitalism is practiced in this part of the world?

The central theme of this chapter can be put quite simply – and dramatically: Can the distinctive institutions that have long governed national capitalisms within Europe and that are currently being jeopardized by the rising tide of global liberalization and interdependence, be regrouped and revitalized at the regional level, i.e., at the level of the European Community (EC)? As the SEA and the MAA are sequentially implemented over the next decade, will Europe enter the twenty-first century with a relatively unified (“convergent”) set of norms and practices regulating the production of goods and services and the exploitation of labor and capital? Or will its twelve or more members fail in this unprecedented endeavor – and either retreat to protecting their distinctive (if costly) institutions behind existing national boundaries, or resign themselves to playing a less distinctive (if still prosperous) role in an evolving global economy?

In chapter 3, I examined a state in which the distributional conflict over property rights institutions was never resolved, leaving both property rights and tradition fluid and poorly enforced. In this chapter, I examine a state in which an alternative outcome was obtained. In Akyem Abuakwa, the distributional conflict over land was resolved; property rights and tradition were fixed and well defined. What accounts for these divergent results?

My analysis of the Akyem case underscores many of the conclusions reached in prior chapters. The indigenous elites responded to the commercialization of land by ‘reinventing tradition. ’ They articulated a notion of customary land tenure that allowed them to profit from the new economic opportunities. Predictably, their declaration of tradition sparked intense conflict within the state over the distribution of land. The institutional structure of indirect rule forced elites to turn to British colonial authorities to resolve that conflict. The ties between local elites and the colonial state were therefore crucial to the enforcement of property rights.

Equally important, the analysis of the Akyem case yields new insight into the study of property rights institutions. In this chapter, I argue that property rights institutions cannot be founded on the basis of coercive authority alone. Coercion is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the creation of a stable property rights system. Property rights will be secure only when citizens have some assurance that the coercive agent will not abuse her authority and confiscate others' wealth, and when the defeated actors are given a positive incentive to invest on the basis of the new property rights system.

Indirect rule transferred the struggle to define property rights to the traditional state, but it did not predetermine the outcome of those struggles. The definition and enforcement of property rights in each state were instead the products of (I) the indigenous actors' competition to secure a distributionally favorable definition of property rights, and (2) the interaction between these indigenous actors and the European officials who wielded the coercive authority of the colonial state.

Part II examines the transformation of property rights systems in two traditional states of the Gold Coast Colony: the Ga state and Akyem Abuakwa. In both, indigenous actors responded to the commercialization of land by ‘reinventing tradition. ’ Individuals and groups defined customary property rights systems that gave them privileged access to and control over land; and they reformed traditional state institutions in an effort to enforce those rights. In the Ga state, the elites' endeavor failed, and customary land tenure was both fluid and insecure. In Akyem Abuakwa, however, the elites succeeded. Property rights and custom were fixed and secure.

The analysis of these divergent outcomes raises many of the central theoretical questions introduced in chapter 1. Both case studies confirm the proposition that distributional conflict lies at the core of the institution building process. In both the Ga state and Akyem Abuakwa, elites and non-elites battled one another to define a version of custom that gave them a disproportionate share of society's resources. The resolution of that conflict hinged upon the use of coercive force.

The Accra riots of 1948 heralded a period of rapid and profound political change in the Gold Coast Colony. The changes would ultimately culminate in Gold Coast independence in 1957. In this chapter, I analyze the starting point for this transformation: the drafting and implementation of the Gold Coast constitution of 1950. Briefly, I argue that, during the original episode of constitutional creation, the British colonial government adopted procedures that encouraged Gold Coast elites to use the constitution to pursue narrow, redistributive gains – including the redefinition of rights to land. The British adopted procedures that encouraged elites to concentrate authority, deliberately forgoing potential safeguards against arbitrary, authoritarian rule.

I develop this thesis in three stages. In the first, I identify the actors who participated in the design of the 1950 constitution. How did the Gold Coast elite mobilize themselves at the national level, who challenged them, and how did the British respond? In the second and third, I examine the successive stages of constitutional creation. At each juncture, I explore the interaction between British control over procedure and the institutional choices made by the indigenous actors.

IDENTIFYING THE ACTORS

Three sets of actors dominated Gold Coast politics during the period of constitutional reform: British colonial officers in London and West Africa; the conservative United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), led by J. B. Danquah; and the more radical Convention People's Party (CPP), led by Kwame Nkrumah.

This book analyzes the creation of property rights institutions in the Gold Coast Colony from 1927 to 1957. Drawing upon new institutionalist scholarship, I have argued that the transformation of property rights is an inherently political process. State actors create or manipulate political institutions to pursue their own, independent goals. Those institutions establish the framework within which individuals in society compete with one another and with the state to secure a favorable definition of property rights. The degree to which property rights are enforced is a product of the interaction between state and society. State actors cannot simply impose their preferred property rights systems upon their subjects; neither can subjects enforce property rights at a local level without the state's support.

Brought to the study of Africa, these propositions illuminate the historical origins and persistence of the continent's insecure land tenure. At the same time, they offer insights into the study of customary law and customary land tenure, and they explain the failure of the British colonial enterprise. Brought to the study of economic development and institutional creation, the propositions underscore the need to move politics to the fore in the field of political economy.

THE ORIGINS OF INSECURE TENURE

The dominant paradigms in development theory provide contrasting interpretations of the transformation of pre-capitalist land tenure systems. Liberal theorists posit that Africa's continued integration into the world capitalist system will lead to the collapse of customary land tenure.

One of Africa's greatest tragedies lies in its apparent inability to take advantage of the continent's abundant natural resources. African governments confront persistent poverty and famine; they are forced to spend scarce resources on food imports to feed a burgeoning population. These conditions signal a clear need for greater agricultural production; yet African farmers cultivate only one fifth of the continent's 2.5 billion acres of arable land.

Social scientists attribute this tragedy to myriad causes. Civil war and ethnic unrest drive people from their homes and farms. African governments depress the price of food and export crops, destroying the farmers' incentive to produce. Credit markets are incomplete, depriving farmers of the capital they need to move beyond subsistence production. Underlying and exacerbating each of these factors, however, is a more fundamental problem: the nature of African land tenure. Throughout Africa, property rights to land are fluid and insecure. Private property, state ownership, and communally defined rights coexist in an ever-changing mix. Definitions of communal tenure continually shift. The farmer or entrepreneur who claims land under one property rights system can never be certain when (or if) others will challenge his claims; neither can he predict whose claims the local community or state will uphold.

Economists of all persuasions warn that insecure property rights to land and other economic resources inhibit economic growth. Where land rights are insecure, the rights-holder does not know whether he will control either the land or the profits from the land in the future.

The imposition of colonial rule and the coincident appreciation in land values transformed political and economic life in West Africa. The rise in land values prompted European and indigenous actors alike to work to redefine customary land tenure. The institutions of colonial rule influenced the type of property rights systems that these actors defended, and determined the actors' capacity to enforce those rights at the state or local level.

I begin my analysis of these complex events with an examination of British colonialism. The study of British colonialism highlights one of the central themes of chapter I: the need for a more realistic vision of the state. Specifically, the study suggests that any theory of the state must account for the impact of information asymmetries on the state ruler's capacity to enforce property rights or achieve other goals.

The ruler of any state, from the most benevolent to the most predatory, needs information in order to govern. Governance requires a ruler (acting alone or on behalf of her constituency) to target a number of goals, and devise policies to achieve those goals. In the abstract, however, any number of policies are feasible. Consequently, the ruler needs information that allows her to situate each policy choice within a specific context and thus link that choice to a policy outcome.

A simple example illustrates the logic. Assume that a ruler wants to collect the most revenue at the least possible cost.

This chapter examines the indigenous elite's response to the commercialization of land in the Ga state. I focus specifically on the efforts of the Reindorf family to define and enforce a distributionally favorable property rights system. Briefly, I argue that the Reindorf family reinvented Ga customary law, articulating a tradition that gave them exclusive rights to a significant portion of Ga land. They sought to enforce this new custom by reinventing the institutions of the traditional state so as to gain influence over the Ga Paramount Chief. Ultimately, their efforts failed. I attribute that failure to the elite's inability to manipulate the linkages between the traditional state and the British colonial state. The Ga elites were never able to persuade the British to use the colonial state's coercive authority on their behalf. Thus, distributional conflict went unchecked; property rights remained fluid and insecure.

I develop this argument in four stages. First, I provide a brief description of the Ga state and discuss the nature of Ga customary law and Ga traditional institutions prior to colonization. I then outline the changes wrought by indirect rule. Second, I examine the elite response to the commercialization of land. What type of property rights system did they articulate, and how did they try to enforce those rights? Third, I analyze other Ga citizens' reactions to the elite's overture. I trace the efforts of one group, the Manbii Party, to enforce an alternative vision of customary land tenure and Ga tradition.