In the Al Khalifah era, Manama developed as part of a network of port settlements which connected the Persian Gulf to the world of trade, merchants and trans-continental routes extending from the Mediterranean and the Red Sea to South East Asia. Viewed from the perspective of this maritime world, these commercial emporia were essentially ‘brides of the sea’. Yet, as clearly suggested by the case of Manama, they also constituted the microcosm of the complex political and economic dynamics which bound coastal societies to their agricultural and tribal hinterlands. That this dual relationship with hinterlands and forelands underpinned the urbanisation of the Gulf coast is evident from the vicissitudes of the tribal and imperial histories of the region before the discovery of oil.

Developments in Bahrain reflected wider processes of political and urban change which were triggered by the resurgence of tribal power throughout the Persian Gulf in the eighteenth century. Alongside the Al Khalifah, a powerful cohort of tribal rulers came to control the Arab coast, favouring the consolidation of a new constellation of maritime outposts. From Kuwait in the west to Ras al-Khaymah in the east, these port settlements under tribal regimes started to compete for the control of regional and long-distance trade with the leading commercial emporia of Basra, Bushehr and Muscat in Oman. As was the case of Manama and Muharraq in Bahrain, fully fledged port towns with complex socio-political organisations only began to take shape in the second half of the nineteenth century under the combined forces of the pearl boom and of British informal empire.

The previous two chapters have explained the evolution of politics and society in Manama before and after the discovery of oil, focussing on the role of networks of patronage, of imperial and overseas connections and, after 1919, of municipal government. This chapter traces the evolution of urban political sociability in the same period through the lens of civic strife, popular politics and ideological contestation. These were the ‘unruly’ activities which reshuffled power between urban groups, and between them and the state. Key episodes of unrest and the performance of Muharram rituals are analysed as contexts of public engagement and as evidence of the changing relationship between the body politic of Manama and the government of Bahrain. Not only did they bring new leaders, social groups and political allegiances into the arena of urban politics but also fostered the growth of new forms of community and public consciousness. Muharram rituals, in particular, marked the evolution of Shi‘i popular politics throughout the period. The lower classes of Manama used them as venues to express values and symbols which addressed issues of power, authority and class in the public arena.

Episodes of unrest in Manama also marked crucial junctures in the process of nation and state building, a further testimony to the importance of urban activism in reshaping Bahrain's political and social orders.

Before the discovery of oil, the presence of water and the rich pearl fisheries of Bahrain supported the growth of towns and agricultural hamlets. The continuity of settlement can also be readily explained by a long history of trade and by the political realities of a frontier society in flux. The strategic position of the islands favoured the consolidation of local administrations under the aegis of the regional powers and of the maritime and land empires which dominated the Gulf coast. Yet until the establishment of the Pax Britannica in the first half of the nineteenth century, the absence of fixed military and political frontiers fostered continuous instability throughout the region. Bahrain was a busy ‘buffer’ zone between the Arab and Iranian worlds and the point of intersection between the tribal and agricultural frontiers of the Persian Gulf. The coastline did not constitute a barrier but a permeable border in a region which had a long history of indigenous seafaring supported by an advanced maritime technology. Over the centuries, migrations from the mainland were the engine of political change as suggested by the sequence of dynasties of tribesmen, merchant seafarers and imperial administrators which ruled the islands. Newcomers had a profound influence on the economic and demographic make-up of Bahrain; the mainland was a reservoir of manpower but migrations could easily carry the seeds of societal and political collapse.

INTRODUCTION

The effect of democracy on economic development has captivated many thinkers. De Tocqueville (1835) and Schumpeter (1942), for example, believe democracy provides the social securities required for development. Hayek (1944) argues that democracies exhibit relatively less unrest and political instability, promoting development. Friedman (1962) asserts that democracy promotes development by keeping state power in check. North (1990) expects autocrats to prey on their subjects, and Olson (1993) argues that autocrats are corrupt and promote their cronies, which are bad for development. Going a step further, Fukuyama (1992) argues that capitalism and democracy work in unison to promote welfare, a view many observers share (e.g., The Economist, 1994; Cohen, 2007).

In contrast, Marx (1867, 1871) and Lenin (1911) argued that democracy came out of capitalist development as a tool for the elite to deprive and appease the masses. John S. Mill (1860), a supporter of democracy, is skeptical about its ability to promote development. Huntington (1968) argues that democracies exhibit high state expenditures in response to their citizens' demands, reducing the excess that is expendable for development. Olson (1982) argues that special interests in democracy shape public policy to promote their own interests, undermining the economy. Wade (1996) argues that strong autocrats can resist popular pressure for policies to save doomed industries, which is good for development. Barro (2000) and Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2005) argue that autocrats can effectively pursue prodevelopment policies.

Two important and complex transformations have characterized the global political–economic system since the end of World War II in 1945. One transformation is the rise and spread of democracy over time and across countries. By the term democracy, we mean a national system of political governance based on free elections and broad political representation. We conceptualize this concept as a continuum of political regime types, ranging from full autocracy at one end to full democracy at the other end.

The second transformation is the expansion and deepening of globalization. In recent decades, globalization has been a popular term but is more complex to define than democracy. Scholars typically employ this term to describe recent global transformations toward growing cross-national interconnectedness. Although many scholars tend to focus on the interconnectedness features of particular interest to their own disciplines, some take a broader perspective. For example, Held et al. (2009) cast a wide net, covering essentially all the transformations that have increased international interconnectedness, including political-legal (e.g., growth of international treaties and institutions), military (e.g., disputes, growth of armies, and weapon proliferation), communication and informational (e.g., Internet, telephone, and media), economic flows (e.g., trade and investments), knowledge flows (technology transfers and education), taste convergence (e.g., consumption preferences), social contacts (e.g., migration and tourism), and environmental developments (e.g., pollution and changes in the biosphere), as well as the national and international income inequalities resulting from these processes.

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we begin the third and last part of this book. So far, the inquiries we have conducted could in principle have taken place anywhere, be it on planet Earth or somewhere else in space, as long as there exist people who interact with one another, markets that enable people to attach monetary values to goods and services, and governments that decide to use force against other countries. The global political economy and the interactions it entails, however, invariably occur within the confines of the physical environment, the biosphere of planet Earth. Consequently, the political and economic forces we focus on in this book – democracy, economic openness, and military conflict, and the complex transformations they entail – can influence this very physical environment within which we all live.

The questions we seek to answer in the third part of the book concern whether and how these effects on the environment occur. Is a rise in the level of democracy good or bad for the environment? How does a rise in the level of international trade affect the environment? What are the implications of being involved in military conflict for a country's physical environment? Chapters 7, 8, and 9 in the third part of the book address these important questions.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter studies the effects of war on the environment in an innovative way and as part of the story told in this book. Thus far we have studied the effects of economic openness and democracy on conflict, inequality, development, and the environment, and how these forces interact. The concern of analysts and policy makers is growing, including those in the Pentagon, that the environment will play a role in conflict as climate change progresses. The effect of conflict on the environment, in the context of globalization, thus becomes an important complex transformation to study.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) expects that climate change will intensify during this century, causing growing environmental degradation (IPCC, 2007a, 2007b). Consequently, we may see more wars as countries vie for degraded resources or quarrel over who should cover the costs of ameliorating or reducing environmental damages. Although the link from climate change to war is still only a possibility, many scholars have observed that environmental forces have already caused conflicts. In contrast, the effect of war on the environment has received little scholarly attention. Part of the reason for this neglect is perhaps the temptation to assume that wars always destroy the environment. One may recall the pollution caused by burning oil wells during the 1991 Gulf War or the destruction of forests during the Vietnam War. We argue that it is not the only possibility; war may benefit the environment, albeit perversely, by disrupting environmentally harmful economic activities.