We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Hyper-active Governance is a new way of thinking about governing that puts debates over expertise at the heart. Contemporary governing requires delegation to experts, but also increases demands for political accountability. In this context, politicians and experts work together under political stress to adopt different governing relationships that appear more 'hands-off' or 'hands-on'. These approaches often serve to displace profound social and economic crises. Only a genuinely collaborative approach to governing, with an inclusive approach to expertise, can create democratically legitimate and effective governance in our accelerating world. Using detailed case studies and global datasets in various policy areas including medicines, flooding, water resources, central banking and electoral administration, the book develops a new typology of modes of governing. Drawing from innovative social theory, it breathes new life into debates about expert forms of governance and how to achieve real paradigm shifts in how we govern our increasingly hyper-active world.
In this chaper, I examine the relationship between landholding inequality, interventions in agricultural markets, and the stability of authoritarian regimes. I construct measures of the size of rents that are generated by agricultural market distortions. I show that both forms of agricultural rents are much smaller than those originating from oil revenues. I then go on to estimate a series of models of authoritarian regime durability. I test whether landed elites are threatening to authoritarian regimes, and concentrations of landholdings are associated with a greater risk of regime collapse. I find a weak positive relationship between landholding inequality and the likelihood of collapse. I look at the relationship between agricultural rents and regime durability. I find that rents that accrue to the state have no effect on the probability of regime collapse. Rents accruing to agricultural producers, however, do have a significant interactive effect on regime stability. Where landholding inequality is high, regimes that distribute greater rents to the agricultural sector are significantly less likely to break down.
In the conclusion, I discuss the contribution of the book and its implications for the study of authoritarian regimes, development, and democratization. In the long run, government policies that tax the agricultural sector lead to rural poverty, urbanization, and political instability. On the other hand, regimes that implement pro-farmer policies increasing agricultural prices are more likely to lock their countries into a long-run development trajectory that significantly decreases the risk of political instability and authoritarian regime collapse. By bolstering the incomes of rural farmers they mitigate poverty, slow rural-urban migration, promote economic growth, and decrease inequality. Rulers confronted with significant threats from both large concentrations of urban food consumers and landed elites cannot effectively use agricultural policy to address rural-urban conflict, because measures that are in the interests of the rural sector run invariably counter to those of the urban sector. These leaders are thus faced with unique challenges to their rule and a high likelihood of political instability. One likely outcome of this situation is a military dictatorship.
In this chapter, I lay out a theory of agricultural policymaking and political stability under authoritarian and democratic governments. From this theory, I derive a series of empirical hypotheses on policy outcomes and the consequences of agricultural policy for regime stability, which I will go on to test in the remainder of the book.
In this chapter, I explore the link between government food taxes and urban unrest. I analyze an event dataset on social and political disorder in cities across the developing world matched to cross-national data on consumer food taxes between 1965 and 2009. I estimate panel regressions of the effect of food taxes on unrest. I find no simple relationship between food policy and political instability in cities. However, when the effects of food taxes are allowed to vary by political regime type, I find that higher taxes are significantly associated with greater levels of unrest under anocracy. I also estimate instrumental variables regressions that exploit exogenous variation in the composition of a country's agricultural sector to identify the causal effect of food taxes on unrest. The results of these models align with those of the panel regressions. I find that higher food taxes are significantly correlated with greater unrest, but only under anocracies, which combine a lack of democratic accountability with a relatively permissive political opportunity structure.
In this chapter, I model agricultural policy outcomes across countries. I do so using cross-national data on agricultural market distortions, regime typ,e and structures, which are indicators of the strength of rural and urban interests. I show that democracies support agriculture more than authoritarian regimes, on average. I look at the effects of urbanization, inequality, and unequal distributions of landholdings on agricultural support. I find that urbanization is associated with less support for agriculture under dictatorship, particularly in Asia. Inequality is associated with declining support for agriculture in democracies, particularly in Latin America and high-income countries, but not in Africa. Landholding inequality is correlated with greater support for agriculture under dictatorship, particularly in Latin America and Asia.
I use a case study of Imperial Germany to probe the causal mechanisms explored cross-nationally in previous chapters. I examine the political causes and consequences of a protectionist shift in agricultural policy that took place in the late 1870s in Imperial Germany and significantly increased domestic food and agricultural produce prices. I analyze an original dataset on the characteristics of German electoral districts, delegates to the Reichstag, and their voting patterns on the protectionist bill. High levels of landholding inequality in German electoral districts were correlated with disproportionate representation of aristocratic landowners and rural conservatives in the Reichstag, while urban interests had little influence. Subsequent gains from the protectionist trade policy fell disproportionately on areas dominated by the Prussian aristocracy and characterized by higher levels of landholding inequality. Agricultural policy thus played a key role in ensuring the aristocracy's political support for the authoritarian government.
The introduction lays out the scope and contribution of the book. I begin by arguing that the problem of agricultural policymaking plays a central role in debates on the relationship between development, democratization, and authoritarian politics. One of the most salient and contentious social cleavages to be managed in developing nations is not between the rich and the poor, or the middle class and the state. It is between cities and the countryside, and it plays itself out in markets for agricultural produce and food. I briefly outline the book’s central argument: that agricultural policies are a trade-off between rural interests, who prefer higher prices, and urban interests, who prefer lower prices. This trade-off is made under different rules depending on regime type, and in particular based on the structural threats posed to each sector under authoritarianism. By manipulating prices for agricultural commodities and food, authoritarian governments can co-opt threatening groups to supporting their regime and mitigate the risk of political instability. I outline the structure of the book's chapters.
In this chaper, I trace in detail the causal mechanisms linking landholding inequality, agricultural policy, and regime stability in Malaysia from 1969-1980. I analyze an original, constituency-level dataset on the correlates of support for the ruling Alliance at the 1969 parliamentary election. I show that landholding inequality was correlated with support for the Alliance. However, rice-growing areas abandoned the Alliance for the opposition in 1969. This important shift in mass politics led to contentious developments within the elite, which significantly strengthened rural, Malay interests in the ruling coalition. In the course of the next year, a major restructuring of the Malaysian economy was begun, an important component of which was a pro-rural agricultural policy reform, which increased the incomes of Malay rice farmers. This policy played an important role in placating rural interests and heading off their demands for a complete reorganization of the political system. Thus, the power shift within the ruling coalition led to a more rural-biased policy, which in turn ensured regime stability.