The concluding chapter wraps up the various arguments and pieces of evidence presented in this book in favor of our peace formula. Overall, the first take-home message to be highlighted is the need for smart idealism – as neither the cold-hearted egotist nor the naïve idealist will be able to curb conflict. Secondly, it is again stressed which concrete policies are key to making a difference, creating a synthesis of the various points of the previous chapters. In particular, we emphasize the key role of a democratic voice, security warranties, promoting productive work, fostering trust and reconciliation, accelerating a well-managed green energy transition and stepping up international coordination across a variety of issues. The final point is that since we are all affected by conflict, we should all be part of the solution. It turns out that several studies have found that pressure from the public opinion matters, both in the implementation of policies and in preventing atrocities. There is a job to be done, so let us work together to make a change.

This chapter focuses on explaining the powerful logic of perilous promises and hidden information, as well as the dangers of low opportunity costs and attractive rents. We start out by explaining how in many circumstances peaceful bargaining succeeds in preventing hostilities – as the “peace dividend” creates a range of win–win bargaining solutions. Sadly, though, asymmetric information, commitment problems and political bias can lead to bargaining failure and the outbreak of war. Further, when the stakes of contest are high and opportunity costs low, the scope for peaceful bargaining shrinks. In particular, we show that being out of work and out of options makes somebody easy prey for rebel headhunters. This is exemplified by the dreadful consequences of bad harvests. Next, we examine the role of ethnic cleavages and how they tend to be exploited by divisive ethnic politics. Finally, the chapter discusses the curse of natural resources. Countries blessed with valuable soils tend to suffer from conflict, often leaving them poorer than countries lacking natural resources.

This chapter argues that building strong institutions and a productive economy in the aftermath of conflict is not enough and that rebuilding lost social capital and trust is of paramount importance. Intergroup trust matters deeply, as the same formal institutions can have divergent effects in different social structures and for different levels of social capital. Starting from the so-called contact hypothesis that fostering positive intergroup interaction builds trust, it is argued that reconciliation and the rebuilding of social trust are also part of the promising blend of propeace policies. A variety of empirical studies are discussed, ranging from reconciliation efforts in Rwanda and Sierra Leone to programs fostering intergroup contacts in Spain, Nigeria, India and Iraq. While we find that more intense group contacts deploy typically desirable effects, trying to achieve reconciliation by altering beliefs through media campaigns is a double-edged sword that involves a series of dangers. We conclude this chapter by stressing the key role of stepping up critical thinking.

As shown in this chapter, state capacity and security warranties are further key factors in the peace formula. In particular, besides certain institutional features, the overall strength of the state is a major determinant of political stability, as illustrated by examples and recent research on Iraq, Somalia, Niger and the origins of the Mafia in southern Italy. Drawing on cutting-edge studies, it is argued that being feared (by extremist groups) may be more important than being loved (by the population at large). In order to win the hearts and minds of the population, it is essential that first public safety is guaranteed and that basic services are delivered efficiently. This is easier said than done. It is shown that when foreign military aid aims at capacity building, it often backfires. In contrast, UN peacekeeping troops have been demonstrated to play a key role. We end this chapter by emphasizing the several domestic factors that can help the building of lasting state capacity, with a special emphasis on well-designed welfare programs such as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal.

This chapter starts off by explaining that we are in the midst of a critical historical juncture with a record number of wars and conflicts around the world, calling for urgent action. Next, we discuss in depth three common but disastrous misconceptions, namely that shady deals leaving autocrats in power can bring peace, that “buying” peace through simple cash transfers works, and that charm offensives and communication efforts suffice to do the job. Drawing on a number of examples, the book highlights the pitfalls of these common misconceptions before turning to success stories. Illustrated by examples of the successful postwar reconstruction of Germany and Japan, the fall of apartheid in South Africa and democratization of Uruguay, Chile and Peru, the chapter then formulates the key components of what is called the peace formula – a set of key policies that constitute crucial ingredients for a successful and lasting pacification process. Finally, it is stressed that to counter distorted incentives for peace we need smart idealism – pairing good intentions with evidence-based policy knowledge.

This chapter starts by delimiting the scope of the book and making clear that we focus on various types of domestic political violence but that international wars are touched upon as well. We clearly define these terms and provide examples that illustrate the differences between distinct forms of violence, before moving to a discussion of the costs that these forms of violence impose on society. Strikingly, some people believe that wars and conflicts are good business. They are not. This chapter shows that wars not only destroy millions of innocent lives, but they are also poison for the economy. In particular, wars may be lucrative for the few but disastrous for the many. The detriments of war are manifold and include human, economic and social costs. This is illustrated by a series of historical examples. Drawing on recent cost estimates, it is also shown that the costs of a given war spread well beyond the borders of the country at war, with continental if not worldwide consequences.

This chapter shows that violence today sows the seeds of future fighting through a series of vicious cycles. First, it is stressed that persistent poverty creates vicious cycles of deprivation and disputes. Namely, poverty provides the breeding ground for violence, as the lack of income and perspectives makes it relatively more appealing to join armed rebellion. This, in turn, further impoverishes the country. Secondly, wars tear apart the social fabric of society, which in turn hinders postconflict reconstruction. Put differently, hate and distrust in the aftermath of fighting often trigger revenge wars further down the road. The third vicious cycle studied concerns education, with low human capital fueling fighting and subsequent wars destroying schools. Last but not least, this chapter discusses the impact of war trauma on future crime propensity. These various vicious cycles are illustrated with the help of a series of historical examples, spanning Peru, Angola and Uganda to Sri Lanka, Tajikistan and Switzerland. This discussion highlights the crucial importance of fostering peace right now, which leads to a powerful peace multiplier.

This chapter shows that a series of public policies have the potential to boost citizens’ perspectives for finding work and thereby foster incentives for peace. The first prominent policy is to invest in education. A more educated population generates countless benefits, one of which is the prospect of obtaining better jobs. Fundamentally, more meaningful employment raises the opportunity cost of giving up paid work to join an armed rebellion. Furthermore, physical capital (money) can more easily be stolen than human capital (knowledge). Hence, investing cash in building classrooms means that trying to topple the state will become less lucrative. Next, it is spelled out how better health leads to both a longer time horizon and a higher opportunity cost of conflict. This, in turn, makes long-run (peaceful) investments more appealing and reduces the scope for short-term appropriation and looting. Finally, a series of labor market policies are assessed, stressing the role of good jobs in making it less attractive to leave work and go to war. Empirical evidence from a variety of contexts is presented.

Introduction

During fieldwork in the Santal Parganas in February 2006, I was one day accosted by a policeman – the head of the local thana (police station). He was visiting the village where I was staying to talk to the parganait (leader of a group of villages) about the tense situation in the area. There were press reports on the growing activities of Naxalite groups in the region, he said, led by ‘civil elements from outside’. Training in the use of firearms was being organised and an atmosphere of violence being created in this otherwise peaceful region.

I soon realised that he was talking about the neighbouring panchayat (village council) of Pachwara in Pakur district, which has witnessed strong resistance to a large coal mining project in the last three years. I was told that compensation has now been paid out in cash and the resistance broken. Work was on full swing on the project, and it was now only a few people who were creating problems – these were the Naxalites, who needed to be arrested at the earliest!

This brief encounter raised a number of issues: How had the state actually managed to acquire land and get an agreement on cash compensation from the local adivasi people? Was any dialogue ever held or was this agreement a one-sided one? Was this solution not in contradiction to the existing protective land policies, as legalised through the Santal Pargana Tenancy Act (SPTA) of 1949? And was it not a gross violation of the Supreme Court's Samata judgment of 1997?

The fundamental issue behind these questions seems to be one of differing conceptualisations of land in cultural and political terms by the local people and the state, including the meaning of and principles underlying the notion of non-alienability of land in today's context. Economic growth and ‘national development’ require additional resources, whether minerals or land, for power generation, construction, industry or infrastructure development. Both industry and government make a strong case for the extraction and use of resources which are ostensibly being ‘wasted’ in ‘undeveloped’ and ‘remote’ adivasi regions such as Jharkhand. This view of land use and development, however, differs from local adivasi understandings. For the adivasis, apart from food production, land is valued for its ability to provide security and reinforce a sense of personhood (Rao, 2008).

This book collates papers I have written over the past twenty-five years based on intensive long-term engagement with the adivasi (mainly Santal) population of the Santal Parganas region of Jharkhand state. The main arguments presented in this book, while located within particular historical and political moments in the region, have global relevance across multiple disciplines, like development and gender studies and explorations of indigeneity and ecological change. The chapters in this book contribute to the production of knowledge in three broad areas.

First, they contribute to an improved understanding of gender as contextual, relational and dynamic, moving beyond the socially constructed roles and relationships between men and women. Such an understanding generates the need for reflexive methodologies that provide possibilities for studying relationships across space, time and institutional settings. Second, they seek to deepen our understanding of adivasi societies in relation to their ecological environment, especially their conceptualizations of land and labour, and how these ideologies feed into shaping unequal power relationships amongst themselves and with other groups. Third, they help us realise the importance of locating these dynamic relationships, whether at the level of the household or the community, and the interlocking of personal or individual, community and ecological needs and aspirations, within the changing political and economic context.

On 2 August 2000, the parliament approved the Bill for the reorganisation of Jharkhand as a separate state. Much has been written about the politics and governance of the newly established Jharkhand state and the continuities and changes in livelihoods. But analyses of gender roles and relations, and how these are affected by resource relations, livelihood transitions and the new narratives of citizenship, are missing from the discourse. This provided me the space to focus on the opportunities and the contradictions that have emerged in the new state, as aspirations of the state and its adivasi populations diverge – the former focusing on capitalist growth and the latter on the control over natural resources.

Methodologically, my approach combines historical and ethnographic methods from a feminist epistemological lens. I combine early insights on gender, indigeneity and ecology from colonial archival records like the land revenue settlement records of the early twentieth century with life history narratives from the post-independence years to the present.

Introduction

There is an ongoing debate globally and in India about the types and nature of educational provisioning and its implications on the dynamics of schooling choice and the reproduction of social inequalities (Compare's Special Issue, vol. 36, no. 4, especially Mehrotra and Panchamukhi [2006] and Tooley and Dixon [2006]). Most studies contrast state and private provisioning in terms of access, costs and quality, rather than explore student and parental aspirations and their perceptions about livelihood opportunities and future well-being. The gender-specific ways in which the social and sexual division of labour mediates the schooling experience are largely disregarded. The much-coveted white-collar employment is not necessarily an outcome of educational investment due to the presence of other constraints for boys, and often not even an aspiration for girls; yet the choice of a particular school and the prestige attached to it in itself becomes a marker of social standing and a way of differentiating achievement (Caddell, 2006). Schooling choice can simultaneously be used to either reproduce or transform social and gender inequalities, by excluding the marginalised or providing them an opportunity to gain access to tastes and styles that serve as markers of elite distinction (Bourdieu, 1984).

This chapter explores how people of different social categories (sex, age, occupation, ethnicity) in a village in Jharkhand make educational choices and the way this fits with their distinction aspirations. The village is remotely located, with poor literacy and high poverty rates. It is a mixed-caste village, with populations of Hindus, Muslims and Scheduled Tribes (STs). Social hierarchies and differences are visible in terms of both educational and occupational status across these categories. Despite the presence of affirmative action and welfare policies in favour of the STs, caste Hindus are doing much better than the other two groups. The Muslims and the STs consider attaining education a key strategy to fulfil their aspiration of catching up and competing with the Hindus.

The secondary school certificate in particular is seen as a minimum qualification for most professional jobs; yet in India, few rural boys and girls actually manage to complete their secondary school. At the upper primary level, 50 per cent of enrolled children drop out before completion, with the proportion as high as 65 per cent for ST children (Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2007).