This chapter describes the operational nationalization dataset in detail. The chapter begins by defining state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with de facto control of operations as a measure of operational nationalization. After describing how operational nationalization is measured, the chapter explains the coding and construction of the 187-country, 116-year dataset of national oil companies (NOCs) based on primary and secondary sources of each country’s petroleum history. Only 70 of these countries are major producers, but for completeness the full sample includes all sovereign countries with populations greater than 200,000 in 2000. This chapter includes several brief examples of NOC varieties, cases of NOC reforms and privatizations over time, as well as varieties of nationalization in nonoil sectors like copper, coal, zinc, cobalt, and lithium. The chapter also discusses how the database compares with existing nationalization datasets.

The chapter explains how and why the EU has intervened with both standards and procedural regulations in the case of organic agriculture, first in 1991 and again in 2007. The chapter begins with analyzing the development of private organic agriculture governance since the late-1960s. It shows how attempts at private governance harmonization, the expectation of EU intervention providing new productive opportunities for farmers, and active lobbying by the organic agriculture movement (especially IFOAM) resulted in the 1991 EU Organic Agriculture Regulation. The Regulation offered an organic production standard and modest procedural rules for private governance schemes. Continued problems due to a fragmented private governance market led the Commission to propose severe limitations on private schemes’ governance space in the early-2000s. Opposition to these proposals by private governance schemes, the organic movement, and key Member States prevented significant public intervention. Nonetheless, both standards and procedural regulations were strengthened in an updated Regulation in 2007 by the introduction of a mandatory EU organic logo and mandatory accreditation of private auditors.

Under which conditions will a public authority intervene in private governance such as certification and eco-labeling schemes for sustainably produced goods? This chapter introduces this research question by presenting the empirical puzzle the book addresses: Why has the European Union (EU) intervened in private governance that deals with organic agriculture and biofuels, but has not intervened in private governance dealing with fair trade and fisheries? The chapter distinguishes between a public authority intervening with standards regulation that involves creating a public definition of sustainable production, and with procedural regulation that addresses the way private governance schemes are organized. The argument the book develops is that whether a public authority intervenes with standards and/or procedural regulation depends on the interplay of two variables: the domestic benefits of product differentiation by a public authority and the fragmentation of the private governance market. The chapter situates the book in the current state of the literature on the interactions between public and private governance and explains the research design and research contributions.

This chapter presents a series of empirical analyses to test nationalization's primary effects on revenues and secondary effects on political survival. It begins by assessing the claim that nationalization will foster greater government take of resource revenues compared to maintaining operations by private firms. It then examines whether this corresponds to a higher probability of leadership survival: if nationalization increases state capture of resource revenues, then it should be the case that leaders use this wealth to consolidate power and prevent ouster. Beyond the survival of political leaders, it should also be true that political regimes in general will be stronger if resources are nationalized. These hypotheses are tested using the complete cross-national NOC dataset in conjunction with existing data on government revenues, the breakdown of regimes, and leadership survival. The empirics support the theory: nationalization increases state capture of resource revenues and increases the likelihood of survival of leaders and their political regimes. The results suggest that nationalizing operations explains why resource-rich leaders survive in some countries but not others.

This concluding chapter discusses the scholarly and policy implications of the book’s findings. Leaders that pursue predatory and opportunistic behavior are not as likely to fail as the conventional wisdom suggests; these leaders have little option to survive in power other than by seizing assets instead of building growth-enhancing institutions. This chapter then provides a policy roadmap to how extractive resources will be managed in the future for oil and for commodities that have thus far avoided nationalization. The examination of the possibility of future oil nationalizations in Lebanon and Guyana will be particularly relevant for states considering their ownership options in light of new discoveries. Rare-earth minerals and advanced materials involved in the production of renewable energy facilities and energy storage--namely cobalt, lithium, and palladium--have largely been produced by private firms. If and when the production of these materials is nationalized, it will have profound impacts not only on the leaders of producing countries, but also on the world that relies upon these resources to sustain the coming industrial revolution in clean energy.

Chapter four empirically assess the veracity of the argument on why leaders nationalize their oil sectors and establish operational national oil companies (NOCs). To test hypotheses derived from the theory’s implications, this chapter presents the findings from a method of statistical analysis that combines the cross-national NOC dataset with information elicited from structured interviews with oil experts. This technique -- Bayesian statistics -- allows for a holistic analysis of the determinants of nationalization that incorporates both quantitative and qualitative evidence on NOC formation. The results show the importance of information diffusion and perceptions of leader survival in the decision to nationalize the oil sector. The chapter then offers a case comparison of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 1940s to show how information diffusion to a strong regime led to maintaining private ownership in Saudi Arabia in 1949, while knowledge about revenue sharing diffused to a weak regime led to nationalization in Iran in 1951.

The chapter explains how and why the EU has intervened with both standards and procedural regulations in the case of biofuels production, first in 2009 and again in 2015. The chapter begins with an analysis of the emergence of private biofuels governance since the early 2000s. It then discusses how in 2003 the EU established a policy stimulating the development of a domestic crop-based biofuels market based on the expected economic and environmental benefits of biofuels, while not directly addressing private governance. Once it became clear that the sustainability of biofuels needed to be regulated, the EU established standards and procedural regulations in the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive. Developing sustainability criteria was considered necessary to further support the economic opportunities of farmers and biofuels producers. The diversity of biofuel certification schemes also warranted EU-level control, with policymakers considering them useful instruments to verify compliance with public sustainability criteria in the form of a meta-standard approach. Continued problems with the diversity of private schemes resulted in additional procedural regulation in the 2015 ILUC Directive.

How does nationalization of operations causally increase government revenue? Using the case of oil politics in prerevolutionary Iran, this chapter analyzes production elasticity and reduced informational asymmetries after the Shah of Iran nationalized the oil operations of BP and its partners. The chapter draws on a combination of conversations documented in archival records and quantitative analysis of historical fiscal data from the BP Archive. It begins by explaining the Shah’s surprise decision in January 1973 to reconfigure the National Iranian Oil Company from its role as a passive observer to a fully operational oil company able to set production levels and prices. The chapter then presents findings using BP’s revenue projections as counterfactuals to estimate the causal effects of the Shah’s decision with respect to whether NOC reform increased government take of oil revenues in 1974–1975 and whether revenues collapsed after retaliation by international oil companies in 1976 to strip the NOC of its ability to sell oil on the global market. The chapter illustrates both the nuances and consequences of operational versus nonoperational NOCs for fiscal strength.

The chapter develops a theory of public intervention in private governance. It examines the conditions under which a public authority will intervene and the form this intervention will take: standards and/or procedural regulations or the absence of intervention. The chapter explains that the type of public intervention depends on the interplay of two variables: the domestic benefits of product differentiation and the fragmentation of the private governance market. On the one hand, a pubic authority may intervene in the market for sustainably certified goods to improve the competitive position of domestic producers, who are the main rule targets of private governance schemes. On the other hand, a public authority can intervene to structure a fragmented private governance market in order to overcome problems such as supply chain confusion, a lack of credibility of existing private governance schemes, and trade and competitive distortions. The chapter further conceptualizes private governance schemes as interest groups that engage in lobbying. It also explains the dynamics of the theory in the context of the EU policymaking process and how the interventions may evolve over time.

The chapter explains why the EU explicitly decided not to intervene in private fair trade governance on two separate occasions, in 1999 and in 2009. The chapter starts by comparing private fair trade governance schemes, including Fairtrade International, Rainforest Alliance, and UTZ Certified. It then discusses why EU policymakers in the 1990s focused on Fairtrade only and declined to intervene because of the specific North–South trade dynamics of this issue area; the lack of concrete productive opportunities in the EU; and institutional constraints of the international trade regime. The Fair Trade movement’s successful harmonization of complementary private governance schemes also contributed to the EU’s non-interventionist approach. The broadening of the policy domain beyond Fairtrade in the early 2000s did not lead to fragmentation concerns, since differences among the schemes were framed as commercial and economic-ideological in nature and not problematized as a fragmentation issue. Active lobbying by and on behalf of private governance schemes ensured this outcome, resulting in a market for private governance that remains free of public intervention.