This chapter examines the specific features that made US antitrust and EU competition law particularly conducive to a republican understanding of economic liberty and translated the structural goal of preserving a polycentric market structure into concrete competition policy. It sheds light on how the ideal of republican liberty and the idea of a competition–democracy nexus were given shape through a specific legal modus operandi, such as the structure of legal commands, standards of assessments, and institutional principles. The chapter identifies the (i) extensive use of broadly construed rule-like presumptions of anticompetitiveness, a (ii) possibilist standard of harm, and (iii) a precautionary error–cost framework erring in the case of doubt on the side of over-deterrence (type I errors) as the main channels of republican antitrust in the US and EU. These legal filters can be considered the main parameters or policy levers of a distinctive republican approach towards antitrust law and policy.

For years now, Kerala has had the distinction of being ruled by a communist-partyled coalition. The communist alliance won the first state assembly elections in 1957, lost in 1960, returned to power, and ruled the state in 1967–70 (first under E.M.S. Namboothiripad till 1969 and then under C. Achuthamenon), 1970–77, 1978–79 1980–81, 1987–91, 1996–2001, 2006– 11 and since 2016. In between, there were years when the state was under President's Rule, that is, the federal government governed it. The composition of the left coalition changed. It was never a body consisting of only the ideologically left parties: the Muslim League and some Christian factions allied with the communists. However, the main constituents of the coalition were the Communist Party of India (CPI) until 1964 and the CPI (Marxist), or CPI(M), after the CPI split into two parties.

In no other state of India, except West Bengal (and later Tripura), did the CPI or CPI(M) command a popular support base large enough to win elections. In common with West Bengal, tenants and agricultural labourers in these acutely land-scarce regions formed the main support base for the party. The communists won elections on the promise of land reforms. There was another historic factor behind their popularity. Caste equality movements coalesced around the leftist movement. Because of their commitment to the rural and land-dependent poor, the left delivered land reforms in Kerala and West Bengal in the 1970s. And in both states, ruling left parties indirectly drove private capital out of trade and industry. Ideological differences within the Communist Party of India led to a split in 1964. A faction led by S.A. Dange tended to have cooperation with the Indian National Congress, which then had a good relationship with the Soviet Union. That and the debates on National Bourgeoisie led to the split.

This is not a paradox. The paradox was that from the 1990s, if not earlier, the left quietly turned friendly towards private capital. By then, agriculture was in retreat, the old base of the left was not significant anymore, and the state was rapidly falling behind India in economic growth (and investment rates).

The introduction chapter lays the groundwork for understanding the intricate relationship between Congress and information acquisition, particularly through committee hearings and witness testimonies. Highlighting the pivotal role of information in shaping legislative decisions, the chapter probes into the challenges faced by Congress in navigating the complex landscape of external expertise within a politically charged environment. The chapter delves into the critical questions driving the book’s exploration: How does Congress acquire information, and what factors influence the selection and content of information provided by external witnesses? It introduces the overarching themes of partisan incentives, institutional conditions, and the strategic nature of information acquisition, aiming to dissect their impact on legislative processes. By providing a comprehensive overview of the book’s scope, methodology, and key theoretical insights, the introduction sets the tone for a deep dive into the dynamics of congressional information-seeking behavior.

This chapter introduces the conceptual claim of this book that the idea of a competition-democracy nexus is grounded in a normative commitment to a republican conception of economic liberty as non-domination originating in ancient Roman thought. The chapter first shows how the existing ‘special interest capture’ and ‘conventional liberty’ accounts fail to make sense of the competition–democracy nexus. It then explores the republican conception of liberty as non-domination as an alternative explanation of the idea of a competition–democracy nexus. It shows that this republican understanding of economic liberty is the only explanatory variable that can explain why competition enhances and the concentration of economic power undermines democracy and why competition law is the right tool to address this problem.

This chapter discusses the study’s main findings and their broader theoretical implications for how we understand the role of parties and partisanship in democratic accountability and representation. It contributes to ongoing debates about the various functions that parties serve, the changing relationship between parties and voters, and the development of partisanship in new democracies. The chapter concludes by illustrating the theory’s relevance and plausibility in other new democracies as well as for new parties in more established democracies.

In this chapter, we examine how the politics of interbranch relations between the legislature and the bureaucracy affect the invitation of bureaucratic witnesses to hearings and how Congress can use hearings to control executive branch influence. We focus on the presence of divided government – when the party controlling Congress is not the party that controls the White House. We find that during periods of divided government, committees invited relatively fewer bureaucrats to testify; instead, they invited relatively more witnesses from think tanks, universities, and within Congress itself. This result is particularly pronounced when hearings were held on issues that the president prioritized. These findings are substantively important, especially given how the existing literature has characterized bureaucrats’ advantages in information and expertise in policy implementation vis-à-vis Congress. We provide evidence that under divided government, committees limited the amount of expert information from the executive branch that could be favorable to a president from the opposing party and instead welcomed outsiders to compensate for the relative loss of information from bureaucrats.

This chapter empirically tests the theory about the micro-foundations of electoral support for new parties. It analyzes how individual voters respond to appeals based on different mobilization strategies in discrete choice experiments conducted in Bolivia and Ecuador. These experiments present voters with campaign posters that closely resemble real-world posters; the results illustrate that organizational endorsements are very effective at mobilizing electoral support, especially for new parties. Such endorsements are also effective across several different types of organizations and can sway organization members as well as people in their wider social networks. Furthermore, endorsements can influence voters even when they provide no direct information about policy platforms; unlike organization members, sympathetic nonmembers do not follow the endorsements. It also shows that endorsements can even overcome ethnic cleavages and foster electoral support when candidates’ policy positions are at odds with voters’ preferences.

The state's climate is unique among Indian states. Following the Koppen– Geiger classification of climatic regions of the world, over two-thirds of the land in India is tropical savanna, desert or semi-arid. Most of Kerala is monsoonal or highland tropics. The difference is this. The average summer temperature in the former regions can reach levels high enough to dry up surface water. The monsoon rains relieve that aridity, but only for a few months in a year. That dual condition makes water storage and recycling a fundamental precondition for economic growth. It elevates the risk of droughts and diseases from seasonal or periodic acute water shortages. Kerala, by contrast, does not get as fierce a summer as the other areas of India and receives a lot more rainfall. That dual condition implies a natural immunity from seasonal food and water scarcity and a low disease risk.

With its extraordinary biodiversity, this is a vast storehouse for natural resources. The state has a surface area of 38,855 square kilometres and is bounded by the Arabian Sea to the west and the Western Ghats to the east. The eastern highlands, the central midlands and the western lowlands, with 580 kilometres of coastline, can access a wealth of ocean resources and means of subsistence for their fisherfolk and the general populace. Compared with semi-arid India, the benign environment largely explains the head start in life expectancy (Chapters 1 and 6). Further, nature provides industrial resources that cannot be found elsewhere. The highlands have the ideal climate for growing coffee, tea and spices. Low hills are often planted with rubber. The seaboard traded with West Asia for centuries. The state's Gulf connection, thus, had a prehistory. A large tourism business has developed by selling nature.

On the other hand, recent experience shows that climate change and overdevelopment can jointly raise the risk of disasters. In the first three weeks of August 2018, Kerala received 164 per cent of the average rainfall for that time of the year. The following floods were devastating, comparable only to a similar event in 1924. In 2019, extreme weather repeated, now causing landslides. Mining and quarrying, frequent blasting and unscientific changes in land use patterns affected the highland ecology.

This chapter explores how different proponents of the idea of a competition–democracy nexus envisaged the opertationalisation of the twin-goal of republican liberty and democracy through the protection of competitive markets as an institution of antipower. Various republican antitrust paradigms shared the idea that competitive markets operate as an institution of antipower that maximises liberty as non-domination and promotes republican democracy as long as they diffuse economic power polycentrically amongst a multitude of independent economic agents. Based on this assumption, all iterations of the competition–democracy nexus saw the role of legal rules and, most notably, competition law as securing a polycentric and deconcentrated market structure. The various republican antitrust paradigms also envisaged different ways through which competition law can guarantee and preserve polycentric competitive markets. These design approaches can be largely divided into two categories: situational and conduct-based structuralism.

Chapter 7 scrutinizes how Congress’s internal resources impact the quantity and quality of information received by committees. Amid concerns over diminishing congressional capacity and the waning role of support agencies, the chapter explores the repercussions of downsizing initiatives – such as the elimination of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) – on committee information channels. Employing a difference-in-differences research design, the study reveals a stark decline in technical and scientific witnesses invited by committees heavily reliant on internally produced information post-OTA elimination. The findings underscore the critical role of robust congressional capacity in summoning research-based witnesses, emphasizing its pivotal significance in ensuring legislators’ access to vital scientific and technical insights.