The chapter opens with an overview of the discussions on internal armed conflict at the four sessions of the diplomatic conference convened between 1974 and 1977 (the ‘CDDH’) which led to the conclusion of the first two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Conventions. The chapter then considers key outcomes of the CDDH – Article 1(4) of Protocol I, which requires ‘wars of national liberation’ to be treated as international rather than internal armed conflicts, and Protocol II in terms of both scope and content – from the perspective of the principal actors in the negotiations, in this instance the USA, UK, Canada, Nordic states (particularly Norway), Australia, Egypt, India, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and ICRC. In this instance, the provisions on internal armed conflict primarily reflected the preferences of materially less powerful states: the 1974 negotiation of Article 1(4) also illustrates well the limited efficacy of moral persuasion, technical authority and principled argument in the absence of a normative consensus across delegations. The 1977 drafting of Protocol II, in contrast, highlights the ability of weaker powers to deploy moral and technical authority alongside principled argument to bring about drafting outcomes.

How does institutional complexity affect effectiveness? This chapter addresses this question for the three policy fields studied in this book: renewable energy, fossil fuel subsidy reform, and carbon markets. The chapter takes a comprehensive perspective across the three case studies by examining three dimensions of effectiveness: output (generating regulations and intrastructure), outcome (changing behaviour), and impact (solving the problem). The study relies on a two-track approach, integrating assessments by researchers and interviews with key stakeholders. The results show how the considerable institutional complexity in the climate-energy nexus has consequences for effectiveness. Notwithstanding the methodical challenges for evaluating effectiveness under conditions of institutional complexity, these insights demonstrate that such an assessment is of high importance and should be continued for other contexts of global governance. In particular, the findings of this chapter help to identify suitable management options – i.e. options for formally regulating the linkage between institutions – for the climate-energy nexus. With these suggestions and its conceptual and empirical novelty, the chapter contributes to a variety of literatures – on climate and energy governance, on institutional complexity, and on effectiveness – while being of interest to different stakeholders operating in the climate-energy nexus.

The first section of the chapter draws together the findings from Chapters 3 – 5, revisiting Chapter 1’s ‘straw-person’ Figure 1 in light of the case studies to produce a more fine-grained portrait of how hypothesised and other factors contributed to shaping the civil war regime. This is followed by a reconsideration of how these factors combined in different instances to produce drafting outputs.

This chapter provides context for the study as a whole, situating the development of the civil war regime within the evolution of the international law of armed conflict. The chapter considers the classical, mediaeval and enlightenment manifestations of the legal distinction between international and internal armed conflict. It then discusses the rise and fall of the doctrines of belligerency and insurgency, the Lieber Code, and the establishment and early activities of the ICRC, before surveying the development of the law of armed conflict from the late 19th century until the Second World War. The chapter then considers the development of the civil war regime between 1949 and 1998 and subsequently, highlighting the key elements of the regime and setting these in the broader international legal context, including the development of international human rights law and international criminal law.

The concluding chapter first summarizes some of the volume’s main results along the four evaluative themes. In terms of coherence and management, the three policy fields under scrutiny – renewable energy, fossil fuel subsidy reform, and carbon pricing – are roughly marked by coordination, rather than competition or outright harmony. Regarding legitimacy, the specializations and work backgrounds of stakeholders lead to considerable variations in their perceptions of institutions. For effectiveness, institutional complexity plays both a supportive and a hindering role across all three cases. Following the summary, a series of policy recommendations is developed, including: improving awareness of each other’s activities to avoid duplication of efforts and conflicting messages; aligning interpretations of central concepts, i.e. what constitutes renewable sources of energy, fossil fuel subsidies and carbon pricing; building stronger connections to counterparts in other areas of the climate-energy nexus and beyond; and entrusting one institution with an orchestrator role. Finally, the chapter suggests a future research agenda on the governance of the climate-energy nexus, e.g. to learn more about the causes of institutional complexity, to identify conditions for successful management efforts, and to examine further subfields and even other domains outside the climate-energy nexus.

In this chapter I apply the framework developed in Chapter 3 to the first case study, namely the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy missions. This case study focuses on two such mission in particular: NAVFOR Atalanta and EULEX Kosovo. The structure of both missions and their potential for human rights violations is discussed, before turning to the applicable accountability mechanisms. These include the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Ombudsman, domestic courts, and EULEX Kosovo’s Human Rights Review Panel. The overall assessment is that the accountability mechanisms applicable to CSDP missions are insufficient.

In this chapter I apply the framework developed in Chapter 3 to the ICC Detention Centre. The chapter opens with an overview of who the ICC detains, and how the Detention Centre is managed. Then I identify the human rights obligations of the ICC and discuss the potential for human rights violations in connection with ICC detention. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to the myriad of accountability mechanisms available to ICC detainees: the administrative appeals procedure, pre-trial and appeals chambers, the Independent Oversight Mechanism, and domestic courts. Despite some promising aspects, these accountability mechanisms are also insufficient.

This chapter introduces the topic in four steps. First, by explaining the research design. Second, by explaining the methodology applied. Third, by discussing a few key aspects related to the sources of law applied. Fourt, the chapter concludes with a section on the concept accountability, and how it can be applied to the relationship between international organizations and individuals.

In this concluding chapter I first summarize the key findings across the three case studies, and offer an overall conclusion to the research question posed in the introduction. I also discuss some hypotheses, generated from the case study findings, which may explain the variations between cases and the variations between different types of accountability mechanisms. Finally, I sketch out some aspects of a reform agenda.

This chapter establishes four evaluative themes that will be employed across this volume to analyze the institutional complexity of policy fields in the climate-energy nexus: coherence, management, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Coherence among institutions is conceptualized along four dimensions: convergence on an overarching core norm for the policy field, balanced coverage and distribution of memberships (private, public, hybrid), balanced coverage and distribution of governance functions (standards and commitments, operational activities, information and networking, financing), and mechanisms underlying cross-institutional relations (cognitive, normative, behavioural). Management will be examined according to types of managing agents, political levels (from domestic to global), and the consequences of management efforts in enhancing coherence. Legitimacy will be assessed along nine dimensions, among them expertise, transparency, accountability, or procedural and distributive fairness. Effectiveness, finally, will be examined in terms of normative and legal output produced by the institutions, their behaviour-changing outcome, and their ultimate problem-solving impact. Altogether, the four themes and their dimensions make up a novel framework for an in-depth analysis of a governance nexus. They help us examine a variety of important questions in a comparative research design, combining a high level of ambition with feasibility and novelty.