The concluding chapter gives an overview of our key results and critically reassess our conceptual and theoretical approach in light of our empirical findings. We discuss theoretical implications and some limitations to our study and conclude by pointing out future avenues for research, including the need to investigate the link between administrative styles and policy outputs, the interaction of formal autonomy and administrative styles, as well as issues of stability and change of administrative styles.

This chapter focuses s on the IMF and the UNHCR as two IPAs that display a highly entrepreneurial administrative style. These IPAs share routines that combine strong policy advocacy with institutional consolidation. Taking account of the high differences in formal autonomy between the two IPAs, these similarities in administrative styles are striking. In particular, one might intuitively expect that in view of its limited autonomy the UNHCR should display a servant style. Yet, what these IPAs have in common is the perception of similarly low internal and high external constraints that facilities the emergence of entrepreneurial routines in both.

This chapter shows how humanitarian agencies account for the aid they provide, acknowledging donors, creating aid narratives, and seeking to legitimise their allocation decisions. Three case studies of Ireland, Soviet Russia, and Ethiopia illustrate the variety of aid documentation over time and across organisations. Broader issues of governance, legitimacy, and equity often remained secondary to the idea of efficiency. Thus, humanitarian records present the entangled moral and economic choices made, while rarely addressing the dilemmas faced. The moral demand for accountability was primarily ascribed to donors. Transnational famine relief throughout the 1840s, 1920s, and 1980s placed great emphasis on reports. Accounting practices were directed at satisfying the demands of the givers, but at the same time consumed resources that could have helped the needy.

Introduction

These words, spoken on 13 April 2017 during a debate in the Kyrgyzstan Parliament by an ethnic Kyrgyz member called Ainura Altybaeva, express the strong resentment that exists against ethnic Uzbeks, for the quotation highlights a difference in the way many Kyrgyzstan Uzbeks feel: they do not generally worry that their children might grow up as ‘non-patriots of Kyrgyzstan’. This is hardly their main concern. As my Uzbek informants reveal, the practices that characterize the everyday securityscapes of Uzbeks in Southern Kyrgyzstan point in a very different direction. They have chosen to encourage their children to learn the Russian language because members of the Uzbek community do not generally see a future for their children in Kyrgyzstan. This is why the majority of Uzbek children from economically stable families attend private Russian-language kindergartens and schools, or take language courses in Russian.

This phenomenon is in direct contrast to what the Kyrgyz government is doing at the larger level of policymaking, where it vigorously promotes the role of the Kyrgyz language, culture and tradition. All recent Kyrgyzstani presidents have actively championed the primary usage of the Kyrgyz language. In 2011, then President of the Kyrgyz Republic Roza Otunabaeva stated that ‘the younger generation of all ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan should eventually learn to speak Kyrgyz’ (Farangis, 2011). In 2013, Almazbek Atambaev, president from 2011 to 2017, again expressed an interest in promoting the Kyrgyz language, stating that ‘it is a disgrace to not speak the language of the country where one permanently lives’ (Baktybaev, 2013).

The purpose of this article is to examine how Uzbek parents in Osh seek to make sense of their children's future and act in ways that are acceptable to the state in response to the dramatic conflicts and political changes in Kyrgyzstan's post-Soviet environment. In times of insecurity and rapid change brought about by conflict, the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan are finding creative ways of building a better future for their children.

Operating against anarchy rather than hierarchy, international constitutionalization is a highly contested but unintended political process. It is a by–product of international treaty making, which is intended to create fairly specialized rules within issue–specific domains. Approximating the evolutionary pathway, this process nonetheless generates a less unified international constitutional framework than in the national setting. An examination of international constitutional developments (along the five core constitutional elements) reveals that formalization of international rules through treaties has become standard in the post–1945 period. Sovereignty has developed into the fundamental international principle, extending the circle of members to include newly emerging states. Relations among states have deepened to enhance inter–state cooperation, and rights and duties have further reproduced inequalities among states. The chapter concludes by stressing the inadvertent constitutional consequences of international treaty making, which leads to the constitutionalization trap.

In this chapter, the comparison of the NATO and the ILO reveals similar administrative styles despite them having almost nothing in common in structural terms. While NATO’s servant style is not particularly astounding, given its policy area, mandate, and functional design, the ILO’s case is puzzling. Despite it being an organization with rather broad autonomy, (normative) authority, and high legitimacy, the ILO’s IPA regularly behaves very passively when it comes to putting its own stance on the IO’s outputs. We show that their similar servant styles can traced back high internal challenges and to the perception of not particularly pronounced external pressures. In conjunction, the constraints arising from the former and the sense of security stemming from the latter render more entrepreneurial behaviour neither possible nor necessary.

Chapter 5 compares the IOM and FAO. It highlights how internal challenges in the absence of serious external threats favour a similar consolidator style in the two IPAs. Both IPAs combine pronounced routines directed towards institutional consolidation with only weak policy advocacy. We show that neither size, budgets, mandate, nor organizational structure can convincingly account both for the IPAs’ pronounced positional orientation and their lack of functional orientation geared towards advocacy. Moreover, the chapter draws attention to the stickiness of administrative styles in showing that such deeply and institutionalized organizational routines tend to display high stability towards endogenous and exogenous change.