Just as the initial driver of the desire to tell positive stories and increase Chinese soft power was a defensive one, so too was the Chinese rejection of the truly universal nature of dominant norms and practices of international politics. Rather than consider China against supposedly universal definitions and concepts, the aim was to ‘Sinify’ them. To establish understandings and definitions that emerged from China's own history and thinking and reflected China's specific developmental experiences. This would then generate specific China relevant definitions that should provide the basis for any consideration and/or evaluation of Chinese policy and practice rather than using those developed and deployed by others that had emerged from Western philosophies and histories.

The logical extension of this thinking, continually repeated by Chinese leaders and scholars, is that all countries need to do the same to develop individual bespoke nationalized norms and theories. The same reasoning applies to political systems and economic models as well. So, for example, just as China developed its own developmental path and did not follow any other pre-existing model – even socialist models explored elsewhere – so ‘other countries should not copy the Chinese model’ (Xiao Xinfa, 2018: 26). They should not follow the specifics of what China did, but instead copy the same methodology and ‘embark on a political development path that suits its own national conditions and conforms to its own characteristics’ (Zhou, 2018: 13). The outcome should be a system of normative, theoretical and developmental anarchy. Anarchy is used here in its IR theoretical meaning of an absence of a higher form of authority above the sovereign state where no interpretation dominates, and each country pursues its own development path and defines its own set of national norms and principles. The result should be a global order characterized by massive diversity, with the common nature of values, norms and principles stripped back to very basic elements and only the most basic components of the ‘common values’ of existence (Yan Shuhan, 2018: 20).

The need to embrace diversity is one of the core principles of the CSFM, and marks it out as a very different type of global ambition than those that conceive of building a community of common (liberal) values.

Before 2004, it was extremely rare to hear the words ‘China’ and ‘soft power’ spoken in the same sentence (Gill and Huang, 2006). In the following five years, the study of Chinese soft power generated enough scholarship to put it on the way to becoming part of any mainstream analysis of the Chinese power. Predominantly China's potential regional power but also influence and attraction in other parts of the world too. In a remarkably short period of time, it was a topic that went from being pretty much non-existent to become a ‘theme of the time’ of sorts.

It is no real coincidence that this rather rapid change of focus coincided with the initial boom in COFDI discussed in the previous chapter. In addition to the general growth of financial flows, the establishment of China's new sovereign wealth fund (the CIC in September 2007) provided a focal point for those already concerned that the Chinese state was now prepared to use its financial resources in strategic ways that could harm the national interests of major Western powers. Not just by buying up strategic assets in the West, but also by trying to buy friendship and support in the developing world. It also provided an example within China of how (mis)perceptions of what the country wanted could result in actions to block Chinese activity (Wu and Seach, 2008: 47). Hence the importance of trying to assuage these potential concerns by ‘cultivating a benign reputation abroad’ (Shirk, 2007: 106).

There were other reasons too though. In 2007, Hu Jintao's report to the 17th Party Congress had included a specific call to increase Chinese soft power as a source of both national cohesion and global competition:

Over the course of the twentieth century, America’s strategic theorists drew from at least four paradigms of war’s nature: traditional, modern, materialist, and political. The traditional paradigm remained in vogue until the 1950s, even though the expansion of airpower during the 1920s and 1930s qualitatively changed the character of war. For that reason, the same three Jominian core principles – concentration, offensive action, and decision by battle – remained operative. The development of nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and 1950s, however, raised concerns over those principles and the traditional paradigm. As a result, it was strongly challenged by the political model, through the vehicle of limited war theory. By the late 1950s, the political model was in open conflict with the traditional paradigm. By this point, the principles of limited war theory had taken precedence over the core Jominian imperatives. In this case, a change in the character of war, or rather a near-change since nuclear weapons were not used after 1945, had created competing paradigms in the American way of thinking about war.

Chapter 5 analyzes the thinking of Herman Kahn, who dared to think the unthinkable. It describes his "America," which again was that of the golden age of the middle class, but which also overlapped with the sense of malaise that plagued the 1970s. Like the limited war theorists, Kahn agreed military instincts needed to be curbed, and he attempted to counter uncertainty by arguing, largely in vain, that escalation itself was also a bargaining process with systematic waystations or steps embedded along its path. This chapter discusses his model of war’s nature, which, like those of Brodie, Osgood, and Schelling, priviledged war’s political dimension, though he gave policy more agency than did they.

Chapter 9 analyzes the theories of John Boyd and William Lind. It describes their lives as well as their "America," which was marked by the widespread sense of malaise that followed America’s failure in Vietnam. Both theoriests contributed to a resurgence of maneuver theory as well as to an empasis on the importance of an adversary’s cultural values and social cohesion. This chapter discusses their assumptions about war’s nature, which formed the modern model.

Overview

While the assertion that ‘geography and history play a significant role in foreign policy-making’ (Cohen 2015) is a point that has been well contested, in the case of the Republic of Turkey, the country's own state practices demonstrate that its geographical characteristics have played an important role in the determination of at least its transboundary water policy. Turkey lies at the upstream of several transboundary rivers – namely, the Euphrates– Tigris (ET), Coruh and Kura; it is considered at least one source of the many transboundary tributaries of the River Aras, and is in a downstream position regarding the Orontes and Meric Rivers.

The total surface area of the drainage basins of these rivers comes to 256,000 km2, which constitutes around one-third of Turkey's total surface area. The average water potential of these rivers within Turkey is 70 billion m3 per year, equivalent to 30 per cent of the overall water potential of the country. Transboundary rivers form the basis of 22 per cent of Turkey's borders, constituting at least some of the dividing markers with all neighbours – namely, Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Moreover, Turkey presides over a significant amount of arable and irrigable land in these river basins; the ET river basin alone constitutes 20 per cent of the country's arable land. Considering the growing demands of the increasing urban and rural populations of these basins, geography clearly lies at the fore in the formulation of transboundary water policies (Kibaroglu 2015).

Since the first years of the Republic of Turkey (established in 1923), the changing nature of relations with various neighbours has determined the subsequent evolution of transboundary water policies. Hence, from the early 1920s until the late 1950s, when Turkey and its neighbours were all engaged with establishing state bureaucracies, their aligned concerns and similar need for socio-economic development paved the way for an overall productive relationship to ensue. Throughout this period, Turkey signed various bilateral treaties, which mostly concerned the delimitation and the nature of use of boundary rivers (Kibaroglu et al. 2011). Also significant is that, at the time, none of the relevant countries pursued any major development projects which would have resulted in utilization of water by one to the detriment of the others (Kibaroglu et al. 2012).

Diplomacy is a set of initiatives that aims at reaching agreeable solutions between parties who have diverging interests in potentially conflict-laden issues that might otherwise escalate into a hot confrontation. Diplomacy encompasses the processes and institutions by means of which national interests and identities of sovereign states are represented to one another (Wiseman and Sharp 2012) and is enshrined in international law, which states use to explain and justify their policies to actors concerned before the international system. Diplomacy brings state behaviour into the realm of logic and order, by explaining it in terms of existing international legal norms. It is thus a product of foreign policy, combined with international law (Hurd 2015). In line with these definitions, this book aims to assess ‘the processes and institutions’ in Turkey's water diplomacy framework with a specific focus on its evolving position vis-à-vis international water law.

Water is vital to many levels of human survival. It fluctuates both in space and time, and has multiple and conflicting demands in terms of its use. This means that flows crossing international boundaries can be a source of tension between states (Wolf 1998). While tension does not necessarily always lead to hot confrontation, early coordination and cooperation between riparian states through water diplomacy mechanisms can often help solve the problems that may arise thereof. Water diplomacy is a process of interactions between states that ultimately hope to prevent hostility through dialogue. The role of water diplomacy in the context of transboundary waters is to foster cooperation among riparians. A broader and more inclusive definition would posit that ‘water diplomacy includes all measures by state and non-state actors that can be undertaken to prevent or peacefully resolve (emerging) conflicts and facilitate cooperation related to water availability, allocation or use between and within states and public and private stakeholders’ (Huntjens et al. 2016, 13).

The main objective of this book is to elucidate Turkey's water diplomacy framework with its key actors and guiding principles. Thus, the analysis adopts an institutionalist approach, by presenting and emphasizing the role of the legal and institutional foundations upon which Turkey's water diplomacy framework rests.

Overview

Water diplomacy covers a complex array of water management problems that can be best understood as a product of competition, feedback and interconnectivity between natural and societal variables within a political context (Islam and Susskind 2013). Although we currently observe the emergence and increasing presence of non-state actors within the framework of water diplomacy, states are nonetheless pivotal in its practice. Hence, previous chapters of this book have expounded upon the discourses and practices of water diplomacy as have been implemented by the Turkish state, analyzing its institutional foundations in the context of the country's historical and geographical realities.

Broadening the view, however, this chapter offers a look at the role nonstate actors play in Turkey's water diplomacy framework (WDF); investigating if and how epistemic communities, academia and civil society contribute to transboundary water policymaking. Particular attention has been paid to a Track II initiative, namely the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC), which was established in 2005 by a group of scholars and professionals from Turkey, Syria and Iraq in the Euphrates-Tigris (ET) river basin.

The chapter concludes with a presentation of the best practices and lessons learned from the history of Turkey's water diplomacy. Keeping an open dialogue with its neighbours over transboundary water issues as well as signing of several bilateral water agreements (i.e. best practices) can be seen as achievements in Turkish water diplomacy. Yet, lack of a comprehensive river basin treaty and Turkey's (non-party) position towards global and regional (European) conventions still constitute stumbling blocks from which lessons should be drawn. The chapter offers a non-zero-sum approach to water negotiations in making policy-relevant recommendations for tackling with future challenges in Turkey's water diplomacy.

Non-State Actors in Turkey's Water Diplomacy Framework

Track II Water Diplomacy: Euphrates– Tigris Initiative for Cooperation*

The international arena is no longer the exclusive domain of foreign ministries and diplomats. Aside from the efforts of official diplomats, civil society and academia play an important role in establishing connections and building trust between various parties (Huntjens and de Man 2017).

Track I diplomacy is typically carried out by government officials, who use bargaining, negotiation and other peaceful means to negotiate treaties, trade policies and other international agreements – including those aimed at preventing, limiting, managing or settling conflict.

Overview

Turkey's fundamental foreign policy principles with respect to transboundary waters have been shaped by physical as well as human geography, and influenced by global, regional and bilateral political, economic and social interactions. In this chapter, Turkey's water diplomacy principles will be analyzed by scrutinizing the official manuals and information notes published by the concerned ministries, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs (MFWA), as well as from speeches and statements delivered by concerned authorities at international gatherings and in the press.

An analysis of the MFA's standpoint on ‘sustainable water management’, through the documents posted on its official website, demonstrates that Turkey's overall water policy and water diplomacy principles are closely connected (Table 1). The MFA's observations on the global water predicament are informed by international scientific studies issued by UN agencies (UN-Water 2018). In this respect, the MFA highlights that more than half of the world's population will be living with a water shortage within 50 years due to the worldwide water crisis. The MFA also draws attention to related global statistics and scientific information: ‘While the world's population grew threefold, water use increased sixfold during the twentieth century, and the problem is further aggravated by the uneven water distribution on earth’. Moreover, the MFA to ask the critical question regarding ‘what governments and international organizations should do to reverse the situation and avert a water crisis at the global level’. The MFA has, indeed, been attentive to the global water situation and has developed discourses on issues such as ensuring global food security for over eight billion people by providing adequate supply of water for irrigation and agriculture. Furthermore, the MFA underlines the importance of the adoption of a more efficient water management system so that governments can meet the most basic human needs (MFA 2018a).

The MFA underlines that ‘water resources are essential for satisfying basic human needs, alleviating health problems, promoting social and economic development in general, and conserving ecosystems’. The MFA stresses the importance of sustainable water resources management in the context of socio-economic development.

Overview

Water law, especially at the international level, has been relentlessly criticized as vague, useless and impotent. Yet, whenever a dispute arises at local, national or international level, water law has often been instantly resorted to as a panacea to lead negotiations to settlements between competing stakeholders. And thus, despite its many ambiguities, the overriding view is that by levelling the playing field for all stakeholders and permitting the consideration of all relevant factors, international water law still constitutes a valuable tool in providing the necessary framework to set the fundamental principles, priorities, approaches and objectives of integrated water resource management at the river basin level (Wouters et al. 2003).

It is generally observed that water diplomacy circles, namely diplomats, legal advisers and decision makers in Turkey have endorsed and adopted customary international water law, particularly its cornerstone principles, that is, ‘equitable utilization’ and ‘no significant harm’. Hence, this chapter first depicts how and to what extent Turkey's state practices follow and contribute to the principles of customary international water law.

Turkey's position towards the Convention on the Law of the Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses (hereinafter, United Nations Watercourses Convention – UNWC) has constituted a significant aspect of how its transboundary water policy have been perceived by relevant external actors. It is striking, for instance, that Turkey was one of only three countries who rejected the UNWC in 1997 (Convention 1997). Although the reasons behind Turkey's rejection of the UNWC were officially stated during the Working Groups in New York in 1997, they were never properly elaborated upon in such a way as to reflect its concerns and dilemmas. Hence, it falls to this chapter to shed some light on just these concerns.

It pays to recall in the meantime that since the UNWC vote in 1997, there have been many changes to Turkey's stance vis-à-vis international water law. The chapter will also look into those changes (i.e. the bureaucratic reorganization process) and focus on the evolving position of Turkey vis-à-vis international water law. To illustrate, the main responsibilities of the Water Law and Policy Department, under the General Directorate of Water Management (DGWM) of the MFWA (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry since 2018), include making studies on national and international water law and legislation, scrutinizing international conventions and leading harmonization efforts with regional and global water law instruments in coordination with the relevant public institutions.

This book presents the main institutions and the principles of Turkey's water diplomacy framework. All through the book, the chapters dwell upon and highlight the specific role of the Euphrates–Tigris (ET) river basin in developing water diplomacy principles as well as shaping Turkey's stance vis-à-vis the international water law. One key finding of the book is that Turkey's water diplomacy framework embodies clearly identifiable, well-established formal state institutions. Thus, as Figure 1 demonstrates, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) constitutes the central node of water diplomacy institutional framework. In the same vein, the MFA leads the systematic bureaucratic collaboration with water line ministries and relevant institutions, namely the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (former MFWA and MEF). Those state institutions, which are generally responsible for the development, management and preservation of water resources have worked closely with the MFA in the formulation of the fundamental principles of water diplomacy. Moreover, the concerned state institutions that are responsible for different aspects of water policy and management have been diversified in the early 2000s. Thus, the General Directorate of Water Management and the Turkish Water Institute (SUEN) have contributed to water diplomacy discourses and practices under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Furthermore, as the water diplomacy policies and practices expanded towards new dimensions, like ‘humanitarian water diplomacy’, DSI and other state institutions, such as Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) as well, have been integrated into Turkey's water diplomacy institutional framework.

Another observation on Turkey's water diplomacy framework entangles the peculiarity of the ET river basin in the formation of water diplomacy institutions and principles. In this context, transboundary (Joint Technical Committee) as well as national (Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP RDA)) institutions are delineated as integral components of institution-building in water diplomacy framework.

The role of non-state actors or informal institutions in transboundary water policymaking is still minimal even though there is ample room to involve them in water diplomacy in particular, with an objective to communicate more effectively across a wide spectrum of scientific disciplines, policymaking bodies and practitioners, and also to strive for integrated approaches to tackle the complex issues like transboundary water cooperation in conflict-laden regions, such as the downstream riparians of the ET river basin.

Overview

This chapter delineates the institutional setting in transboundary water policymaking in Turkey. Water has become an issue in Turkish foreign policy in the early 1980s with Turkey's plan to build a series of large-scale dams and extensive irrigation systems in the upper reaches of the Euphrates–Tigris (ET) river basin within the context of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP in Turkish acronym). With the increasing profile of the GAP in the international arena, a bureaucratic structure has evolved since then where the principles and policies with regard to the transboundary waters have been determined. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) became the main official body for formulating as well as executing Turkey's transboundary water policy. In this context, a separate department/unit in charge of regional and transboundary waters was formed at MFA under the directorate general, which is responsible for issues pertaining to energy, water and the environment.

The relevant institutions within the state mechanism, which provide technical information, such as the status of water resources in terms of quality and quantity, as well as those responsible for the development, management and preservation of water resources, have been entrusted to work in conjunction with the MFA in the formulation of the fundamental principles of transboundary water policy. First and foremost, among these institutions is the State Hydraulic Works (DSI in Turkish acronym), which has been responsible for the development and management of Turkey's water resources since 1954. Moreover, in 2011, within the restructuring process of the government, the mandate of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MEF) was reorganized under two new ministries. It was in this context that the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs (MFWA) was established. Under the MFWA, the General Directorate of Water Management (DGWM) and the Turkish Water Institute (SUEN in Turkish acronym) were established as new public institutions to provide inputs to transboundary water policy.

There is also a growing interest in conducting humanitarian water diplomacy by the leading water agencies such as the DSI. Turkey's water infrastructure investments in Africa and water projects completed in Turkey and beyond borders for displaced people in Syria constitute main achievements in this regard.