Chapter 4 focuses on the variety of governors in areas of limited statehood. State and non-state, local, national, transnational, as well as international actors are motivated to engage in governance in areas of limited statehood if certain conditions are present. Moreover, we find the entire range of modes of governance, from hierarchical steering including the use of force to inclusive, participatory, and deliberative governance. We start with external state governance, including international and regional organizations, development agencies, and foreign governments. We then turn to the non-state sector, starting with (I)NGOs and multi-stakeholder partnerships. A very different type of actor are (multinational) companies who are usually not inclined to become governors to begin with. In contrast, “traditional” authorities, such as tribal chiefs and community leaders as well as non-state justice institutions tend to be among the most important indigenous governors in many areas of limited statehood. A rather unlikely group of governors are violent non-state actors such as rebel groups or warlords.

Chapter 6 investigates human rights, the rule of law, as well as participatory institutions. Democratic governance is possible, even if state capacities to enforce rules and decisions are weak or absent. We start by addressing the human rights problematique in areas of limited statehood. Strengthening state capacity might do human rights and the rule of law more harm than good, resulting in autocratic and repressive statehood. We explore the effectiveness of regional organizations (RO) and of (I)NGOs and non-state justice institutions to provide fair and transparent access to justice as a crucial component of the rule of law. They can accomplish these goals, the more their institutional design enables deliberative negotiations through fair and transparent procedures. The remainder of the chapter discusses the effectiveness of companies and rebel groups to engage in human rights and democratic governance. It is one thing to expect from companies to comply with human rights norms. It is quite different to ask them to promote human rights and the rule of law beyond their premises. Rebel groups are more likely to provide effective human rights and inclusive governance, particularly if they require international and domestic legitimacy and if they are faced with trust-based communities.

Chapter 1 introduces the central puzzle the book seeks to solve. We start from the proposition that limited statehood is not a historical accident or some deplorable deficit of most Third World and transition countries that has to be overcome by the relentless forces of economic and political modernization in an era of globalization. We suggest that “limited statehood” is here to stay. Governance research has to account for limited statehood. Accordingly, we ask how effective and legitimate governance is possible under anarchy. How can political rule as well as security and other collective goods be provided when the state is weak or even absent? Areas of limited statehood are neither ungoverned nor ungovernable. We find great variation with regard to effective and legitimate governance, pertaining to both rule-making and the provision of public goods and services. The chapter goes on to discuss the book’s theoretical contributions in addressing this puzzle, as well as its normative, political, and world order implications. We conclude with a roadmap of the book.

Chapter 5 deals with the provision of security in areas of limited statehood. We contest the notion that areas of limited statehood are mostly violent places where civil war prevails. We analyze peacekeeping missions, military interventions from the outside, as well as externally promoted security sector reform. We find that more limited external governance fostering inclusive post-conflict peace-building and security sector reform is more effective than comprehensive state-building efforts. We then look at the conditions under which violent non-state actors can provide public security in the territory that they control. Warlord governance tends to be rather ineffective. Rebel groups score better, particularly when they face high legitimacy needs and local communities with strong trust-based action capacity to hold them accountable. The chapter also looks at tribal groups and leaders as rather effective peace-keepers. They normally lack military enforcement capacity, but can rely on strong social norms to maintain security in communities. While “security under anarchy” is possible in areas of limited statehood, our findings cast serious doubts on whether public security governance can be sustainable in the long run, if a (state) monopoly of the use of force is not restored at some point.

Chapter 7 deals with welfare governance concerning health, education, food security, and environmental protection in areas of limited statehood. The provision of collective goods and services with regard to welfare is possible “under anarchy” and under rather adverse conditions of civil war. The chapter covers a wide variety of actors – from IOs and foreign donors to (multinational) companies, multi-stakeholder partnerships, (I)NGOs, violent non-state actors, and “traditional” authorities. We find that most governors are able to provide effective governance services. Recent studies demonstrate that foreign aid improves local conditions, thereby contributing to increased state legitimacy. The contributions of business and VNSA to effective welfare governance is more circumscribed. Business as governors will step in as subsidiary service providers as long as nobody else is providing governance. As to VNSA, legitimacy needs lead them to provide effective welfare governance. However, the circle from effective governance to output legitimacy is likely to be disrupted by their opponents, e.g. by state actors fighting them. Effective welfare governance depends on two scope conditions: the absence of large-scale violence and at least some degree of public security, on the one hand, and a minimum infrastructure (such as roads and electricity), on the other.

Chapter 2 introduces the main concepts, namely “areas of limited statehood” and “governance.” We discuss functional and institutional conceptualizations of the state and explain why we settle for an institutional understanding in the tradition of Max Weber. We conceptualize areas of limited statehood as referring to those spaces where state institutions are too weak to implement and enforce central decisions and/or to uphold a monopoly of the use of force. We continue by discussing measurement issues and providing empirical examples for measuring limited statehood, including subnational levels. We then turn to introducing our understanding of “governance,” which we define as institutionalized modes of social coordination to adopt and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods and services. The chapter concludes with a discussion of several issues emerging when applying the governance concept to areas of limited statehood. This concerns, on the one hand, the distinction between the “public” and the “private” spheres common to Western modernity, which has to be adjusted to conditions of limited statehood. On the other hand, the inherent intentionality and normativity of the governance concepts need to be taken into account.

Chapter 8 summarizes key findings of the book and explores the feedback loops between legitimacy, institutional design, social trust, and effective governance. We also discuss various implications of our findings. First, we turn to the ambivalent role of the state in areas of limited statehood. Effective governance in most issue-areas is not possible without some degree of security and without some basic infrastructure. Yet, the residual state often behaves as a governance spoiler rather than an active supporter. It needs to be tamed by the rule of law and participatory institutions. Second, we discuss the implications for international affairs. The international system shares the “anarchy problematique” with areas of limited statehood. Many IR theories are highly relevant for explaining effective governance in areas of limited statehood – and vice versa. The global governance system and areas of limited statehood are also firmly intertwined in a multi-level governance system. Third, we discuss the political implications of our findings. Most analysts and policy-makers alike agree that comprehensive state-building efforts in ALS have largely failed. Rather than lowering our normative standards, we suggest a paradigm shift from state-building to governance promotion.

Chapter 3 elaborates our theory of governance in areas of limited statehood. While existing approaches address certain pieces of our “governance puzzle,” none of them offers a satisfying answer. We develop a theoretical explanation for when and how actors are motivated to engage in governance. As to the role of (state) institutions, we argue that the shadow of hierarchy and the shadow of anarchy go a long way to incentivize actors to become governors. The same holds true for the quest for (international as well as domestic) legitimacy and social acceptance. Personalized trust relations within and among local communities not only helps overcoming collective action problems, but also leads to the demand for governance contributions. Next, we introduce our theory of effective and legitimate governance in areas of limited statehood. First, institutional conditions fostering effective governance consist of institutional design, inclusiveness and fairness, and residual statehood. Second, empirical legitimacy and social acceptance of the governors and the governance institutions matter for effectiveness. Last not least, personalized, group-based, and generalized trust constitutes a further enabling condition for effective governance.