Why should regional organisations, having developed progressive checks on sovereignty at the start of the twenty-first century, roll them back at the first challenges to these principles? Dominant norm theories suggested a ‘cascade’ of internalisation of liberal norms that had begun at the end of the Cold War, but these had come to be challenged by emerging theories of normative contestation. The chapter critiques the expectations generated by norm cascade theory, suggesting a rethink of the role of power and a more evolutionary, anti-foundationalist approach to understanding norm development.

On July 8, 1996, the world awoke to a landmark advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ): “Nations are not prohibited from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons under international law.” Less than two years prior, and after decades of concern about the harm that the existence of nuclear weapons could do to the world, the UN General Assembly had requested that the ICJ provide an advisory opinion on the following question: “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”

In the previous chapter, the circumstances in which a state may seek to exercise its jurisdiction in relation to civil and criminal matters were considered. In this chapter, the reverse side of this phenomenon will be examined, that is those cases in which jurisdiction cannot be exercised as it normally would because of special factors. In other words, the focus is upon immunity from jurisdiction and those instances where there exist express exceptions to the usual application of a state’s legal powers. The concept of jurisdiction revolves around the principles of state sovereignty, equality and non-interference. Domestic jurisdiction as a notion attempts to define an area in which the actions of the organs of government and administration are supreme, free from international legal principles and interference. Indeed, most of the grounds for jurisdiction can be related to the requirement under international law to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other states.

The rules governing resort to force form a central element within international law, and together with other principles such as territorial sovereignty and the independence and equality of states provide the framework for international order. While domestic systems have, on the whole, managed to prescribe a virtual monopoly on the use of force for the governmental institutions, reinforcing the hierarchical structure of authority and control, international law is in a different situation. It must seek to minimise and regulate the resort to force by states, without itself being able to enforce its will. Reliance has to be placed on consent, consensus, reciprocity and good faith. The role and manifestation of force in the world community is, of course, dependent upon political and other non-legal factors, as well as upon the current state of the law, but the law must seek to provide mechanisms to restrain and punish the resort to violence.

This chapter considers three legal ideal types for international economic governance, each with its own dispute resolution approach. The private contract mode of transnational economic governance lets businesses create mutual agreements (contracts), so long as these agreements adhere to basic contractual confines. For transnational business, the private contract model is generally coupled with a form of dispute resolution where the parties choose their dispute settlement preference: mediation, good offices, arbitration or adjudication in a designated adjudicatory system. In essence, business chooses its rules and the judge of those rules, albeit within certain confines. The private contract model is the most decentralized mode of transnational economic governance, and it exists only so far as governments choose to let businesses define the contractual terms for trade and the resolution of disputes.

Ulric Huber or Ulricus Huberus (1636–1694) was a scholar, judge, and statesman of the Dutch “Golden Age” who published widely on law and on politics, in both Latin and the vernacular.1 His work on private law has lived through in South African Roman-Dutch law, whereas his contribution to constitutional theory and public law is noted by legal historians.2 A modern authority on Roman-Dutch law even claims that “[n]ext to Hugo Grotius [Huber] was probably the greatest, as he was certainly the most prolific Dutch jurist.”3

State responsibility is a fundamental principle of international law, arising out of the nature of the international legal system and the doctrines of state sovereignty and equality of states. It provides that whenever one state commits an internationally unlawful act against another state, international responsibility is established between the two. A breach of an international obligation gives rise to a requirement for reparation.

The CSSDCA had been proposed in 1991 but failed to reach a decision at the OAU as it floundered in committee. Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo revived the idea and had it adopted in 2000, permanently changing the OAU’s attitude to collective security responsibility as it reformed into the new AU. By 2003, the CSSDCA’s main objectives had been achieved and its component parts internalised into various structures of the AU such that the conference was no longer required. This chapter analyses the differences between 1991 and 1999 when the CSSDCA was first rejected and then accepted, measured by the control of the initiative, appeals to norms, and other opportunities for influence.

Political entities are not immutable. They are subject to change. New states appear and old states disappear. Federations, mergers, dissolutions and secessions take place. International law has to incorporate such events into its general framework with the minimum of disruption and instability. Such changes have come to the fore since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of over 100 new, independent countries.