Competition is commonplace among militant groups. Although political scientists have begun recognizing its importance, they lag behind other fields in the general study of competition. This is critical due to the strategic depth that competition brings. How one group behaves affects another group, and vice versa. Moreover, target governments and international organizations can manipulate the environment in which the groups must then interact. This chapter argues that building models to examine these issues is a useful strategy, but that the literature on political violence has not yet explored the implications. We then set the stage for the results we develop throughout the book.

Authoritarian states have used international law in many ways, but generally have mimicked democracies in the postwar period. Authoritarians are now beginning to introduce normative content into the international legal arena. As compared to prodemocratic international law, authoritarian use of international law places greater emphasis on internal security and has a different style, being more flexible and less amenable to third-party dispute resolution. As authoritarian governments become more powerful in the international system, their contribution to international law is growing, potentially diluting the role of democracies.

This introductory chapter situates the phenomenon of backlash against the international justice regime within a larger debate about the retrenchment of liberal democratic norms. This chapter considers how international courts gain their authority and contends that international human rights and criminal courts enjoy structural, adjudicative, and moral authority over states and political elites. It is precisely these sources of authority, however, that are the targets of backlash. The chapter goes on to provide a definition of backlash politics, suggesting that backlash is action – not just rhetoric – targeted at the authority of international courts. The chapter then puts that definition into practice by providing a typology of backlash, which includes: (1) withdrawals from international courts; (2) the creation of alternate/substitute justice mechanisms; (3) bureaucratic and budgetary restrictions; and (4) doctrinal challenges. The chapter concludes with a roadmap for the rest of the book.

Chapter 5 examines two subtle forms of backlash politics: bureaucratic and budgetary restrictions. Using examples from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the ICC, this chapter explains why states turn to these bureaucratic and budgetary levers to undermine international courts. By imposing bureaucratic restrictions and tightening the tribunals’ purse strings, states and political elites can undermine the structural, adjudicative, and normative authority of courts. While this form of backlash politics does not garner the same attention as withdrawals or threatened substitutions, as the case studies show, it can be equally damaging. Moreover, because of the tribunals’ abiding dependence on member states for material and staff support, it is particularly difficult for the tribunals to guard against this form of backlash.

Democracies and dictatorships differ in terms of their time horizons. Governments in democracies know that the political system will continue after they leave office, whereas autocrats see the survival of the regime and of the government as being identical. This makes democrats more interested in international legal commitments, which constrain the state even after the government is gone. Further, democracies are subject to greater demands for transparency. Authoritarians, in contrast, are more risk averse. Drawing on these differences, the chapter develops a distinction between prodemocratic international law, pro-authoritarian international law, and regime-neutral international law.

International law can facilitate democratic governance by preserving the norms of reciprocity that make democracy work. It can do so by articulating norms and standards, facilitating the creation of public goods, supporting domestic institutional structures, coordinating reputational sanctions and, on occasion, legitimating external intervention. These tools are limited but can function when political incentives are aligned.

This chapter presents some basic descriptive data on core behavior in international law, including the formation and interpretation of international law, participation in multilateral treaty regimes, the conclusion of bilateral treaties, and the willingness to bring disputes before international courts and tribunals. In every area, democratic governance shows substantially greater propensity to engage international law, relative to autocratic governments.

Target governments can reduce grievances among disaffected populations who might otherwise pledge support to a group. Incorporating this into the workhorse model, we show an unexpected relationship between the total number of groups and total violence observed. When few groups exist, the target state has little incentive to reduce grievances. Due to the lack of competition, the government calculates that paying that price in violence is worth offering fewer concessions. In contrast, when many groups exist, the competition instills great fear in the target state. As a result, it may calculate that entirely abandoning the objectionable policy is the best solution. Without any supporters to recruit, the groups then drop their violence outputs. Thus, violence may decrease in the number of competing groups because violence deters the government. We characterize the circumstances under which the deterrent effect dominates the competition effect and provide broader tips for the empirical literature on outbidding.