Chapter 17 attempts to pin down a moving target, cyber and its use and utility in armed conflict. The cyber targets chosen by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are detailed. The chapter defines cyber “attacks,” differentiating them from cyber “operations” – akin to a felony-misdemeanor distinction. Cyberattacks are found to be a use of armed force, in the sense of UN Charter Article 2(4), raising the right of victim states to respond with armed force in self-defense. Potential cyber conflicts are classified as international or non-international based upon their perpetrators. The difficulties of attribution of cyberattacks are detailed, including sovereignty and military necessity. A counter to cyberattack is belligerent reprisal, which is explored. Cyberattacks on critical national infrastructure (CNI) are a major problem. After defining CNI, the US position on responses is discussed. Recent changes in US cyber policy authorize far greater cyber retaliation and reprisal, as well as providing federal funding to carry them out. Finally, CNI’s weak link, the unwillingness of civilian corporations to fund their own cyber protection, is noted.

Coastal geography continues to influence the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Two major geographical circumstances are explored in depth in the context of the continental shelf delimitation beyond 200 nm, namely the cut-off effect and disproportionality. In terms of cut-off effect, this chapter articulates its relevance by examining three sub-issues: first, the continuing relevance of cut-off effect in the delimitation between two adjacent States; second, cutting off the access to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm; and third, cutting off the entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. As to disproportionality, after clarifying its meanings and functions, this chapter analyzes the prospect of a substantial disproportion in coastal lengths being a relevant circumstance in the continental shelf delimitation beyond 200 nm.

This chapter explores a broader question with respect to the delimitation methodology for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, namely, whether an equitable solution for the continental shelf differs from that for an exclusive economic zone. Examining resources-related circumstances, conduct of the parties, and special characteristics of the maritime zones, this chapter argues that a court or tribunal hardly resorts to regime-specific circumstances in maritime delimitation, because maritime delimitation is a spatial exercise that spells out the relationship between the relevant coasts and the maritime areas. It thus concludes, on the basis of the State practice and the jurisprudence that witnesses a trend towards a single exercise of maritime delimitation, the law of maritime delimitation will develop to embrace a common approach to maritime delimitation within and beyond 200 nm.

This chapter explains the legal uncertainties arising in the continental shelf delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles. Given the special characters of the entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in terms of its substantive, procedural, and institutional attributes, a great measure of uncertainty is introduced into the delimitation of the extended maritime areas, in particular with regard to the competence of international courts and tribunals and the applicable delimitation methodology. Clarification and refinement of these issues are vital for the pursuit of an equitable solution to maritime boundary-making and the stability of the law of maritime delimitation.

Chapter 13 covers LOAC that permits or restricts the targeting of enemy objects: “military objectives.” Lawful military objectives are defined. Economic targets and war-sustaining targets, contentious issues, are described, with the US minority position noted. World War II’s area bombing by all parties to the conflict is shown to be unlawful, unproductive and, today, unlawful. The widely used targeting criteria, lawful by virtue of nature, location, purpose or use, is expanded upon, with examples of each qualifier. That is followed by relating the six-step targeting process employed by US units in combat. Collateral damage and its avoidance efforts are discussed at length, with emphasis on Chapter 7’s core principles of distinction and proportionality. Unique targeting issues such as “dangerous forces” and dual-use targets are covered, with examples. Precautions in the attack do not sound particularly significant but they are essential LOAC constants. Two recent trial records are included in the Cases and Materials section to illustrate real-world legal consequences of disregarding the illegalities of targeting human beings, even ones’ enemies.

Chapter 5 explains the varieties of armed conflicts. Conflict status determines the law that applies to that conflict, including prohibitions and duties applicable to those involved. Conflict status is the first question a student should answer when looking at any armed conflict. This chapter details the factors that determine conflict status. Common Article 2 conflicts (the designation referring to the Article which is common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions) are international armed conflicts. Those conflicts are discussed, as are common Article 3 conflicts, those between a nation and an armed opposition group – rebels or terrorists. Given that states beyond those directly involved may intervene, interfere, assist or impede one side or the other, this is a challenging but important chapter. It gives the student the information necessary to recognize any conflict’s status. Also discussed are recent developments in conflict classification, for example, gray zone conflicts and hybrid warfare, as well as the LOAC of cross-border terrorist attacks and the lawful ability of attacked state forces to pursue and engage those terrorists across a neighboring state’s border.

Relevant coasts and relevant area are two essential concepts in the delimitation methodology. This Chapter reflects on their determination in the continental shelf delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles. It argues that the judicial and arbitral decisions that have delimited the continental shelf beyond 200 nm unduly expanded the scope of the coasts and areas that were deemed relevant in the delimitation process. It further examines other factors that may contribute to a precise determination of the area of overlapping entitlements to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm, which include the coastal relationship, the 200-nautical-mile limits, the foot of the continental slope, and the outer limits of the continental shelf.

Chapter 19 covers a critical 1980 Convention involving battlefield weapons and practices. Some weapons have long been banned: bayonets with serrated edges, explosive bullets, and poison, for example. The 1980 Convention addresses five weapon types through five protocols. Looking to Chapter 7’s core principle of distinction, Protocol I bans nondetectable fragments: glass bullets that cannot be detected by x-rays in casualty treatment. Protocol II limits (but does not ban) antipersonnel land mines and booby-traps. Both are banned in areas frequented by civilians but continue to be allowed elsewhere. Examples of their limited uses are provided. The “Ottawa Convention,” banning antipersonnel mines entirely, is also covered. Protocol III limits use of incendiary weapons, banning their use on targets where civilians might be present. Protocol IV bans blinding laser weapons. Nonblinding lasers are unaffected. Protocol V requires ratifying states to retrieve unexploded ordnance, land mines, cluster munitions, dud artillery rounds, at the conflict’s conclusion. All good intentions that are difficult to put into practice, aided by language that invites evasion. But better than nothing.

Chapter 10 looks at command responsibility, the other side of the “obedience to orders” coin. A soldier who knowingly obeys an unlawful order is guilty of the resulting crimes but the superior who gave the order is equally culpable. Like obedience to orders, command responsibility is an ancient concomitant of command authority. The modern establishment of command responsibility arguably started with the case of Japanese General Yamashita, at the end of World War II. His military commission ruled that, although he issued no unlawful order, he knew or should have known of the crimes being committed by his subordinates. He was hanged for his inaction. Nazi generals were hanged or imprisoned for orders they issued or passed on. The commander’s knowledge, actual or constructive, is required for conviction. A commander’s seven routes to trial – the ways in which a combatant leader may be exposed to legal liability for their subordinates’ actions – are explained and illustrated by modern-day cases. The chapter also recites instances of officers themselves disobeying orders they view as unlawful. Today, 1977 Additional Protocol spells out a commander’s responsibility for unlawful acts.

Chapter 9 examines the most-frequently raised defense to war crime charges, obedience to orders. The defense is rarely successful but has been raised as long ago as 1474. Examples are culled from Chapter 3’s Leipzig Trials that followed World War I. A history of the defense in US and UK military law provides background and context. The defense of superior orders was valid in the UK and the US until late in World War II, when the UK and US decided to preclude Nazi war criminals from its use. The case of a noted World War II US submarine commander who ordered machine-gunning of survivors of a ship he had sunk, is recounted. The post–World War II Nuremberg Military Tribunal is thought to have finally ended the defense but it only briefly slowed its use. It was Calley’s My Lai defense in 1971 and it continues around the world today – although constrained. What constitutes an unlawful order is parsed through actual examples. Readers are advised what to do, should they be given an unlawful order. Use of the defense in foreign jurisdictions is demonstrated. Again, excerpts from modern-day trials are in the Cases and Materials, at the chapter’s end.