What are the normative implications of political regulation waves? Based on quantitative counterfactual estimation and qualitative case description, this chapter assesses the hard tradeoffs imposed by political regulation waves – between social stability, employment, economic growth, and health and longevity among local populations. Local leaders face incentives to signal competence by promoting laxer environmental regulation to benefit jobs and the economy, imposing a measurable human cost due to dirtier air. Conversely, when local leaders seek to move up the political ladder by strengthening the implementation of regulations in pursuit of blue skies, air quality improves, but firms suffer profit losses, and many people lose their jobs and are forced to spend brutal winters without heating. One form of the political regulation wave is not inherently better than another. These are difficult tradeoffs.

Policymakers in China have paid attention to SO2 emissions reduction since the 1990s, as adverse environmental effects such as acid rain devastated large parts of the country. Shen empirically tests the “political regulation wave” theory based on temporal patterns in SO2 regulation between 2001 and 2010. During this time, reduction targets were nonbinding during 2001-5 but binding during 2006-10. Since SO2 emissions management entails a low level of ambiguity, regulatory efforts translate well into regulatory effectiveness. Results based on official data from statistical yearbooks and on satellite-based statistics concur that top prefectural leaders whose prefectures received high reduction targets were incentivized to produce an incremental yet steady decrease in regulation during 2001-5 to accommodate economic and stability goals, consistent with theoretical predictions. Later, when binding SO2 reduction targets became tied to local leaders’ career prospects, they fostered a more consistent regulatory implementation during their tenures.

This chapter presents a new incentive-based theory to explain the systematic variation in regulatory stringency over time, which Shen calls the theory of “the political regulation wave.” It is intended to be a general theory with three scope conditions. First, in a decentralized political system, local leaders or politicians possess discretion over decision-making, resource allocation, and control over the bureaucracy. Second, local politicians or political leaders are incentivized to prioritize different policy goals throughout their tenure, per what their constituencies or political superio+L2rs prefer, to maximize their chances of reelection or promotion. Third, implementation of the policy is high conflict and low ambiguity in nature, so it takes on a political character. China’s air pollution control policies for sulfur dioxide (SO2) satisfy all scope conditions, while fine particulate matter (PM2.5) control satisfies the first two but entails some level of ambiguity. Nevertheless, the two empirical cases provide an interesting comparison. Shen derives three testable implications for SO2 and PM2.5 control in China.

This chapter explains how governance, especially local governance, happens in China. It expands upon China’s hierarchical political structure and its environmental governance system, highlighting the local environmental protection bureau (EPB)’s low rank and dilemma of having two principals—upper-level EPB and local government. Utilizing field interviews with key local actors and referencing public and internal policy documents, Shen lays out a broad range of factors considered when superiors make promotion decisions, such as competency, performance, and character factors. Crucially, Shen finds that local political leaders are expected to implement critical policies like economic growth steadily and incrementally during their tenure, with later years’ performance being more critical for promotion evaluation. The chapter concludes by exploring the pathways through which local leaders influence regulatory stringency to promote different priorities and targets, with promotions in mind.

This chapter explores why, in the wake of similar exposure to cyclones, Myanmar experienced catastrophic outcomes in 2008 while Bangladesh and India did not when exposed to similar cyclone risks in the 2010s. I also makes use of within-case analysis to compare Bangladesh and India to themselves in the past when they experienced worse humanitarian outcomes after exposure to severe cyclones.

This concluding chapter reviews the core argument of the book. I assess what can be learned from paired cases, the impact of restricted external finance on climate security, the state-centric emphasis of the book, the fragility of progress, and the need to elevate this kind of work in political science journals.

The section, beside a standard recapitulation of the findings, offers several suggestions as to how the existing norms might be interpreted in the future. It proposes a consistent uniform approach to targeting in armed conflict. It points to the risks associated with excessive expansion of the category of lawful targets.

This chapter presents the fragmentation of law applicable to targeting in armed conflict, which spans international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international criminal law. It discusses the interrelationships among these branches of law. Considering IHL’s most direct relevance to targeting in armed conflict, it reviews its material, geographical, temporal, and personal scope. It addresses the foundations of IHL, including the relationship between the principles of humanity and military necessity, as well as the perception of IHL as a regime that authorizes rather than restricts attacks, and also the principle of equality, theoretically designed to ensure implementation of IHL. In the final part of the chapter, the definitions of the central terms used throughout this monograph are discussed – namely that of attack and permissible degree of force to be used against lawful targets – and the restrictions on means and methods of warfare in the same context.

This chapter explores why, in the wake of similar exposure to drought in the 2010s, Somalia experienced a famine but Ethiopia did not. I also use within-case analysis to explain why Ethiopia experienced a famine in the mid-1980s but not in the 2010s.

This chapter focuses on human targets. It foregoes the traditional division into civilians and combatants in order to address lawful targets in bothinternational and non-international armed conflict, and the notion of 'combatant' has no application to the latter category. For maximum clarity as to who can be lawfully attacked in armed conflict, itdiscusses – separately with regard to international and non-international armed conflict – the situation of several categories of persons such as members of the armed forces, members of the police, members of non-state armed groups, civilians, and peace operations personnel.

This chapter reviews the argument in the book to understand the intersection between state capacity, political exclusion, and international assistance and how these conjoin to contribute to negative security outcomes. I discuss how to operationalize each of these parameters. I then diagram several causal pathways connecting these factors to negative security outcomes. I also develop predictions for likely outcomes when these factors have more favorable and mixed characteristics in terms of state capacity, exclusion, and assistance.