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This paper presents a typology of different constitutional conceptions, which are designed to help us classify the constitutional conceptions and debates that appeared in Latin America during the nineteenth century and to compare the opposing ideas that were present at the time. Three broad categories of constitutional projects are defined: (1) conservative models, characterized by the defense of political elitism and moral perfectionism; (2) majoritarian or radical constitutions that sought to reach out to the popular sectors and anchored themselves in a form of moral populism; and (3) the individualist or liberal constitutions. This analysis explores the ideas and principal architects of these various constitutional initiatives for a number of Hispano-Latin American nations for the 1810-60 period, when the basic features of their constitutions were shaped.
The following note on a contributor to LARR volume 29, number 2 was inadvertently omitted from that issue. Christopher H. Lutz and W. George Lovell coauthored “Conquest and Population: Maya Demography in Historical Perspective.”
CHRISTOPHER H. LUTZcofounded the Centro de Investigaciones Regionales de Mesoamérica in Antigua, Guatemala. He is the author of Santiago de Guatemala, 1541-1773: City, Caste, and the Colonial Experience and coeditor with Robert M. Carmack and John D. Early of Historical Demography of Highland Guatemala.
The present set of Research Notes, which were first presented at a forum on Latin America's market reforms held at the 2003 Latin American Studies Association Congress, investigates the economic and social repercussions of the neoliberal wave that swept across the region during the 1990s. Have market reforms brought greater economic stability and stimulated growth? How have they affected crucial social issues, such as unemployment, poverty, and inequality? After Weyland's introductory explication of these questions, the Research Notes by Evelyne Huber and Fred Solt and by Michael Walton advance divergent assessments of neoliberalism's successes and failures. Huber and Solt argue that overall, Latin America's market reforms have yielded disappointing results in terms of economic stability and growth, social equity, and the quality of democracy. In particular, countries that enacted more radical reforms or that took especially drastic steps towards change performed less well than nations that proceeded more cautiously and gradually. By contrast, Walton argues that market reforms have increased growth while not significantly exacerbating economic instability and social inequality. And to the extent that neoliberalism fell short of expectations, the problem did not emerge from market reforms as such, but from deficiencies in the institutional context in which these reforms were enacted.
During the dramatic wave of democratization in the 1980s, Venezuela stood out as South America's wise elder. While neighboring militaries had shifted in and out of power, sometimes ruling for decades, Venezuela had maintained a stable democracy since 1959. After a relatively brief period of adjustment, the country settled into a political system in which two dominant political parties alternated in power and the armed forces remained peacefully in the barracks. Yet twice in 1992, important sectors of the armed forces took up arms to displace what they and many other Venezuelans viewed as a decrepit and corrupt political system. The coups failed, but they left the political system shaken and the military's political subordination seriously in doubt. The coup attempts also raised doubts about Venezuelan strategies for military control that had been a model for the rest of Latin America.
This article revisits debates concerning poverty, inequality, and development in Latin America and explores a possible “high road” to globalization capable of achieving both more rapid economic growth and significant and lasting reductions in poverty and inequality. In reconnoitering the contours of this path, the authors probe a partial convergence in theory, concepts, and policies that may offer new opportunities for bridging the yawning chasms that heretofore have divided multilateral financial organizations, local governing elites, and academics as well as Center-Left political parties, organized labor, social movements, and NGOs. The article concludes with an assessment of the capacity of this emerging political agenda and attendant “polycentric development coalitions” to deepen and extend democracy effectively beyond the electoral arena to include basic issues of justice and equity.
The profile of voters and nonvoters according to age, occupation, and education is described. The study is based on samples of around 30 male mesas from the city of Buenos Aires in four presidential elections1983, 1989, 1995, and 1999and 100 from each of two elections (1997 representatives and 1999 presidential) in the homonymous province. Data from official voter registers (padrones) are analyzed for those obligated to vote (18-69) and for those exempted (70+ years). The level of abstention increased slowly but steadily along the time span considered. Citizens obligated to vote do so more than those who are not. Logistic regression equations showed a positive effect of the lowest occupational status categoriesless educated peopleon the odds of nonvoting, while the opposite was true for the highest occupational status categories.