Introduction

This chapter presents a comparative analysis of the middle power behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in the formation of APEC and the EAS, and traces the empirical developments back to the differentiated structure of regional politics. Building on the works of Albert et al and Donnelly, the understanding of structure here focuses on stratificatory and functional differentiation (Donnelly, 2009; Buzan and Albert, 2010; Albert et al, 2013; Donnelly, 2013). This structure forms the basis for middle power behaviour in multilateralism, although the eventual effects would be activated through negotiations of social, relative and relational power politics (Barkin, 2010, pp 18– 20). The key argument is that as a way to ensure their own place and relevance in the region, middle powers have sought to dilute major-power stratification and undertake functionally differentiated roles in regional multilateralism. These are broad objectives across all three middle powers, although, as we will discuss later, the specific details and considerations for each middle power initiative vary. The discussion will also reinforce the importance of context for middle power behaviour, by highlighting briefly two other scenarios of Asia Pacific multilateralism in which middle power initiative was apparently absent. The behaviour of middle powers in regional multilateralism is thus conditioned, but not determined, by the structure of differentiation.

This chapter is organized as follows. It starts off with a section that looks at each middle power’s behaviour across both APEC and the EAS. The analysis here will draw out similarities and differences for each middle power in their approaches towards the two instances of regional multilateralism. The objective is to find out if there are consistencies or discrepancies in the strategies of each middle power in regional multilateralism at different times, and what drives such considerations. This is followed by a section that recalls the book’s theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3. It will discuss how the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea could be understood through the lens of differentiation, as well as explain how all three countries tried to shape power politics to their advantage in the formation of APEC and the EAS.

Introduction

The contemporary study of middle powers has focused primarily on defining the concept and examining the foreign policies of such states. While there has yet to be a standardized definition of what middle powers are, the literature suggests three primary ways of approaching the concept, based on material capabilities, identity and behaviour. These approaches are not mutually exclusive; rather, as we will see in the following discussion, their respective elements are interlinked. The themes in each of these approaches to middle powers moreover correspond to the three dominant IR paradigms, namely, (neo)realism, constructivism and (neo)liberalism. This chapter reviews the existing approaches to middle powers with three aims in mind. First, examining the strengths and weaknesses of each approach would help to establish a working definition for middle powers. This would, in turn, be the basis upon which the countries for study are selected. While acknowledging that definitional issues remain the biggest challenge for middle power theory building, the best way forward would nonetheless be to arrive at a composite definition of middle powers that draws on the strengths of the three approaches while offsetting their weaknesses. Consequently, the working definition of a middle power in this book refers to a state that quantitatively ranks below the major powers but above most of the rest of the states; identifies and is regarded by others as a middle power; and employs behavioural strategies such as investing in multilateralism and relying on persuasive or soft power.

Second, through a review of the extant approaches to middle powers, we will be able to discern the notion of differentiation that is implied in the study of middle powers but thus far undertheorized. For instance, defining middle powers based on material capabilities – also known as the position approach – is premised on the assumption that these states have a different level of capabilities as compared to others. The identity approach makes the case that middle power identity is different from the identities of major powers and smaller states. Last but not least, the behaviour approach emphasizes that middle powers rely on particular foreign policy strategies or diplomatic styles that other types of states may not be as drawn towards or be as effective in.

Introduction

This chapter sets out a framework to explore the differentiation mechanism that generates middle power behaviour in multilateralism. As highlighted in the preceding chapter, while it is commonly accepted that middle powers are inclined towards multilateral diplomacy, less attention has been given to the underlying processes that produce middle power behaviour in such forums. In addition to analysing the structural forces that make it possible for middle powers to adopt certain strategies in multilateralism, this line of research would also offer useful insights to help clarify the distinctions between middle powers and other types of states. Building on the earlier analysis that differentiation has been a core yet understudied dimension in the middle power concept, the framework offered here seeks to make more explicit the basis of differentiation in the study of middle power behaviour. This is achieved by using differentiation theory as a heuristic to explain middle power behaviour. Originating from sociology and anthropology, differentiation theory has typically not occupied a major space in mainstream IR. This is in part due to neorealism’s dominance in IR, which posits that states are functionally alike, with the only difference among them boiling down to the distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 1979, pp 93– 9). Such a reading leads to the assumption that a theory of international politics must be necessarily based on the major powers and that non-major powers, including middle powers, have little role to play in international politics due to the constraints of structure (Waltz, 1979, p 73).

Certainly, it is evident that much of the behaviour approach to middle powers focuses on how these countries could overcome their structural constraints as defined by neorealism. Beeson and Higgott underscore the basis of middle power theory as ‘the ability to use non-material assets’; Cooper, Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal juxtapose the ‘non-structural forms of power and influence’ that middle powers leverage against the ‘structural leadership’ of the US; and, Gilley and O’Neil distinguish middle power theory from ‘more structurally determinative theories of great powers and secondary states’ (Cooper et al, 1993, p 23; Beeson and Higgott, 2014, p 223; Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 18).

As World War II approached its final days in April 1945, delegates from 50 countries convened in San Francisco for the United Nations (UN) Conference on International Organization. The aim of the conference was to discuss and sign the UN Charter, the draft of which had been prepared jointly by the Republic of China (ROC), Soviet Union, United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) earlier in 1944. Also known as the Dumbarton Oaks proposals (so named due to the location of the meeting among the Allied ‘Big Four’), the draft outlined the new institution’s purposes, membership and organizational structure (‘Dumbarton Oaks’, 1945). The UN would have four principal bodies, namely a General Assembly (UNGA), a Security Council (UNSC), an International Court of Justice and a Secretariat. Significantly for non-major powers such as Australia and Canada, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals appeared to give extensive decision-making powers to the five permanent members of the UNSC – the aforementioned ‘Big Four’ and France. While it was generally accepted that the major powers would primarily be the ones with the responsibility and ability to maintain global peace and consequently ‘must enjoy an authority commensurate with their economic and military resources’, there was also concern over their unchecked influence that could pose a risk to the interests of the smaller countries (Evatt, 1946, pp 27, 106; see also Hilliker, 1990, p 734). In this context, the Australian and Canadian representatives, among others, voiced the opinion that their respective states should be given priority among the non-major powers, for non-permanent seats on the UNSC.

Australia’s claims to ‘special recognition’ in the UN were based on the argument that ‘middle powers’ like itself possessed both the resources and willingness ‘to make practical contributions to security’, as evident in their contributions to the first and second world wars (Evatt, 1946, p 27). Meanwhile, Canadian officials argued for a ‘Middle Power amendment’ to the selection of UNSC non-permanent members (Hilliker, 1990, p 780). As one of the world’s ‘responsible middle powers’, Canada was ‘willing and able to expend lives and resources on a considerable scale towards achieving [the UN’s] purposes’, and hence should be distinguished from other states that, ‘because of small resources, backward political development, or inertia, could not or would not make a sizable contribution’ (Hilliker, 1990, pp 734, 900).

Introduction

This chapter examines the conditions and circumstances surrounding the formative days of the EAS that was launched in 2005, focusing on the structural forces and processes that generated middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism. The time period for this case study stretches over a relatively long period of time, from the late 1990s to 2011. This is due not only to how the EAS and its membership evolved, but also to the fact that the platform’s establishment was linked to the East Asian community debate that occurred particularly robustly through the late 1990s and 2000s. Strictly speaking, however, the analysis narrows down to three specific points within this time period. The first is the late 1990s, when South Korean President Kim Dae-jung convened the EAVG following the Asian financial crisis, for regional policymakers to provide recommendations on strengthening regional cooperation and community building. It was in the EAVG report that the creation of an EAS was first mentioned. The second point in time is the inauguration of the EAS itself, in 2005. In the period leading up to the platform’s launch, a debate emerged over its membership composition. Some countries expressed the preference for the new forum to only include the APT members, while others sought to also bring in Australia, India and New Zealand. It was in large part due to Indonesia’s efforts, supported by others, that the EAS launched as a 16-member forum. The third and final point in time under study for this case is the late 2000s to early 2010s, when both Indonesia and Australia attempted to secure US participation in the changing regional multilateral architecture. This vision was ultimately realized in 2011, when Indonesia chaired the first 18-member EAS that included Russia and the US.

The establishment of the EAS was an important moment because it institutionalized the annual gathering of leaders representing the key countries that would shape the regional strategic environment going forward. While the summit initially started off as a cooperative platform for non-traditional security issues such as finance, energy, education, avian flu prevention and disaster management, Indonesia took the initiative to add issues such as the South China Sea disputes when it was chair in 2011.

Introduction

This chapter examines the conditions and circumstances that led to APEC’s creation in 1989 and its early years, focusing particularly on the structural forces and processes that generated middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism. Launched amid the end of the Cold War, APEC was a significant advancement for the regional multilateral architecture. As superpower and military tensions decreased in the late 1980s, the launch of APEC reflected the acknowledgment by regional countries of the need for greater and more inclusive cooperation on economic issues. Certainly, the idea for APEC did not emerge out of the blue. Its inauguration in 1989 was a culmination of three decades of efforts to boost economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific, including the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), both established in the 1960s. From 1980, the quasi-governmental Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) also assumed a vital role in laying the foundations for APEC (Drysdale, 2009, p 18). Nevertheless, APEC’s importance lies in the fact that it was the first regional organization in this field at the government level when it was inaugurated in 1989 (Keating, 2001; Park and Lee, 2009, p 98). Its ability to annually convene the political elites of regional countries at a time of significant international political change moreover imbued the economic forum with strategic and political intent. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, APEC was the only venue where multilateral talks could be conducted among policymakers and leaders of key regional countries such as Japan, China and the US, among others.

The success in getting APEC off the ground illustrated the ability of middle powers, such as Australia, Indonesia and South Korea, to shape the regional multilateral architecture. On the one hand, the behaviour of these three middle powers diluted stratification in the Asia Pacific by diffusing power away from the major powers. On the other, their behaviour also strengthened functional differentiation in the Asia Pacific as they took on initiatory and mediatory roles in the APEC initiative. While the origins of APEC could be traced to the combined efforts of Australia and Japan, due to various reasons Australia became the public face of the initiative.

The collapse of the Weimar Republic and the ensuing rise of the Nazi dictatorship in Germany serve to this day as a “warning from history.” The precise lessons to be drawn from this episode remain controversial. Did the first German republic collapse from a lack of popular support or from institutional weakness? These questions were far from the minds of Republican elites. Arnold Brecht and Hans Staudinger regarded problems of stability as primarily administrative. Territorial reform and the creation of public–private partnerships were their creative attempts creating some much-needed breathing space for the young Republic. These initiatives tell us much about the reasons why elites overestimated the robustness of their own institutions. At the same time this ill-founded confidence was necessary for such administrative experiments. Paradoxically, assuming stability can be important in encouraging elites in new democracies to engage in necessary reforms. The administrative rationale also had a dark side, however. It led to a myopic focus on technical detail while ignoring the larger political context and in particular, underestimating the systemic threat from political extremism.

This chapter defines robustness and fragility, argues that they can only be determined confidently in retrospect, but that assessments made by political actors, whilst subjective, have important political implications. We suggest some of the consideration that may shape these assessment. They include ideology, historical lessons, and the Zeitgeist. We go on to describe the following chapters, providing an outline of the book.

Chapter 6 commences by exploring the extent to which recognition and enforcement approaches are likely to inform each other over time. I do so by analysing the differences in legal tradition and approaches across states that have, historically, been seen as impediments to agreeing to a harmonised global framework promoting recognition and enforcement. While this argument has less resonance now that global judgments instruments have been formally adopted, it can still be generalised to suggest that these differences may inhibit the uptake of these instruments in and by national legislatures. To determine whether this is likely to be the case, I analyse the experience of the New York Convention (with respect to arbitral awards) and the Brussels Model (with respect to judgments) in overcoming perceived hurdles expressed to arise due to differences in legal tradition and approach (e.g. between civil and common law traditions).

The second factor analysed in Chapter 6 is whether divergent rationales underlying recognition and enforcement limit the extent to which experiences or lessons learnt in one approach may fruitfully extend to others.