This chapter looks at immigration as a battlefield in the struggle over the future. It considers how international law can be reinterpreted to limit the rights of refugees and otherwise to constrain immigration, as well as the harms these changes likely would bring about.

The essential purpose of European Union (EU) integration is, as Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) makes clear, to create ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. The EU legal order is therefore shaped to support a dynamic process of European integration. Its legal construct relies on a number of foundational objectives, principles and values – such as equality between participating States and their peoples – that also act as compasses (Section 1.1). The ambitious nature of the process, going well beyond a simple form of economic collaboration among States, distinguishes it from other forms of regional integration while enabling multiple interactions with non-member States and other organisations (Section 1.2). This first chapter stresses that the legal specificities of the EU legal order are best understood in light of its ongoing process of change, constantly seeking to better match evolving political goals with an appropriate legal machinery (Section 1.3). The resulting decisive changes and predominant features of the EU legal order are first and foremost crystallised in the primary legal framework on which it relies, in the form of the two main treaties shaping the EU.

The legal order of the European Union can be distinguished from other international law systems because its legal acts have autonomous effects that are independent of the specific laws of its members. These effects result in EU law being uniquely integrated with the laws of its Member States (Section 4.1), and this is also enabled by the particularly sophisticated machinery put in place at European level for the appropriate implementation and enforcement of EU law across the Member States of the EU (Section 4.2). To ensure adherence to its founding values, as well as its perennity, the powerful legal order that results is itself subject to the rule of law (Section 4.3), as well as to ongoing reflections on its limitations (Section 4.4).

This chapter looks at the current attacks on international economic law with respect to trade and investment. It considers the trajectory of these attacks and the consequences of a complete dismantling of this body of international law.

The preface explains the immediate context of the book and acknowledges those who contributed to the project.

Ths chapter looks at the economic and political dimensions of the downside of the knowledge economy. The knowledge economy both drives knowledge clusters and creaters hinterlands where those left behind by the changes in the economy dwell. Significant evidence shows the extent of grievance on the part of the left-behind, which manifests itself in nationalist populism and hostility to international law. Populists depict international law as a series of corrupt power grabs by an élite that is indifferent to the left-behind. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the possibility of Chinese hegemony substituting for international law as a way of organizing international cooperation.

This chapter traces the revolt against international law by domestic courts. The Luxembourg Court of the European Union and the Supreme Court of the United States began this trend, but many courts around the world have joined in. A growing number of top-level courts in EU member states have rebelled against the Luxembourg Court. Russia’s Constitutional Court has taken the movement as far as it can go by wielding constitutional law in new and surprising ways as a way to excuse Russian noncompliance with its international obligations.

The protection of marine environment assumes a special place under UNCLOS. Part XII provides for general obligations to protect and preserve the environment as well as more specific provisions concerning the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution, including those relating to different sources of pollution. At the same time, Part XII is intended to provide a general framework for the protection of the marine environment. This framework nature is demonstrated not only by the existence of many generally-worded provisions and open-ended obligations which need to be further elaborated but also in the existence of numerous reference to external rules and standards, international organisations and regional arrangements. This chapter examines the contribution of UNCLOS tribunals to clarifying the scope and content of the general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment before moving to discussing the extent to which UNCLOS tribunals have shed light on the normative content of three key environmental obligations and principles in the context of the marine environment.

This chapter provides a somewhat more optimistic view of the posssible outcome in the battle for the future. It argues that small but necessary revisions of international law led by a norm entrepreneur state can lead to greater international cooperation and more resilient international law. It looks at cartel policy, antibribery law, and financial institution regulation as instances of successful projects led by a single state that became widely supported. It describe how similar efforts might play out in diverse fields such as climate change and cyber security.

As outlined in Chapter 1, the EU Treaties play a central role in the process of European integration. They set out the boundaries of the European Union legal order. Within these boundaries, it is not only the EU Treaties, but also a vast array of legal acts that may be adopted and that produce legal effects. The European Union thereby autonomously generates a structured set of instruments complementing the Treaty framework. With a view to shedding light on this system of legal norms, this chapter further elaborates on the primary legal framework of the EU legal order (Section 3.1), on the basis of which the system of allocation of competences between the EU and its Member States may then be set out. Indeed, the rules and principles governing the existence of an EU competence (Section 3.2), the various types of competences (Section 3.3) and the principles governing the exercise of these competences (Section 3.4) all derive therefrom. It is within this framework that further legal acts (Section 3.5) may be adopted by EU actors, in accordance with procedures established for that purpose (Section 3.6).

The term ‘coastal State’ is not defined under UNCLOS despite being one of the most frequently used terms. In the EEZ, UNCLOS confers upon coastal States both exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction over natural resources and jurisdiction in relation to artificial islands, installations and structure, marine scientific research and environmental protection. However, the scope of these rights and obligations is not always clearly set out in the relevant provisions, requiring further clarification and elaboration. Moreover, due to the new scope of power given to coastal States in the EEZ, the question has arisen as to how coastal States’ rights and obligations in this new maritime zone, as well as coastal States’ rights and obligations in the territorial sea and the high seas, interact with historic claims arising prior to the entry into force of UNCLOS. This chapter analyses the decisions rendered by UNCLOS tribunals addressing the abovementioned issues and assesses the extent to which they have contributed to clarifying relevant rules relating to coastal States’ rights and obligations under the law of the sea.