This introduction provides an overview of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Conflict across the Middle East has routinely been framed as a consequence of proxy wars, such as the conflict in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, albeit playing out in different ways. These proxy wars are often found as features of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, yet the ways in which Saudi Arabia and Iran develop relationships with local actors points to a more complex set of relationships than the model typically understood within a ‘proxy relationship’. Indeed, as work done by the Sectarianism, Proxies and De-sectarianization (SEPAD) project has observed, perhaps most clearly in a special issue edited by Edward Wastnidge and myself, trans-state relationships between states – in this case Saudi Arabia and Iran – and non-state actors are products of time and space, meaning that a range of factors influence the relationships, producing a number of different outcomes. This includes some local actors possessing far more agency than is often typically assumed, as observed by Amal Saad in the case of Hizbullah. This ability to exert influence independent of the patron actor’s wishes appears to push the borders of the concept. The introduction closes with a discussion of the foreign policies of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Designed as a follow-up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which guided international development policies from 2000 to 2015, the 2030 Agenda proposed a new development road map for the subsequent fifteen-year period. The most iconic SDGs deal with the eradication of poverty and hunger, the fight against climate change, and the creation of a global partnership for sustainable development. The chapter shows that the SDGs’ script was not written in advance for the UN supertanker does not follow a predetermined route. The 2030 Agenda is also a useful reminder that for every global public policy adopted, alternative courses of action that were once part of the conversation are discarded along the way. Our analysis illuminates not only the experimental nature of the SDGs’ creation but also the power relations and the political choices that the SDGs reflected. Among other things, the 2030 Agenda was also profoundly marked by a set of practices related to goal-setting. In addition, convergence around sustainable development can be seen as the silver bullet of the 2030 Agenda, together with the idea that global poverty must be eradicated and that in this process, no one should be left behind.

To understand the ways in which Saudi Arabia and Iran have engaged with Iraqi politics and sought to define the principles of vision within Iraq’s political field, one must understand the structural factors conditioning and curtailing the deployment of capital. Here, tracing the evolution of Iraq’s political field is essential as a means of understanding the actions of Riyadh and Tehran. This tracing involves reflecting on identity politics and the interplay between identity groups and the state. The nature of this interplay, in turn, allows for the development of relations with regional powers, on both an individual and a communal level.

The protection of civilians in armed conflict (what we have earlier termed the PoC doctrine) has become a policy of major importance in twenty-first-century global governance. Largely driven by the security council, PoC offers another example of global policy that can be understood as a bricolage of practices and values, with improvisation once again playing a key role. This improvisation is especially apparent in the permanent conflict between the desire to make PoC a more consistent global policy and the goal of avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach. An operational challenge for PoC therefore consists in making continual trade-offs between the different visions of “protection,” as well as between the various conceptions of PoC’s proper place among UN priorities. Rather than following a rational design, the history of PoC has been determined by the shifting balance of global power relations and the vagaries of international circumstances. On one hand, PoC has become highly institutionalized thanks to the mobilization of enormous human and financial resources by the UN, member states, and the NGO community. But on the other hand, as a policy, PoC has developed as a succession of improvised or ad hoc decisions.

Far from resulting from a rational design, the Human Rights Council is in fact a perpetual work in progress. In terms of policymaking practices, the level of open-endedness and the role of trial and error in the institutionalization of this UN body is particularly striking. The making of the HRC is testimony to the prevalence of bricolage in global public policymaking: even its anchoring practice, the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), is subject to unending revisions. In terms of value debates, this chapter shows how the consensus against the politicization of human rights, which originally led to the demise of the COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, actually hides deep cleavages over universality, equal treatment, and dialog. A lot of these debates pit the North against the South, although the lines demarcating these two camps are often blurred. Today’s HRC forms an amazing bricolage of governance practices and universal values, one characterized by constant adaptation and constructive ambiguity.

In order to understand the ways in which the Saudi–Iranian rivalry plays out in Syria, it is essential to trace the evolution of the political field and its interaction with the transnational field. In doing so, the chapter critically reflects on the evolution of political life in Syria and the position of the state within broader regional currents, with a focus on Ba’athism, the Axis of Resistance, and the Arab Uprisings. Syria’s importance within such movements meant that it became a state of interest for other regional powers, particularly seen in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings.