This chapter describes the working practices of the Court, and the reforms made to increase the speed of cases, as well as to improve the processes. The author notes that the Court has demonstrated significant agility in its more recent amendments to the Rules to take account of the worldwide pandemic, and argues that there is evidence to suggest that the Court is becoming more assertive, moving away from its traditionally high level of deference to States.

Estimates of the economic costs of climate change rely on guesswork in the face of huge uncertainties, and arbitrary judgements about what is important. The models can produce any number their creators want them to; and typically, they trivialise the risks. Despite being described as ‘worse than useless’ by leading academics, economic analysis of this kind has been credited with a Nobel Prize, and it continues to inform government policy.

Property law is increasingly confronted with limits and modifications arising from environmental and social contexts. The objective of this chapter is to highlight how property law can provide answers to environmental challenges, by adapting several of its fundamental concepts to the polymorphism of environmental and social issues. Starting with a study of the theoretical movement of Earth jurisprudence, the chapter suggests that it is possible to consider Nature as a subject of legal interests, allowing it to acquire legal standing. It also suggests that it is necessary to reconceptualise property and its narrative to develop, in both civil and common law, a more limited, relational and functional conception of property. In addition, the polymorphic heritage of property law makes it possible to call upon the civilian concept of patrimony, in its symbolic or technical function, to protect the environment.

Non-legally binding instruments do not constitute treaties but they are widely used by states and international organisations as a form of political commitment. They have various titles, the most common of which is memorandum of understanding, although some states use this title also for treaties with a certain subject matter. In the multilateral context, non-binding instruments are often used for plans of action, guidelines and other forms of standard setting. To ensure that an instrument is non-legally binding, care must be taken in the drafting to evidence that intention, including use of the right terminology. An examination of state practice reveals broadly similar principles. Why do states and international organisations use non-legally binding instruments in preference to treaties? Reasons include confidentiality, lack of formality, and ease of amendment and termination. But there are risks, including possible lack of respect for commitments and lack of care in drafting. Non-legally binding instruments, both bilateral and multilateral instruments, may in some contexts be regarded as a form of soft law. They may also exceptionally give rise to estoppel. Non-legally binding instruments may also be evidence of a state’s decision or policy in the context of judicial review by domestic courts.

This chapter explains the role played by reservations, the application of the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and practice in dealing with reservations. It defines reservations and distinguishes them from interpretative declarations and political declarations. It examines whether reservations are permissible or impermissible, including the test whether a reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. It also discusses the rules governing acceptance and objection, the legal effect of reservations, the question whether a prohibited reservation can be severed, and special cases such as human rights treaties, reservations relating to internal law, vague or general reservations, reference to Islamic law, late reservations, and the role of treaty monitoring bodies. It analyses the procedure for making or objecting to reservations or withdrawing them, and the functions of the depositary in relation to reservations.

Science can only tell us a part of what we need to know about the risks of climate change. We also need to make judgements about politics, technology, and international security. To tell truth to power, we need to bring these fields of knowledge together.

The economics used by governments is based on ideas from the 1870s, when economists adopted the language of science, but not the method. To make the maths easy to solve, they assumed the economy was simple, predictable, and static. Nobody believes these assumptions are true, but they still shape analysis that informs policy. When the economy is complex, uncertain, and changing, this kind of analysis can lead us to bad decisions.

At any moment in time, you can ride a bike with least effort by cycling in first gear. But if you want to ride around the block with least effort, first gear will not be ideal. By failing to distinguish between these two different situations, economists have recommended the worst possible climate change policy to governments. Contrary to their belief, emissions trading will achieve decarbonisation at maximum cost, and minimum speed.

When a treaty prescribes how disputes can be settled, it usually provides for a preliminary phase involving direct negotiations or consultations. In the case of bilateral agreements, more binding mechanisms tend to be found in agreements with more specific obligations, or those directly affecting individual interests, such as trade. Otherwise, bilateral agreements will often specify that disputes are to be resolved by the diplomatic channel or other avenue of voluntary settlement. Both bilateral and multilateral treaties may provide for conciliation or mediation. The parties may, however, wish to resort to compulsory binding settlement. The two principal features are a prior agreement to submit disputes to a third party, and a provision that the decision of the third party is legally binding on the parties in dispute. Procedures of arbitration and judicial settlement, including the International Court of Justice, are analysed. In respect of remedies, the chapter examines countermeasures and the principles underlying them, sacrosanct obligations and necessity.

This chapter examines both entry into force and provisional application. A treaty enters into force in such manner and on such date as may be specified in the treaty or as the negotiating states may agree. Ways include ratification (or an analogous procedure) by all or a minimum number of negotiating states; exchange of instruments of ratification; notification by each state of the completion of domestic procedures; on the date of a reply note in the case of an exchange of notes; or on a date specified in the treaty; or on signature only by all the negotiating states. There can be more complex provisions, particularly with treaties that amend a previous treaty. The ‘date of entry into force’ is analysed. States may also provisionally apply all or part of a treaty prior to entry into force, subject to their constitutional provisions. Where a treaty has been terminated, the parties or some of them can agree to revive it.

This chapter highlights the central role that burial grounds play in the construction of diasporic memory and collective identity through a visual ethnography of tombstones located in several Islamic burial grounds across Western Europe. In spite of the long-term settlement of Muslim communities, such spaces are extremely rare and suffused with deep cultural meaning. Displays of belonging through epitaphs, images, and grave design are strategies to demonstrate connections to various collectivities. As places where the physical landscape is symbolically inscribed and signified, Islamic burial grounds in Europe offer insight into the changing contours of membership and identity in contemporary multicultural societies.

The issue of successive treaties arises where all or some of the parties conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject matter. The relevant rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are in Articles 30 and 59, which have to be read together. The chapter analyses how these rules might apply. In the case of bilateral treaties, the parties will often include express provisions to clarify the position in respect of an earlier treaty. If not, it may be possible to resolve any inconsistency by interpretation of the two treaties, or the earlier treaty may be treated as terminated or suspended in accordance with Article 59. Or the residual rules of Article 30 may apply, by which the earlier treaty may apply only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with a later treaty. The principles are the same in respect of multilateral treaties but there is a greater variety of express provisions, which are not always clear. The fact that all the parties to an earlier treaty may not be parties to a later treaty also adds complexity. These issues are analysed, together with the residual rules of Article 30.