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The EU prides itself on having created a legal system that puts the individual at its centre. Individuals benefit from a broad range of fundamental rights that protect them against EU power. However, to vindicate their rights against the EU, they have to make use of a remedies system, the essence of which was designed and drafted in 1957, with the creation of the European Economic Community. In the meantime, EU power has continued to evolve and expand. This raises the question: Has the EU outgrown its own remedies system? This introduction sets out the aim, scope, and structure of the book and gives an overview of the focus of each chapter.
This chapter explores online dispute resolution (ODR) as a possible mechanism for redressing fundamental rights violations by the EU. ODR as a form of redress mechanism is one of the main solutions that the EU has repeatedly proposed for the private sector when there were signs of problems with access to justice and the violation of individuals’ rights. This has been the case in consumer law with the ODR Regulation. The chapter gives an overview of various existing ODR mechanisms that could provide ideas for an EU fundamental rights ODR platform. Examples range from pre-trial ODR for small claims to out-of-court dispute settlement bodies under the DSA and the Meta Oversight Board. Embedding a fundamental rights ODR mechanism in the EU system would face challenges both in terms of the legal basis and its actual implementation. The European Ombudsman or the Fundamental Rights Officers of the EU Asylum Agency and Frontex could be a possible institutional choice for administering such an ODR mechanism.
This chapter considers whether and to what extent secondary sanctions that contravene commitments under trade and investment agreements may be justifiable under security and general exceptions. It analyses the jurisprudence of various international courts and tribunals on the matter, while focusing on the text of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Articles XX and XXI (which many international economic agreements replicate or adjust). For non-self-judging security exceptions, it concludes, justifiability hinges on the design of sanctions, their targeting of ‘military’ products or services, and the demonstrability of an essential security risk for the sanctioning party. Secondary sanctions might also be justifiable under general exceptions, which feature finer legal criteria to permit measures that pursue legitimate objectives while controlling their abusive application. The chapter considers the enforcement-related exception of GATT Article XX(d), as well as the public morals exception of GATT Article XX(a), which was invoked to justify sanctions in United States – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China. As with other measures at the intersection between economic relations and security, the assessment of secondary sanctions under these exceptions becomes particularly challenging in light of their usual objective: restricting trade or investment vis-à-vis specified states, on the basis not of impersonal objectives but of a state’s perception of its essential security interests.
This contribution examines the possibilities for individuals to access remedies against potential violations of their fundamental rights by EU actors, specifically EU agencies’ deployment of artificial intelligence (AI). Presenting the intricate landscape of the EU’s border surveillance, the chapter sheds light on the prominent role of Frontex in developing and managing AI systems, including automated risk assessments and drone-based aerial surveillance. These two examples are used to illustrate how the EU?s AI-powered conduct endangers fundamental rights protected under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Risks emerge for privacy and data protection rights, non-discrimination, and other substantive rights, such as the right to asylum. In light of these concerns, the chapter then examines the possibilities to access remedies by first considering the impact of AI uses on the procedural rights to good administration and effective judicial protection, before clarifying the emerging remedial system under the AI Act in its interplay with the EU’s existing data protection framework. Lastly, the chapter sketches the evolving role of the European Data Protection Supervisor, pointing out the key areas demanding further clarifications in order to fill the remedial gaps.
Affective polarization (AP), a concept that summarizes intense partisans’ animosity towards opposing parties and positive feelings towards their own, has recently received increasing attention. Despite a growing interest in Latin American polarization, there are very few empirical studies on the range and depth of dislike and distrust towards political adversaries in the region, and how this impacts the quality of democracies. This research note uses survey data collected after ten election cycles in six countries to estimate the scope and depth of AP in the region. We measure the extent of polarization in Latin America compared to other Western nations, assess its evolution, and makes some inroads to explain who drives AP. On aggregate, Latin America does not show large AP scores, yet there are clear signs of an upward trend. More than a widespread social phenomenon, the evidence suggests that AP is driven by large intense minorities.
In Europe, the integration process has domesticated international relations, safeguarded member-states’ democracies, and enabled collective action and supranational problem-solving. It has brought about the European Union (EU) and a democratic ‘surplus’. How has this been possible when the binding effect of EU law is grounded neither in the sovereign’s monopoly on power at the European level nor in the final decision-making authority of the EU? An answer to this puzzle is found in the fact that a public coercive framework has been established, which aims at solving the indeterminacy and assurance problems facing international cooperation. The enabling condition of sovereignty is replaced by those of co-legislation and a binding judicial process. The latter creates reasons for deference to legitimate authority and hence a compliance condition. However, since the Union falls short of meeting certain democratic standards, oversteps competences, and is plagued with inertia, there is a call for constitutional reform.
The author presents contrarian arguments contesting mainstream US views on the danger of a Sino-American war over Taiwan's status. They contend that these countries' dispute about Taiwan is motivated by opposing strategic interests and security concerns rather than just, or even mainly, clashing values such as national reunification, sovereignty, democracy, and self-determination. The danger of a Sino-American confrontation has become more elevated recently due to a confluence of several concurrent developments. Despite this increased danger compared to any time since Richard Nixon visited Beijing in 1972, they conclude that war is not imminent or likely-barring extreme hardliners and radical nationalists taking over policymaking in Beijing, Taipei and/or Washington. Despite a rising chorus urging Washington to commit more firmly to Taiwan's defense, they argue that the United States will not likely intervene directly on Taiwan's behalf. Even more controversially, they submit that Beijing will eventually prevail in this dispute.
This book examines how, and under what conditions, states – in collaboration with non-state actors – can govern a societal transformation toward large-scale decarbonization in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement. It advances an innovative analytical framework on how the state governs through collaborative climate governance to foster cooperation, deliberation, and consensus between state and non-state actors. The book focuses on Sweden, which aims to become a fossil-free state. The chapters analyze Sweden's progress toward net-zero emissions, its role in international climate governance, and how the COVID-19 pandemic affected climate networks. Providing valuable policy insights for other countries endeavoring to decarbonize, this book is a useful reference for graduate students and researchers in climate governance, political science, and international relations. It is one of a series of publications associated with the Earth System Governance Project. For more publications, see www.cambridge.org/earth-system-governance. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Why do states start conflicts they ultimately lose? Why do leaders possess inaccurate expectations of their prospects for victory? Bureaucracies at War examines how national security institutions shape the quality of bureaucratic information upon which leaders base their choice for conflict – which institutional designs provide the best counsel, why those institutions perform better, and why many leaders fail to adopt them. Jost argues that the same institutions that provide the best information also empower the bureaucracy to punish the leader. Thus, miscalculation on the road to war is often the tragic consequence of how leaders resolve the trade-off between good information and political security. Employing an original cross-national data set and detailed explorations of the origins and consequences of institutions inside China, India, Pakistan, and the United States, this book explores why bureaucracy helps to avoid disaster, how bureaucratic competition produces better information, and why institutional design is fundamentally political.
Kant's main work in the philosophy of law – the Doctrine of Right (1797) – is notoriously difficult for modern readers to understand. Kant clearly argues that rightful relations between human beings can only be achieved if we enter into a civil legal condition taking a defined constitutional form. In this Element, we emphasise that Kant considers this claim to be a postulate of practical reason, thus identifying the pure idea of the state as the culmination of his entire practical philosophy. The Doctrine of Right makes sense as an attempt to clarify the content of the postulate of public right and constructively interpret existing domestic and international legal arrangements in the light of the noumenal republic it postulates. Properly understood, Kant's postulate of public right is the epistemological foundation of a non-positivist legal theory that remains of central significance to modern legal philosophy and legal doctrinal method.
Mexico’s consular diplomacy and protection are unique. Mexico has a diaspora of close to 40 million people; approximately 9 percent live in the United States and 12 million of them were born in Mexico. Also, more than 50 percent of Mexicans have a relative living abroad, and over 20 percent of Mexican families receive remittances. Therefore, due to the relevance of its diaspora and its close connections with Mexico, consular diplomacy and protection are high priorities within Mexican foreign policy. This chapter analyzes the current scenario of the Mexican diaspora, as well as the Mexican consular and diplomatic work at a global level and its concentration in the United States; it also explains the economic, social, and military activities carried out by the Mexican state through its diplomatic representations. Its main findings are that Mexico’s policy for protecting its nationals abroad is multifaceted and goes well beyond traditional consular protection, entering the realm of bilateral and multilateral political relations, as well as public diplomacy. The main motivation of consular diplomacy and protection is one of support and, to a lesser degree, one of co-optation, since it seeks to include the Mexican population in the United States as part of a Mexican transnational nation.
The single biggest driver of the UK’s engagement with its nationals abroad is immediate domestic politics. Thanks to its imperial past, the UK has a relatively large number of nationals abroad. Most are comparatively wealthy and reside in developed, stable states where they often speak the language, such as Australia or the United States. Because of their numbers and independent means, the UK government largely tries to limit its liability for them. Instead, it focuses on providing good information and advice to travelers and expatriates alike, while making clear that it expects them to take care of themselves. In extraordinary circumstances, however, particularly when events abroad attract domestic media, public, or parliamentary attention, it is both able and willing to act much more robustly. Typically this involves measures to support nationals in difficulty by evacuating them from conflict zones or the sites of natural disasters. Its relative wealth and status as a liberal democracy means it rarely tries to co-opt or suppress its nationals abroad. It does make exceptions to this rule, however, for individuals whose status as nationals is in dispute.