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The principles of humanity and military necessity form the basis of international humanitarian law and also serve as tools in its interpretation. The chapter presents these two principles and then goes on to discuss two principles that derive from them, to wit, the principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality. The content and scope of these principles and the relationship between them is examined in this and subsequent chapters.
2.1 Causes of the Nuclear Crisis: Political and Economic Issues
2.1.1 North Korea's nuclear drive
North Korea's nuclear ambition is one of the most concerning military developments in Northeast Asia and beyond. North Korea is not the only country that has developed nuclear weapons outside the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)—India, Pakistan, and Israel have not accepted the NPT and have developed their own nuclear weapons. Regardless, the continuing hostility between North Korea and the West renders North Korea's nuclear development particularly alarming. On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced its first nuclear test. North Korea has since developed and tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of delivering nuclear warheads to the continental United States. While other countries—India, Pakistan, and Israel—have secured nuclear capabilities rather quietly, North Korea has openly threatened to use its nuclear weapons against the United States and South Korea. Analysts have estimated that North Korea has more than 60 nuclear weapons and could develop around 200 nuclear weapons and stockpile hundreds of ballistic missiles by 2027. North Korea's nuclear ambitions have altered the balance of military power in Northeast Asia and the security landscape of the region, creating substantial political and economic ramifications.
North Korea's nuclear development traces back to the mid-1950s, shortly after the Korean War. North Korea had the uranium deposits to develop nuclear weapons, but it lacked the technology. In 1956, North Korea signed an agreement on nuclear research with the Soviet Union, and North Korean scientists received training in nuclear technologies in Russia. In September 1959, the Soviet Union also agreed to help North Korea establish a nuclear research center. That same year, North Korea also signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with China. In 1965, the Soviet Union sold North Korea a small two- to four-megawatt research reactor, which North Korea began operating near Yongbyon in 1967. In the 1970s, however, conciliatory international developments such as the non-proliferation treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union made it more difficult for North Korea to obtain foreign assistance to build nuclear weapons. North Korea felt little urgency to develop its nuclear capabilities, though, because it perceived little or no threat from South Korea, which was then focusing on economic development. Interestingly, North Korea proposed a joint nuclear program to South Korea in the 1970s, although South Korea did not accept.
Northeast Asia, a major region in Asia covering China, Korea (South and North Korea), Japan, Mongolia, and the Southeast corner of Russia, is economically one of the most vibrant areas in the world, with a rich array of economic opportunities. Yet, it is simultaneously one of the world's most politically and militarily unstable regions, creating a global security risk. This risk was made apparent by North Korea's nuclear crisis, which was followed by a series of its nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches from 2016 to 2017. Although the worst-case scenario may have been avoided by a summit meeting between the heads of South and North Korea on April 27, 2018, and another summit between the United States and North Korea on June 12, 2018, substantial uncertainty and the risk of a major military conflict remains.
Although less dramatic and visible to the outside world, other political and military tensions among constituent countries in Northeast Asia, with their deep historical origins dating back centuries, are also significant. These tensions have been demonstrated by persistent territorial disputes, lack of reconciliation on the question of war crimes during World War II, increasing disparities in political influence and military power among Northeast Asian countries as a result of China's ascension, and deepening uncertainty in the region due to the potential instability of North Korea (caused by its confrontations with South Korea and its allies, internal political issues, and economic problems). These problems carry with them the potential to destabilize Northeast Asia, the effects of which would have a substantial global impact.
This book examines the causes of these complex tensions in Northeast Asia and their underlying political, historic, military, and economic developments. It further discusses their political-economic implications for the world and explores possible solutions to build lasting peace in the region. This book offers a unique approach to these important issues by examining the perspectives of each constituent country in Northeast Asia: China, South and North Korea, Japan, and Mongolia, and their respective roles in the region. Major global powers, such as the United States and Russia, have also closely engaged in the political and economic affairs of the region through a network of alliances, diplomacy, trade, and investment. The book will discuss the influence of these external powers, their political and economic objectives in the region, their strategies, and the dynamics that their engagement has brought to the region.
The strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific region has devolved into a fraught set of conflict points, now stretching from the India-China border, through the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait to the East China Sea. Yet no part of that arc is as complex as the Northeast Asian theatre, where the interests of six parties collide: the two Koreas, Japan, China, Russia and the United States. As U.S.-China relations have deteriorated, the Cold War divides that have been in place since the end of the Pacific War have hardened, with declining prospects of a negotiated settlement. China's struggle to define its global status and the war in Ukraine are now central drivers in this drama. But in the end, the Korean peninsula remains at its heart, precisely because it increasingly surfaces as a focal point for a broader array of competing interests. Those now include China's decision to cast its fate with Russia and the corresponding logic of tighter political, military and economic cooperation among the democracies: the United States, Japan and South Korea.
Y.S. Lee weaves an introduction to the current state of play. A distinctive feature of the approach is to work through the perspectives of each of the relevant players, with a particular bonus in considering Mongolia's contributions as well. Prof. Lee sees a long-term solution as requiring an institutional component—some kind of regional integration effort that would pull North Korea into the Asia-Pacific success story. He recognizes that building a rules-based order will hinge on where China's domestic politics is headed, but the U.S. must also take diplomatic risks and lead on the economic issues.
Prof. Lee's approach is anchored in realist fundamentals. China is clearly central to sustainable peace in Northeast Asia, and nothing will move unless Beijing comes to see it in its interest to make them move. Given China's massive political, economic, and military influence in the region, a more balanced, reconciliatory, and constructive engagement with the other Northeast Asian countries around the Korean peninsula is imperative to achieve a meaningful settlement. However, Lee's account acknowledges that the nature of China's foreign engagement is inseparable from its internal governance style. He outlines a classic liberal argument (and one with which I strongly agree): China's authoritarian turn is intimately connected with its more confrontational, aggressive, and coercive foreign policy, with Xi Jinping sitting as the architect of that approach.
7.1 An Independent Mongolia: Historical Context—From World Domination to the Fight for Independence
7.1.1 Pax Mongolica
Mongolia, the country that once dominated the world in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, is now the smallest power in Northeast Asia in terms of population (3.29 million) and economy (US$ 15.1 billion GDP as of 2021). However, despite their modest presence in the present day, the Mongols, through their conquest and expansion throughout the thirteenth century, left a profound political, economic, and cultural impact on the Asian and European continents and changed the course of all nations therein. At its height, the Mongol Empire formed the largest land empire in history, spanning from the Pacific Ocean in the east to the Danube River in the west, as illustrated in Figure 7.1.
The Mongols’ military success was unprecedented. The Mongols possessed an impressive cavalry, which could travel up to 100 miles (160 kilometers) a day and move without heavy supplies—unlike other armies at the time. The military genius of Mongolian leaders and generals (such as Chinggis Khan and General Subutai), supported by such powerful cavalry forces, led to unparalleled conquest within a few decades. The Mongol conquest was brutal and destructive, destroying the world's then greatest cities such as Herat, Kyiv, and Baghdad and claiming many lives therein. However, once the Mongol Empire had substantially completed its conquests by the mid-thirteenth century, it brought political unity and stability to the world, including Northeast Asia, often described as the “Pax Mongolica.” The Mongols set up an extensive postal relay system (“jam” system) throughout their empire, which was comprised of fixed relay stations that provided official travelers with horses, lodging, and other necessities for their journeys. The jam system expanded and became the most extensive network of communication and transportation in the pre-modern era, which facilitated the exchange of people, goods, information, and cultures between the East and the West.
The Mongol domination continued for over a century but ended with the dissolution of the Mongol Empire in 1368. The empire had been split into four Khanates (territories ruled by Mongolian leaders, “Khans”): the Golden Hordes in the Northwest (present-day Russia), the Yuan Dynasty in China, the Ilkhanate in the Southwest and Persia, and the Chagatai Khanate in Central Asia. These Khanates retained a strong sense of shared identity and ruled under the laws and traditions of Chinggis Khan, but they operated as autonomous states.
5.1.1 Economic restoration: From defeat in World War II to success in the global market
By the end of World War II, much of Japan had been destroyed. While the allied forces did not invade the main Japanese islands during the war, heavy U.S. bombing destroyed cities, villages, and much of its infrastructure. According to a Japanese government report on war damages, Japan lost 25 percent of its buildings and structures, 33 percent of its urban housing, 34 percent of its industrial machines, 81 percent of its commercial ships, 16 percent of its telegraph, telephone, and water supplies, 11 percent of its electricity and gas supplies, and 10 percent of its railroad and other land transportation. Over two million Japanese citizens also died during the war, while survivors suffered through food shortages and inflation. Economic production sharply decreased because of this war destruction. Figure 5.1 illustrates the low Japanese production of food, textiles, steel, and machinery in 1946 compared to its pre-war production.
The Japanese economy has gradually recovered since 1946. To foster recovery, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) initiated land reform in occupied Japan. Before the war, approximately two-thirds of the Japanese farmers did not own land. The SCAP's policy transferred land ownership to the farmers and improved farm tenancy practices. The reform was successful: the percentage of owner-operated cultivated land increased from 54 percent to 90 percent by 1950 (although the land reform had only a limited impact on agricultural production). An economically more significant development was the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The destructive war was a tragic event for the Koreans, but it provided Japan with decisive momentum for economic recovery. Due to its proximity to the Korean peninsula, Japan served as the supply base for U.N. forces, and money poured into the Japanese economy for supplies from Japanese producers. As a result, production increased by nearly 70 percent during the war—as much as US$ 590 million in 1951 and over US$ 800 million in 1952 and 1953 (which amounted to 60 to 70 percent of its exports at the time) was pumped into the Japanese economy. Thanks to this wartime economic boom, the Japanese economy recovered to its pre–World War II level by 1952.
The Japanese economy continued to grow—an increase of 2.8 to 4.8 times every decade as shown in Table 5.1