This chapter looking at the material presented about the post-WWII, period seeks to identify categories of incentives behind uses of interstate force: struggle to end colonialism, claims of historical rights, spread of ideology, religion, or culture, need for natural resources, wishes to prevent nuclear proliferation. Hurt pride and the aspiration for hegemony are also discussed as incentives to the use of force by the Soviet Union/Russia, US and China. Colliding aspirations for hegemony are noted as special risks of clashes and conflict

In all human societies, whether primitive or advanced, there have been legal norms rejecting the use of force. Norms have emerged from custom. Written law may have resulted from the codification and development of customary rules. This happened in Sweden around 1200 A.D. when a central power succeeded in wielding control and secured the unification and development of regional norms into common rules that became binding on all. Over time majority decisions became the established mode of rules adoption. In the international community, no central power has attained control and there has been no legislature adopting rules binding on all states. At Westphalia, in 1648, after the thirty years war, and in Vienna, in 1815, after the Napoleonic wars, the great powers victors felt a responsibility to design a peaceful order. However, it was only through the joint adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the UN that the states of the world agreed on binding themselves under legal norms prohibiting the use of interstate use of force.

Traditional wars with the aim to conquer territory have become rare after WWII. The Russian invasion of Ukraine departs from the trend but does not fundamentally alter it. This book examines the incentives, and restraints on the interstate use of force. Theories on the causes of war are discussed and a description of post-WWII conflicts and uses of force is offered. Discussion of restraints will focus on the role of military – including nuclear – deterrence, on the effects of conciliation, diplomacy, and disarmament and on the effects of restricting legal rules, notably the UN Charter.

Analysis is offered the UN Charter articles, notably Art. 2:4, that relate to the use of force. The Friendly Relations Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in 1970 is a useful tool of interpretation. The forcible seizure of territory is found to be a primary objective of the ban on the use of force. Post WWII, such seizures have been uncommon, but a few are cited. Interventions are of different kinds and many – that contain elements of force – fall under the prohibition in Art. 2:4. The term ‘force ‘does not cover ‘economic pressures’ but may cover various kinds of cyber-attacks. What the ban on ‘threat’ of force covers has not yet been authoritatively clarified. As only force ‘in international relations’ are covered, the article does not restrict governments’ use of force inside their own territories but it does prohibit foreign interventions supporting rebels. The case of the civil war in Syria and the interventions in it is discussed.

The international community has come a long way to develop a fabric of rules by means of treaties. While the effectiveness of this system generally is high, it is not easy to assess the impact of the handful of rules of the UN Charter that outlaw the interstate use of force. The absence of armed conflicts between great powers or other signs of restraints on the use of force may have been the result of other factors than the ban in the Charter, like fear of initiating nuclear war or fear of the economic cost of ruptures. The rule allowing force in self-defence only when an armed attack occurs has been under strain. Interventions have been undertaken, for instance to remove governments or to forestall nuclear proliferation. While unable to take enforcement actions, majorities in the UN General Assembly have been remarkably firm in an orthodox affirmation of the rules. Through interpretation there has also been some mitigation in terse rules. Thus, the prohibition of the interstate use of ‘force’ has not been taken to cover economic pressure and the right to self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’ may have regard to both past attacks and attacks deemed ‘imminent’ – but not to ‘anticipated’ self-defence.

Introduction

In December 2022, the China Daily newspaper ran an opinion piece titled “Will Americans Imitate China’s Approach to Africa?” The article was making reference to the US–Africa Summit organized by the US in Washington DC hosting several African state leaders. Summit diplomacy has become a staple in China–Africa relations as Beijing hosted the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in the year 2000 and there have been eight editions of the summit since then. It is in this context that the author of this China Daily article and many others have wondered if the US was mimicking China’s foreign policy approach in Africa. To be able to understand if Beijing has been socializing the US in transforming its approach to Africa by imitating its own, we have to first understand what summit diplomacy tells us about the values and norms underpinning Beijing’s approach in Africa.

In June 2021, Uganda’s President Museveni appointed the new Party Secretary for the country’s ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), Richard Todwong. A few moments after the announcement, the party’s website shared that China congratulated the new Party Secretary for his appointment (National Resistance Movement 2021b). As it turns out, in 2019, Todwong had participated in a three-month training at Peking University sponsored by the Chinese government for elites to learn about governance from Communist Party of China (CPC) experts. In an interview with Xinhua about the training, he highlighted how “African leaders could learn governance philosophy of the CPC, as the party is committed to a people-centered philosophy of development” (Xinhua 2021a). Similarly, at the 100th anniversary of the CPC (in July 2021), Todwong filmed a video message congratulating China, thanking the CPC for its mentorship, resources, and friendship with African political parties, and stating that the NRM will continue to “walk in the footsteps of the Communist Party” to achieve development and wellbeing for the Ugandan people (National Resistance Movement 2021b).

By contrast, the news of Todwong’s accession as the head of the NRM did not make it to US news outlets despite having also trained in the US before going to China. Such variance suggests a difference in China’s relational approach that puts a premium not only on training African elites but also on setting up mechanisms to follow (celebrate, for example) the political achievements of African elites trained in China.

UN Charter Art.33 points to means such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration to settle disputes and to avoid the risk of use of force. Judgments of the International Court of Justice are of great value also to further develop international law. However, courts are hardly ever employed to save peace by the judicial settlement of big disputes. Following the precedent of the Nuremberg tribunal, special tribunals have been set up to try war crimes. Even more important, an international criminal court has been established. Fact-finding (termed ‘enquiry’) has achieved a prominent role both to solve and to prevent conflicts. Thus, the safeguards system of the IAEA using inspectors, cameras and satellites and environmental sampling continuously verifies that no fissionable material is diverted away from peaceful uses. With much fake news around, impartial professional inspection, monitoring and reporting – for instance, about the use or possession of chemical weapons – has become more important. Diplomacy seeks to secure or create peaceful relations by agreement, precluding or removing the threat or use of force. Examples are given of successes of diplomacy to preserve peace as well as of failures and of talks going forever without result.

This chapter gives brief descriptions of Post-WWII interstate conflicts linked to the main phases in great power tensions: the bipolar Cold War, with Korean war 1950, the Viet Nam war 1965, Interventions, Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, the Détente and unipolar conflict resolving world that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union and the multipolar world that is emerging thereafter with terrorism, Russian intervention in Georgia and war in Ukraine and sharp tensions between the Koreas and in the East and South China Seas.

Introduction

This chapter examines how geography has shaped China’s pursuit of great power status and what it means to other countries, especially the US. It argues that geography serves as a social construct for Chinese national identity as well as a security concept for its interest. China’s geographical positioning is undergoing a transformation from imagining the country as a land-based yellow middle kingdom to a maritime blue superpower.

This chapter stresses a spectrum view of tianxia (All under Heaven), a foundational Chinese worldview as well as a spatial-positioning concept. Various political actors offer competing interpretations of tianxia ranging from accommodation to domination. Political geography has shaped this debate—the more China’s physical positioning is highlighted, the more assertive one’s interpretation of China’s global aspiration would become. The Chinese government has been leaning toward an increasingly aggressive execution, interpreting the country’s rapid maritime expansion as a modern shift of tianxia from land to sea. This has caused anxiety among neighbors and confrontation with the US.

This chapter’s analysis proceeds as follows: it starts by introducing tianxia (All under Heaven)—a Chinese philosophical view that imagines an ideal world where a benevolent and powerful leader sitting between Heaven and Earth, ruling his subjects by heeding the mandate of Heaven. Tianxia is both spatial and moral, as it portrays harmonious positionings of all living creatures on the land—people, fauna, and flora.

The chapter then examines how China’s rapid ascendancy has challenged this historical concept. Echoing Salvador Regilme’s chapter on the militarization of the South China Sea (SCS), this chapter points out that China has been aggressively pursuing the goal of becoming a deep blue power. As Beijing seeks to project its influence to the sea, it needs to expand tianxia, a traditionally land-based concept, to justify its vast maritime claim as well. Regilme argues that Xi Jinping’s domestic agenda of boosting nationalism is partly responsible for Beijing’s militant activities in the vast waters of the SCS. Following this proposition but looking through a more long-term and normative lens, this chapter suggests that the conceptual expansion of tianxia serves the Chinese leader’s domestic agenda of rejuvenating Chinese greatness, also known as the “Chinese Dream.” But Xi’s dream has stirred up fear and anxiety among China’s neighbors. It also brings the country on a collision course with America, the region’s hegemon by default.

A farewell is given to something that is leaving. After thousands of years of freedom for nations to go to war, new proximity, interdependence, risks of nuclear war have led them to exercise restraints and to commit themselves to the UN Charter and the requirement to abandon interstate uses of force. This book concludes that while states will continue as always to compete, the great powers are saying farewell to direct interstate wars. For over 75 years there have been no wars between them and no nuclear weapon has been used. The Charter as rule-based international order has often been violated and the veto has often stood in the way of action. Yet, the General Assembly has asserted the order and declared that it does not recognize illegal annexations. The nuclear arsenals remain and pose existential risks to humanity. At the same time, the fear that they would be used in second strikes makes it implausible that any nuclear-armed states would initiate hostilities that could risk leading to nuclear war. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is seen as out of tune with the twenty-first century – an aberration. The growing interdependence of states is creating restraints against causing ruptures and, at the same time, enables states to use crippling economic measures as substitutes for the use of force. In 1962, the Cuban missile crisis shocked the parties and prompted them to use diplomacy to avert the acute risk of nuclear war. Today, one may speculate if the war in Ukraine and threats to the human environment might shock nations to turn to diplomacy and disarmament and switch to the defence of the threatened human environment a major part of the some 2 trillion dollars that they now spend annually to defend themselves against each other. For this to become reality, an engaged public mind would be as important as it was against slavery and nuclear weapons.

UN Charter Art. 2:4 aims to protect states from forcible encroachments by other states, but it does not stand in the way of the Security Council taking or authorizing states to take enforcement actions under Art. 42 and did so in the case of Korea 1950 and Iraq in 1991.It may take or authorize enforcement actions – even inside states – under Art.2:7 and 42. It may also under Art. 53 authorize the use of force by regional organizations – and has done so. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine envisages the use of force to remedy extreme internal situations, such as genocide or massacres, but only within the rules cited requiring approval by the Security Council. The veto is often criticized as hindering action by the Council. It may, indeed, be excessively used but may sometimes be only a signal from one of the permanent members that it may be ready to use its power to resist an action proposed. Post WWII, force has been used by states – but only rarely – to acquire territory while ignoring the Security Council, notably by North Korea in 1950, Iraq against Iran in 1980 and against Kuwait in 1990, Russia against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.

Introduction

Great power rivalry is back once again (Layne 2012; Buzan and Cox 2013; Mearsheimer 2014; Graaff and Van Apeldoorn 2018; Ikenberry 2018a, 2018b; Lake 2018). In the 21st century, post-COVID-19 pandemic world order, China and the US have emerged as the two most powerful state actors, if several quintessential economic, military, and sociocultural indicators are considered. The economic front is indeed an area of great power contestation. According to the World Bank (2022a), while the US in 2021 had the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP; constant 2015 US dollars [USD]) with 20.3 trillion USD, China recorded 15.8 trillion USD. China’s enormous economic wealth that it has accumulated over the last few decades, however, has to be shared by the country’s 1.4 billion people. China’s 2021 GDP per capita (constant USD for 2015) remains remarkably low at 11,188 USD, compared to the US that has 61,280 USD. Notwithstanding, China has overtaken the US as the world’s largest manufacturer of products that are then exported to all countries. Consequently, China has the largest percentage share of the world’s exports of goods, with 14.7 percent in 2020, while the US only has 8.1 percent (Razo 2021). Nearly 124 countries recorded China as their top trading partner, while the US was recorded as the top exporter in only 56 countries (Arte 2022).

In global financial governance, China challenges US dominance as the former established the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the vast rail, land, and sea global network that connects China to a large number of countries in almost all world-regions (Kuo and Kommenda 2018; Nordin and Weissmann 2018; Jones and Zeng 2019). In a bid to stimulate development outcomes elsewhere, China founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is a multilateral financial institution that invests in various economic, social, and sustainable development projects in at least 105 member countries (Kubalkova 2015; Babones et al 2020; Lai 2022). China’s BRI and AIIB constitute attempts to upstage the Washington DC-based World Bank and the Manila-based Asian Development Bank, both of which predominantly reflect US interests.

The chapter explores the question of how different domestic and international law approaches to regulating the international transfer of personal data deal with cybersecurity threats. It examines the 2016 EU General Data Protection Regulation, the 2021 UK National Security and Investment Act, and the 2018 United States, Mexico and Canada Agreement, as representing distinct approaches for regulating international data transfers, namely data protection legislation, investment screening legislation, and digital trade agreements. The analysis demonstrates that a lack of uniformity in terms of what constitutes an adequate level and design of data protection mechanisms has left the issue of how to distinguish between acceptable and non-acceptable data-transfer restrictions largely unresolved.