The conclusion explores the wider meaning and significance of the antipolitics of refusal. Drawing on recent scholarship by Fred Moten, Saidiya Hartman, and Bonnie Honig, I move towards an understanding of the antipolitical – not as an escape from, or return to, the polis – but as a project of building autonomy, care, and horizontalism beyond racial capitalism, the state, and their violent terms of order.

This chapter critically examines the distinctive institutional and normative regime created by the UN for the Palestinian refugees in the immediate aftermath of the Nakba in the form of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. It juxtaposes that regime against the international institutional and normative regime applicable to all other refugees in the world, as administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The special regime for Palestinian refugees is widely regarded as reflective of the UN’s unique responsibility for their plight. Yet, a critical examination of the UN record on the early history, mandate, and regulatory framework underpinning this regime reveals that it was never intended to give effect to Palestinian refugee rights as established under prevailing international law, including as affirmed by the UN itself. The resulting ‘protection gap’ that has consequently emerged for Palestinian refugees, marked by uneven and confused state practice concerning their plight as well as ongoing gender discrimination against them by the UN, is demonstrative of the Organization’s role in the maintenance of Palestinian legal subalternity on the international plane.

This chapter looking at the material presented about the post-WWII, period seeks to identify categories of incentives behind uses of interstate force: struggle to end colonialism, claims of historical rights, spread of ideology, religion, or culture, need for natural resources, wishes to prevent nuclear proliferation. Hurt pride and the aspiration for hegemony are also discussed as incentives to the use of force by the Soviet Union/Russia, US and China. Colliding aspirations for hegemony are noted as special risks of clashes and conflict

In all human societies, whether primitive or advanced, there have been legal norms rejecting the use of force. Norms have emerged from custom. Written law may have resulted from the codification and development of customary rules. This happened in Sweden around 1200 A.D. when a central power succeeded in wielding control and secured the unification and development of regional norms into common rules that became binding on all. Over time majority decisions became the established mode of rules adoption. In the international community, no central power has attained control and there has been no legislature adopting rules binding on all states. At Westphalia, in 1648, after the thirty years war, and in Vienna, in 1815, after the Napoleonic wars, the great powers victors felt a responsibility to design a peaceful order. However, it was only through the joint adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the UN that the states of the world agreed on binding themselves under legal norms prohibiting the use of interstate use of force.

Traditional wars with the aim to conquer territory have become rare after WWII. The Russian invasion of Ukraine departs from the trend but does not fundamentally alter it. This book examines the incentives, and restraints on the interstate use of force. Theories on the causes of war are discussed and a description of post-WWII conflicts and uses of force is offered. Discussion of restraints will focus on the role of military – including nuclear – deterrence, on the effects of conciliation, diplomacy, and disarmament and on the effects of restricting legal rules, notably the UN Charter.

Analysis is offered the UN Charter articles, notably Art. 2:4, that relate to the use of force. The Friendly Relations Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in 1970 is a useful tool of interpretation. The forcible seizure of territory is found to be a primary objective of the ban on the use of force. Post WWII, such seizures have been uncommon, but a few are cited. Interventions are of different kinds and many – that contain elements of force – fall under the prohibition in Art. 2:4. The term ‘force ‘does not cover ‘economic pressures’ but may cover various kinds of cyber-attacks. What the ban on ‘threat’ of force covers has not yet been authoritatively clarified. As only force ‘in international relations’ are covered, the article does not restrict governments’ use of force inside their own territories but it does prohibit foreign interventions supporting rebels. The case of the civil war in Syria and the interventions in it is discussed.

The international community has come a long way to develop a fabric of rules by means of treaties. While the effectiveness of this system generally is high, it is not easy to assess the impact of the handful of rules of the UN Charter that outlaw the interstate use of force. The absence of armed conflicts between great powers or other signs of restraints on the use of force may have been the result of other factors than the ban in the Charter, like fear of initiating nuclear war or fear of the economic cost of ruptures. The rule allowing force in self-defence only when an armed attack occurs has been under strain. Interventions have been undertaken, for instance to remove governments or to forestall nuclear proliferation. While unable to take enforcement actions, majorities in the UN General Assembly have been remarkably firm in an orthodox affirmation of the rules. Through interpretation there has also been some mitigation in terse rules. Thus, the prohibition of the interstate use of ‘force’ has not been taken to cover economic pressure and the right to self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’ may have regard to both past attacks and attacks deemed ‘imminent’ – but not to ‘anticipated’ self-defence.

Introduction

In December 2022, the China Daily newspaper ran an opinion piece titled “Will Americans Imitate China’s Approach to Africa?” The article was making reference to the US–Africa Summit organized by the US in Washington DC hosting several African state leaders. Summit diplomacy has become a staple in China–Africa relations as Beijing hosted the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in the year 2000 and there have been eight editions of the summit since then. It is in this context that the author of this China Daily article and many others have wondered if the US was mimicking China’s foreign policy approach in Africa. To be able to understand if Beijing has been socializing the US in transforming its approach to Africa by imitating its own, we have to first understand what summit diplomacy tells us about the values and norms underpinning Beijing’s approach in Africa.

In June 2021, Uganda’s President Museveni appointed the new Party Secretary for the country’s ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), Richard Todwong. A few moments after the announcement, the party’s website shared that China congratulated the new Party Secretary for his appointment (National Resistance Movement 2021b). As it turns out, in 2019, Todwong had participated in a three-month training at Peking University sponsored by the Chinese government for elites to learn about governance from Communist Party of China (CPC) experts. In an interview with Xinhua about the training, he highlighted how “African leaders could learn governance philosophy of the CPC, as the party is committed to a people-centered philosophy of development” (Xinhua 2021a). Similarly, at the 100th anniversary of the CPC (in July 2021), Todwong filmed a video message congratulating China, thanking the CPC for its mentorship, resources, and friendship with African political parties, and stating that the NRM will continue to “walk in the footsteps of the Communist Party” to achieve development and wellbeing for the Ugandan people (National Resistance Movement 2021b).

By contrast, the news of Todwong’s accession as the head of the NRM did not make it to US news outlets despite having also trained in the US before going to China. Such variance suggests a difference in China’s relational approach that puts a premium not only on training African elites but also on setting up mechanisms to follow (celebrate, for example) the political achievements of African elites trained in China.