Like other political systems, the identity of the European Union (EU) is written in its rules (institutions). More than in ideal-typical national political systems – systems characterized by common languages, histories, cultures – however, formal rules both preponderantly determine and most clearly articulate what the EU does and what the EU is. At the same time, as a relatively pure system of rules, unencumbered by deeply rooted cultural political, linguistic, and other bonds, the EU provides a particularly fruitful laboratory within which to learn general things about institutions. Understanding where rules come from and how they operate is the raison d'être of the booming institutionalist research program; the study of the EU, in which the operation of formal rules is so transparently important, has influenced and will continue to influence the progress of that research program.

Rules, though, have a “dual nature” (Grafstein 1992). Though “humanly devised,” they are also “constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990). Absent some measure of endogeneity, institutions lose their definitional quality as objects of human design or choice. Absent some exogeneity to the preferences and power of, and bargaining between, their creators, they lack the independent effects that make them worth studying.

William Riker (1980) famously argued that if institutions have effects on things that rational actors care about, then those actors should have preferences over institutions and should be prepared to engage in politics with respect to them. The preceding chapter developed a theory that would extend this insight from the U.S. Congress, where it has been most consistently pursued, to the European Union, where it should be no less true (and should perhaps be more so). It developed the argument that everyday politics with respect to rules – “procedural politics” – responds systematically to the opportunities and incentives facing the actors in any political system. More specifically, procedural politics involves strategic interaction over rules and varies with both the jurisdictional ambiguity of issues and the nature (influence properties) of procedural alternatives. These conditions in place, it occurs by predictable means (strategic issue framing and coalition formation) and with predictable effects (on rules choices, on policymaking efficiency and outcomes, and on long-run institutional change). It represents one aspect of a complete institutional life cycle the totality of which must be accounted for if institutions and their effects are to be properly understood.

This chapter begins the process of systematically applying the argument to the European Union. Specifically, it fleshes out, in the EU context, the three premises underpinning the analysis.

Because it draws its raison d'être from the proposition that institutions matter, institutionalism implies that actors – who presumably care about the outcomes that institutions generate – may face incentives to engage in politics with respect to, rather than simply within, rules. This possibility immediately presents institutional analysts with a dilemma, however, since for rules to be rules, they must not only represent objects of human creation or choice but also sources of human constraint. “A completely flexible [institutional] framework is a contradiction in terms” (Matthews 1986, 914). Clearly, rules are sometimes taken as fixed and given. But when will politics remain within a framework of rules, and when does it take place with respect to that framework? How will such politics unfold, and what will be their effects? This chapter addresses these questions, briefly laying out the conceptual premises of my argument and developing at greater length a theory of the conditions under which, the ways in which, and the effects with which actors engage in procedural politics. Although elaborated with reference to the EU, the theory applies quite generally to institutionalized political and social systems.

Generically, of course, rationalist statements about any behavior reduce to statements about preferences, opportunities, and constraints, or about relative costs and benefits. I do argue in the abstract that procedural politics responds to the opportunities for selecting alternative rules and to the net expected benefits of such institutional selection.

Approximately 25 percent of the world's migrants (15 million “foreigners”) reside in Europe today. European policy-makers are forced to deal with this reality and the increasing agitation of their indigenous publics. What was once a bureaucratic and post-World War II phenomenon tied largely to reconstruction needs, the introduction of culturally, religiously, and ethnically diverse groups into European society has had an impact in the public and political arenas. This has been marked by electoral campaigns and party contestation, the emergence and consolidation of extreme-right parties, and increasing public support for xenophobic political forces.

Although traditional partisan/ideological and national interests continue to inform issue attitudes in Europe, the elusive organization of political cleavages in the immigration debate compels us to examine the changing “playing field.” While the analysis in chapter 4 underscored the relevance of domestic constraints on immigration thinking, it suggests that there is some attitudinal convergence that may be related to regional integration. The emergence and consolidation of some type of transnational Europe merit consideration for their effects on policy motives and preferences.

The character of immigration and the European movement toward integration together have created a practical need for transnational regulation and standardized policy-making. A major question in considering EU progress on free movement has been: to what extent have European nation-states abdicated state-level and decision-making interests to forge a common immigration policy at the supranational level? This question can be readily answered by examining institutional developments at the ground level.

Whether intergovernmental or supranational in form, the contours of a common immigration policy are shaped by regional integration dynamics.

Immigration policy typifies issues caught between national and supranational domains. On the one hand, defining citizenship and deciding who should enter a country are a state's prime tasks, symbolizing national sovereignty and control. On the other hand, citizenship of a member-state now confers economic and social rights exercisable throughout the EU, and has consequently brought immigration policy under transnational regulation. As the EU attempts to integrate and manage these competing demands, attitudes toward immigration are swayed by country-specific and partisan/ideological interests.

If the preceding analysis on immigration norms has proved anything, it is that efforts to create a common regime in Europe may take several forms. Nationalist and internationalist impulses within the European Union may be more compatible than traditional assumptions about cooperation have suggested. Too often, the policy discourse on globalization or European integration ignores the restrictive nature of cooperation that allows nations to remain protectionist – especially with regard to issues that are emblematic of their national sovereignty and identity. Perceptive immigration scholars have noted the trend toward restrictivism since the 1990s, yet the momentum toward Europeanization belies this phenomenon, and therefore the general point bears repeating. Increasingly, progress in European integration is accompanied by a reinvention of borders that can be understood only by examining the norms and attitudes that underpin immigration policy.

English-language letter accompanying questionnaire

Dear Member:

The Center for European Studies at the City University of New York is concerned to develop in the United States a greater understanding of the European Community, and especially of the European Parliament. I write to seek your assistance in that endeavor.

In studying the European Parliament at this time, our goal is to build a base from which to trace its development over time. To that end, we are conducting a study of the current members' perspectives and policy preferences regarding one of the most challenging issues facing the Community, i.e., immigration.

As the central emergent leadership institution in the European Community, [what] the Parliament [thinks] seems crucial on this issue. Therefore, the perspectives and policy preferences of the members are essential not only for our understanding of the development of policy, but to our understanding of the development of the Parliament itself.

In pursuit of such understanding, we are asking the cooperation of each member of the European Parliament. Specifically, we ask that you take a few moments of what we know is precious time to share your views on immigration with us by completing the enclosed questionnaire. Your thoughtful and candid answers are essential for our study. They will, of course, be kept completely confidential.

As project director, I will be in Europe during the period 1 April 1992 and 1 June 1992. Should your time permit, I would very much appreciate the opportunity of discussing these issues with you.

According to the official EU mantra, the ultimate aim of the “Community” has been to establish “an ever closer union among the European peoples” (the preamble of the Rome Treaty, the first “constitution” establishing the Community). As with all shared views about Europe, there are many diverse opinions on how to achieve this goal. Nonetheless, its implications, particularly for an immigration regime, are significant. This is because the question of a people's Europe hinges on who those people are, and what to do about the “outsiders” among them.

The basic principle underlying “a people's Europe” relates to the human dimension of the Union – the idea that Community citizenship, irrespective of nationality, bestows the same rights, freedoms, and obligations for all member-state nationals. The concept of European citizenship stresses the universality of human rights throughout the Union.