What follows will disappoint those looking for a “how-to” manual on constitutional design. Certainly there is much here that can be used by those writing or rewriting a constitution, but the major intent of this book is to help us understand constitutional design rather than lay out guidelines for constitutional construction – to help us think about the constitutional project rather than direct us toward specific institutional or constitutional outcomes. Even if one wanted to provide a set of instructions for those framing a constitution, it would be unwise for an outsider to do so. A fundamental fact about constitutional design is that there is no optimal model, no clear set of rules for matching a people and their situation with a set of institutions, and no inherently stable or superior constitutional system. We do know a great deal more about institutional design than Aristotle did, and even a good deal more than we did half a century ago. The empirical knowledge we now possess, however, tends to be piecemeal, theoretically unfocused, and sometimes contradictory. As important as the contributions of empirical and analytic approaches have been over the past half century, there is no substitute for just backing off and asking, How do we go about thinking about constitutionalism and the design of constitutions as an integrated project? That is the deep focus of this book, and that is why it is best to think of it as an exercise in political theory.

Previous chapters have demonstrated how negotiations in the EU lend firm support to the theory of formal leadership. In the EU, the member states have delegated extensive powers of agenda management, brokerage, and representation to the Presidency in response to identifiable collective-action problems. Drawing upon these powers and the Presidency's informational and procedural advantages, EU governments have used the office as a platform for political influence, thus raising the efficiency of negotiations and shaping the distribution of gains from negotiated agreements. Yet what does the EU case actually say about the power of the chair in multilateral negotiations? The EU is sometimes described as sui generis – one of a kind – because of attributes that cannot be assumed in all multilateral negotiations, such as the low number of actors, the high level of homogeneity, and the high degree of institutionalized cooperation. To what extent can the conclusions from this particular negotiation context be generalized to multilateral bargaining at large? Is the phenomenon of a negotiation chair that wields power and influences outcomes isolated to the EU or is it a general feature in multilateral bargaining and international cooperation? This chapter addresses these questions by placing the European experience in a comparative perspective. I consider evidence from multilateral negotiations in the areas of security, trade, and environment, drawing mainly on existing secondary accounts.

The central argument of this book is that the empowerment of chairmanship institutions in international cooperation reflects a rational response by states to collective-action problems in decentralized bargaining, and enables formal leaders both to raise the likelihood of negotiation success and to favor their own preferred outcome. This chapter presents in greater detail the logic of this theoretical argument, summarized in Figure 2.1.

The theory of formal leadership draws on rational choice institutionalism, originally developed in the study of American politics and subsequently imported into IR theory: a view of politics as a series of contracting dilemmas that may prevent or inhibit mutually advantageous exchange; a functionalist approach to institutional choice and development; a conception of states as rational actors that behave instrumentally in the pursuit of their preferences; a recognition of the agency problems inherent in the processes of delegation; and a perspective on formal rules as enabling and constraining factors. Simultaneously, this theory integrates core elements of rationalist bargaining theory: a recognition of the collective-action problems involved in complex multilateral negotiations; an emphasis on the tension between cooperative and competitive negotiation moves; an appreciation of information as a bargaining asset; a perspective on leaders and entrepreneurs as strategic actors; and an analysis of negotiated outcomes in terms of efficiency and distribution. The epistemological affinity between the two literatures is substantial, and the scope for synergies in theory development significant and important.

The previous two chapters have explored the EU Presidency's capacity to shape political outcomes as agenda manager and broker. This chapter turns to the third and final of the Presidency's key functions – representing the member states in negotiations with third parties. The EU Presidency negotiates on behalf of member governments in two principal contexts. It functions as the Council's representative in inter-institutional negotiations with other EU bodies. In particular, it engages in legislative negotiations with representatives of the European Parliament as part of the co-decision procedure, the dominant legislative procedure in the EU. Furthermore, the Presidency acts as the member states' representative in certain international negotiations. The area where the function as external negotiator is most institutionalized is accession negotiations with countries that wish to become members of the EU.

The central argument in this chapter is that EU governments' engagement of the Presidency as their representative leads to a classic principal–agent problem, with divergent preferences, incomplete control, and agent discretion. This claim shares important affinities with arguments about delegation and agency in other contexts where collective principals have delegated powers of representation to an executive agent, for instance, international trade negotiations. In the EU, the member governments have delegated the authority to negotiate agreements to an actor with its own interests and stakes in the outcome. Simultaneously, they have refrained from establishing mechanisms of complete control, since the Presidency must be able to negotiate with some flexibility in order to arrive at external agreements.

The chairmanship is a generic feature of political decision-making, whether at local, national, or international level. In city councils, parliamentary committees, and multilateral institutions, chairmen facilitate and influence decision-making by managing the agenda, brokering agreement, and representing the decision body vis-à-vis external parties. In many cases, the institution of the chairmanship is itself an object of contention. Political parties compete for formal control of legislative committees, and states struggle over the right to appoint the chairmen of multilateral conferences and international organizations. Indeed, this phenomenon extends beyond the political domain, to decision-making in other areas of social organization, from company boards to university departments and local associations.

Yet, so far, political scientists have been slow to ask and answer the kind of questions motivated by these observations. Influenced by the game-theoretical heritage of the field, students of negotiation and decision-making have tended to treat bargaining parties as functionally and formally equivalent, thus leaving little theoretical space for formal leaders with asymmetrical control over the nature of the game. In this book, I have sought to remedy this lack of attention to formal leadership in existing research. Developing and testing a rationalist theory of formal leadership, this book offers answers to three questions of general interest: Why is the institution of the chairmanship a universal feature of political decision bodies? What are the power resources of formal leaders? When, why, and how do negotiation chairs wield influence over political outcomes?

The rotation of the Presidency gives every member state of the EU an opportunity to engage in agenda management, brokerage, and representation. Yet what are the political implications of this arrangement? Does the Presidency office constitute a power platform that permits the incumbent to pursue national interests through extraordinary means, or a burden that forces governments at the helm to sacrifice private concerns for the collective good? In this chapter and in Chapters 5 and 6, I turn to the question of how the powers of the Presidency office may be used to influence the direction of EU negotiations. I begin by analyzing the Presidency's function as agenda manager.

Existing literature is highly skeptical about the capacity of Presidencies to shape the EU agenda. Typically, three forms of arguments are advanced. According to the first argument, the office of the Presidency office has not been conferred any exclusive formal powers of initiative, and therefore cannot set the EU's policy agenda. In this vein, Richard Corbett stresses: “[T]aking on the Presidency does not mean acceding to an executive office but is merely the chairmanship of one of the EU institutions for a short period.” The second line of reasoning emphasizes the limitations on Presidencies' room for maneuver imposed by inherited agendas and unforeseeable events. In an early and widely cited assessment, Guy de Bassompierre asserts that “any Presidency, however worthy and able, can only influence, at best, 5–10 percent of the issues.”

The Presidency has traveled far in half a century of European integration. When the office was first established in the 1950s, it possessed almost no political powers. Today, Presidencies perform functions of agenda management, brokerage, and representation that put them at the center of European cooperation. How can this remarkable transformation of the EU chairmanship be explained? Existing literature tends to present the historical evolution of the Presidency as an accidental and unanticipated process. Helen Wallace concludes: “The Presidency… represents a combination of reactions to events, the follower not the creator of fashion and convention.” In the same vein, Emil Kirchner argues: “The Council Presidency can be described as a body that has grown in status more by default than by design.”

This chapter argues in favor of a functionalist interpretation of the Presidency's development from an insignificant administrative office into a powerful political platform. It suggests that the primary sources behind this evolution are developments in the EU's internal decision-making and external political ambitions that have given rise to real or anticipated problems of agenda failure, negotiation failure, and representation failure. Member governments have responded to these collective-action problems by delegating new and more far-reaching responsibilities to the Presidency. The search for efficient modes of negotiation and decision-making has been the leitmotif of this process, which has taken place through continuous and incremental adjustment of the Presidency's tasks.

Multilateral negotiations today constitute the most prominent method by which states address joint problems, resolve disagreements, and formulate common norms in world politics. Yet international relations (IR) scholars still grapple with the most fundamental questions raised by this practice, pertaining to issues of efficiency and distribution in international cooperation. Why do some negotiations lead to agreements that exploit all possible joint gains, whereas others collapse or produce suboptimal bargains? Why are some states more successful than others in securing benefits from multilateral agreements?

This book is about the influence wielded by the formal leaders of multilateral negotiations – those state or supranational representatives that chair and direct negotiations in the major decision bodies of international organizations and conferences. The book offers a systematic theoretical and empirical exploration of formal leadership in multilateral bargaining. It conceives of the chairmanship as a power platform in international politics, and argues that actors in control of this office enjoy unique opportunities to shape the outcomes of multilateral negotiations. Formal leaders fulfill functions that make it more likely for negotiations to succeed and possess privileged resources that make it possible to steer negotiations toward the agreements they most prefer.

In the book, I present and test a theory of formal leadership that synthesizes elements of rational choice institutionalism and general bargaining theory. The theory develops a coherent argument for the origin of the chairmanship as an institutional form in decision-making, for the power resources of negotiation chairs, and for the effects of formal leadership on the outcomes of multilateral bargaining.

In the previous chapter, I showed how the function of agenda management offers opportunities for Presidencies to shape the EU's policy agenda. In this chapter, I turn to the second of the Presidency's principal functions in EU cooperation: brokerage. My central argument is that the Presidency's brokerage resources permit the government at the helm to construct and shape agreements that otherwise may not have come about. The Presidency's influence over these negotiated outcomes is two-dimensional. By collecting private information on state preferences and structuring negotiations in ways that encourage convergence, Presidencies can unveil the underlying zone of agreement and engineer viable compromises. Presidency brokerage helps to explain why negotiation failure is a reasonably rare phenomenon in the EU, despite a tendency among governments to be secretive about their preferences and to adopt tactical negotiating positions that reduce the zone of agreement. At the same time, Presidencies are tempted to use their informational and procedural power resources for private gain. Typically, they exploit the position as broker to favor the outcomes they desire. If the zone of agreement permits a number of efficient outcomes with varying distributional consequences, Presidencies promote the agreement closest to their own preferences.

The argument in this chapter challenges the dominant understanding of Presidency brokerage in existing research. Typically, this literature asserts that the responsibility as broker carries adverse consequences for the Presidency government's capacity to secure national interests.

My essay examines how Turkey's diverse Islamic groups' attitudes toward Europe have changed from rejectionism to accommodation and embrace as a result of interactions with European institutions and changing conditions inside Turkey. In the process of interacting with Europe, a new accommodative cognitive map of Islamic identity has emerged. This new understanding treats Europe and Islam as potentially mutually reconcilable and not oppositional identities locked in constant struggle. Thus, not Islam or a sui generis Islamic civilization, but dialectical engagement shapes one's perception of the “other.”

This essay differs from Bassam Tibi's essentialist image of a rigid and uniform manifestation(s) of socio-political Islam(s) and a frozen broader Islamic civilization. Tibi's analysis of Euro-Islam is marked by a triangular relationship between essentialism, chauvinism, and fear. He draws the boundaries of Islamic identity around the reified historical notions of jihad, hijra, and daʾwa, and he does not want to entertain the possibility of symbolic meanings and multiple understandings of a text or tradition conditioned by and evolving due to internal and external factors in the manifestation of a given Muslim collective self. This essentialist and reductionist outlook amplifies the paradox identified by Edmund Burke for many secular nationalists in the Middle East, who have become inside-out orientalists in their quest for modernity. This is probably why Tibi opts for a “reformed” Islam, informed by and disciplined via the historically particular case of the Christian Reformation and European Enlightenment.