Introduction

Coming to the end of this book makes me realize primarily how many important and interesting topics within the field of populist radical right studies still need further exploration. This study can at best open consideration of a few issues and begin to answer some of the many questions the subject provokes.

In this final chapter, I want to look both back and forward. This book addresses three aspects of the study of populist radical right parties: identifications, issues, and explanations. On the basis of a pan-European approach I have collected, integrated, and revised insights from existing studies and combined them with new findings from original research. The next sections present some of the main findings of this study and sketch posssible avenues for further research.

The key message of this book is reiterated throughout this concluding chapter: the populist radical right parties themselves must be put at the center of research on the phenomenon. Populist radical right parties are not just dependent variables, passively molded by structural factors, but they also constitute independent variables, actively shaping part of their own destiny. This point is too often ignored in the sociological and economical deterministic studies in political science.

The observation that European politics is dominated by political parties which are older than most of their electorates still holds true for much of Western Europe. And even if party systems seem to be more in flux in the twenty-first century, not only in the Eastern part of the continent, they are still largely controlled by members of the traditional party families, notably the conservatives and Christian democrats, socialists and social democrats, and liberals. In fact, only two new party families have been able to establish themselves in a multitude of European countries since the Second World War: the Greens (or New Politics) and the populist radical right. And only the latter has been able to gain results in both parts of Europe.

Seen in this light, it does not seem strange to have yet another book on this topic. After all, the populist radical right is the only successful new party family in Europe. Moreover, given the unprecedented horrors of the Second World War, and the more recent nativist wars in the Balkans, the destructive threats to liberal democracy of the populist radical right seem reason enough for the extensive study of the phenomenon.

Introduction

Both the academic and public debate about the “extreme right” lends credence to Von Beyme's assertion that we know who they are, even though we do not know exactly what they are. However, I fundamentally disagree with the belief that “the extreme right is easily recognizable” (Anastasakis 2000: 4). Practice certainly reveals that we do not know who they are (also Mudde 2000a): while there is consensus with regard to the inclusion of some parties in this category, the proper classification of many others remains contested. Indeed, there are some special circumstances that make the implications of this assumption especially problematic for this particular party family.

Some scholars consider the Scandinavian Progress Parties to be the first of the recent wave of “right-wing populist” parties (e.g. Decker 2004; Betz 1994), whereas others exclude them from their analysis on the grounds that they are not “extreme right” (e.g. Mudde 2000a). Similarly, while the Italian Lega Nord (Northern League, LN) is included in most comparative studies of the populist radical right party family, at least one prominent scholar (Ignazi 1992; 2003) has consistently excluded it. The confusion with respect to classifying the parties in Eastern Europe is even more striking.

Introduction

Both inside and outside of the academic community, scores of claims are made about the political impact of the populist radical right party family on European democracies. According to various commentators populist radical right parties “poison the political atmosphere” (PER 2002: 11). While much speculation abounds about the alleged impact of populist radical right parties on European democracies, few commentators have addressed the other side of the coin, i.e. the impact of European democracies on populist radical right parties.

This chapter discusses the crucial issue of political impact, largely on the basis of the insights of the few academic studies on the topic published so far. The focus is on the impact both of populist radical right parties on European democracies and of European democracies on populist radical right parties.

Introduction

International cooperation among populist radical right parties has thus far received little academic attention. Some scholars have studied the internationalization of the extreme right, notably neo-Nazi and racist groups (e.g. Kaplan & Weinberg 1999), and there have been a few publications on the cooperation among populist radical right parties in the European Parliament (e.g. Stöss 2001; Veen 1997). However, overall this topic has been the domain of antifascists and freelance journalists, and there has been virtually no systematic empirical challenge to their often grotesque misrepresentations of a “brown network” based largely on bizarre conspiracy theories (e.g. Svoray & Taylor 1994).

As far as European cooperation between more or less relevant populist radical right parties is concerned, opinions differ quite substantially. Some scholars believe that “[t]he attempts at cross-linking [Vernetzungsbemühungen] of the extreme right in Europe have increased in the last years, and particularly the development of an extreme right Europe ideology is presently taking concrete shape – despite all national specifics and differences” (Salzborn & Schiedel 2003: 1209). Others are more cautious, arguing that it does not seem correct “to speak of one European right-wing extremism in the sense of a political actor.

Introduction

Although the populist radical right is not antidemocratic in a procedural sense, as argued in chapter 1, core tenets of its ideology stand in fundamental tension with liberal democracy. Various authors have discussed this tension, although mostly at an abstract level without much reference to concrete positions of the parties in question (e.g. Betz 2004; Decker 2004; see also Lipset 1955). To understand the nature and scope of this tension, we must examine the societal and systemic consequences of the three key features of the populist radical right: nativism, authoritarianism and populism.

The following sections will discuss the populist radical right parties' views on nativist democracy, authoritarian democracy, and populist democracy, respectively. In the conclusion the populist radical right view of democracy will be constructed and compared to the key features of liberal democracy in general, and the way they are implemented in contemporary European countries in particular. This exercise should also help provide a clearer insight into the key question on the mind of many authors and, indeed, readers: how dangerous are populist radical right parties for liberal democracy?

Nativist democracy: it's our country!

The key concept of the populist radical right is nativism, the ideology that a state should comprise “natives” and that “nonnatives” are to be treated with hostility. Like all ideologues, nativists are torn between the ideal and the practice, the dream and the reality.

Introduction

Given the explosion of literature on populist radical right parties in the past two decades, it comes as no surprise that explanations for their success abound. Nearly every author on the subject provides some reason for the electoral success of the party family in contemporary Europe, however implicitly or generally it may be presented. Most scholars' understanding of the phenomenon has been highly influenced by classic theoretical work in the social sciences, especially that concerning (historical) nationalism and fascism. Interestingly, only very little attention has been paid to the electoral failure of populist radical right parties, even though these cases are (far) more numerous (De Lange & Mudde 2005).

In addition to the pure theoretical work, which remains fairly general and underdeveloped, the bulk of articles in refereed academic journals dealing with the topic have involved empirical tests of various aspects of these theories. Overall, the conclusions largely contradict each other, which furthers both the debate and the stream of publications.

Introduction

The academic literature on the populist radical right puts strong emphasis on the alleged neoliberal economic program of the party family. According to numerous authors, neoliberal economics is an essential feature of the parties' ideology and success. At first sight, it is not surprising that the populist radical right is linked to neoliberal economics. After all, contemporary understanding of “the right” in (empirical) political science is first and foremost in economic terms, standing for a trust in the market over the state, i.e. neoliberal economics (see also 1.5).

Few scholars have provided substantial empirical evidence for the alleged neoliberal content of the socioeconomic programs of the populist radical right. In fact, as is so often the case in the field, the claim is just assumed to be correct and broadly accepted. However, systematic analysis does not substantiate these claims; even in their early days most populist radical right parties at best expressed neoliberal rhetoric without fronting a consistent neoliberal program. Could it be that the populist radical right parties were just trying to fit the neoliberal Zeitgeist of the 1980s? Does the populist radical right actually share a coherent and collective (socio)economic program? And, if so, is this a core feature of their ideology?

Introduction

Irrespective of how favorable the breeding ground and the political opportunity structure might be to new political parties, they merely present political actors with a series of possibilities. In the end, it is still up to the populist radical right parties to profit from them. In line with scholarship on political parties in general, populist radical right parties should no longer be seen simply as “hapless victims of their economic or demographic environments, but as … the active shapers of their own fates” (Berman 1997: 102; also Sartori 1990). In other words, the party itself should be included as a major factor in explaining its electoral success and failure.

The strategies of contemporary populist radical right parties are part of almost every account of the party family. Nearly every scholar points to the importance of the “modern image” of populist radical right parties. Indeed, image production by these parties has generated some marvelously creative terminology, including “Haiderization” to designate the process (Marcus 2000: 36) and “designer fascism” in reference to the final product (Wolin 1998). This process of “restyling” is often believed to be only superficial, involving mainly the selection of physically attractive representatives, such as former beauty queens and (young) men in tailor-made suits, rather than a genuine transformation of the ideology and style of the parties.

Introduction

“Globalization” is undoubtedly one of the most overused words of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. According to its proponents, all things good are the direct consequence of globalization, while its opponents link all things evil to that same phenomenon. Consequently, globalization seems so omnipresent that one struggles to comprehend its meaning. This is not helped by the fact that the term is more easily used than defined. Many academic and nonacademic observations obscure both the meaning and the significance of the phenomenon.

Conceptual precision notwithstanding, political actors clearly perceive globalization as one of the most significant phenomena in European politics of the twenty-first century. It is not surprising that globalization is also linked to the populist radical right, one of the other most debated developments in contemporary European politics. Summarizing very crudely, the two are connected in two fundamental ways. On the one hand, globalization is seen as one of the main causes of the recent electoral success of populist radical right parties in Europe (see chapter 9). On the other hand, populist radical right parties are among the most vocal opponents of globalization. The latter aspect, which so far has received scant attention in the literature (Dechezelles 2004; Leggewie 2003; Simmons 2003), will be addressed in this chapter.

In this chapter, our aim is to provide some essential background material for understanding the argument and evidence we present in the rest of the book. We focus on three aspects of the story of the European Parliament: (1) the main powers of the institution and how these have changed; (2) how the political parties and the party system in the European Parliament have evolved; and (3) why the ‘electoral connection’ from citizens to MEPs remains rather weak despite six rounds of European Parliament elections. The chapter concludes with a discussion of ‘roll-call votes’ in the European Parliament, which is the data we use in the rest of the book to understand how politics inside the European Parliament has changed. Roll-call votes are votes where the voting decision of each MEP is recorded. The roll-call voting records are published in the annexes to the minutes of the plenary sessions of the European Parliament. Nowadays, they can also be found on the website of the European Parliament.

1.1 Powers of the European Parliament

The precursor to the modern European Parliament was the ‘Assembly’ of the European Coal and Steel Community, which held its first meeting on 10 September 1952.

Following the reform of the Commission investiture procedure by the Maastricht Treaty, as described in Chapter 1, on 21 July 1994 the European Parliament voted for the first time on the choice of a Commission President, and backed Jacques Santer by a narrow margin. Many MEPs, mostly on the left, were reluctant to support Santer. This was partly because they disagreed with his policy agenda (as a Christian democrat politician) and partly because they were unhappy with the way the nomination process had been conducted by the European Council. So, when the Commission was later accused of gross mismanagement, many MEPs who had originally opposed Santer now found the ideal opportunity to challenge his legitimacy. The Commission survived two censure votes before resigning en masse in March 1999, just before a likely loss in the third censure vote.

The story of the Santer Commission is a revealing case of how the European Parliament exercises its executive-control powers. This case also enables us to test whether our argument, which holds for a large number of votes across a long time period, also explains MEP behaviour when there are high political stakes. If democratic politics exists in the European Parliament, then the positions of the European parties should make a difference, and the left–right dimension should structure MEP behaviour, regardless of whether the parliament is voting on a minor non-legislative resolution or on a Commission censure motion.

If we follow the reasoning from Chapter 2, a strong party system requires that parties are cohesive, in other words that the elected members of the same party vote in a disciplined way, following the position reached by their party leaders in the parliament. A political party will attract support by making commitments to particular policies or goals that are distinct from the commitments of other parties. If a party is able to work as a highly organised team, it will be able to turn these promises into policy outcomes. If a party is not able to ‘rally its troops’, it will have little chance of shaping policy outcomes, and so will leave its supporters disappointed. Scholars of the EU have hence argued that for transnational parties to increase the democratic accountability of the EU they must be able to act cohesively to implement the policy platforms they announce (e.g. Attinà, 1992; Andeweg, 1995; Hix and Lord, 1997). If voting in the European Parliament breaks down along national lines rather than party lines, the transnational political groups cannot claim to be able to articulate the classic ideological viewpoints in the EU policy-making process with any real degree of effectiveness. Testing for the cohesiveness of parties is the first natural step towards understanding the effectiveness of parties. As in the previous chapter, where we looked at the long-run and short-run determinants of participation, we analyse in this chapter the long-run determinants of cohesion.