Abstract: Within neoliberal approaches to the study of International Relations there is a consensus that non-governmental actors and their potential impact need to be studied more. This article examines how Estonian civil society organisations are acting as agents in the general Europeanisation processes. The framework within which they operate, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership, are both in theory open to participation by the third sector. The EU's foreign policy, being built up to such a large degree around notions of soft power, should also lend itself easily to the kinds of bottom-up approaches to spreading its influence which civil society can help to effect. The empirical work shows, however, that due to both institutional and procedural obstacles, this sort of cooperation is not happening to a great extent, or is at least significantly hampered. On key issues and in terms of priorities the agendas of civil society organisations and traditional state actors also tend to diverge, with the former eager to pursue more normative charged policies, and the latter taking a more traditional approach. The state of civil society in the former Soviet Union also makes this style of policy more difficult. Thus the central argument of this article is that while civil society organisations do offer interesting avenues to explore, the EU has been far too unappreciative of the needs of civil society organisations, and has therefore not been able to fully utilise the resources they could potentially provide.

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004–2007 changed the borders of the polity, but also contributed to a crisis of the collective identity of Europeans. The inclusion of many new countries in the EU, relatively little known to the Western European public, generated questions concerning the common European framework of cultural heritage and way of life. Where are the borders of Europe, who is a European, and who is “the significant other” for the Europeans – that is, in relation to whom will Europeans construct their identity? These are the major questions occupying thoughts of scholars, intellectuals and public opinion in Europe and also are the main topic of our interest in this part of the volume.

Both “old” and “new” Europeans are experiencing an identity crisis. The citizens of the old 15 EU member states were confronted with enlargement without having been directly consulted, and without having had the chance to learn enough about the new members to accept them as “us” rather than “them” from behind the Iron Curtain. There is no clear concept of Eastern Europeans belonging to the community of Europeans, and frequent news in the media concerning the political behaviour of the Eastern Europeans or the lack of acceptance of crucial European values (such as tolerance, the secular state, the rule of law) has strengthened the feeling that the east of Europe is still divided from the west by a boundary of culture.

Abstract: This article explores the concept of borderlands with respect to conceptions of Europe and current developments in European societies, especially in the context of the recent enlargement of the EU. It examines the changing nature of borders with a view towards offering an assessment of the notion of a post-Western Europe. The thesis advanced in the paper is that Europe is taking not just a post-national form, but is also taking a post-Western shape and this latter dimension may be more significant. An important aspect of this is changing relations of peripheries to the core. The aim of the paper is to offer a new assessment of the periphery which can be seen as a zone of re-bordering. In the periphery the relation between the inside and the outside is complex and ambivalent; while often taking exclusionary forms, this is a relation that can also be viewed as the site of cosmopolitan forms of negotiation.

Introduction

The enlargement of the European Union has brought about a significant change in the shape of Europe as a geopolitical entity. The significance of the eastern enlargement process goes beyond the institutional question of the membership and constitution of the EU and suggests a major reorientation in the identity of Europe. Unlike earlier enlargements of the EU, the recent enlargement processes have wider cultural implications.

After the beginning of the 1989 breakthrough the concept of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) became widely used as synonym for the group of ten countries from the former Eastern Bloc aspiring to EU membership. A troubled historical experience of long foreign domination, fragile statehood and experience of socialist regimes are shared by Central and Eastern European countries giving this region its distinctive tone. The similarities cannot, however, conceal the differences, as over history the common transformations were moulded by the local particularities – distinct histories, different cultures and dissimilar mentalities of each country.

The recent accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU was yet another common experience of the region, initiating chain of alterations at various dimensions of political, legal, social and cultural lives of the new member states. The volume before you is an attempt to present and assess changes resulting from the accession and European integration processes, grasping both similarities and differences in the countries of the region. In this respect the articles collected in the book fit the wider research agenda called Europeanisation.

Europeanisation has become a very fashionable term in social sciences over the last decade. Nonetheless, the concept continues to be challenged and contested (Olsen 2002; Flockhart 2010).

I recall it being said of a legendary former Director General of the Legal Service of the Commission of the European Union that it was as if the Commission had an extra Member. What, then, is one to say of the legendary former Director General of the Legal Service of the Council – the author of this study? That during his tenure it was as if the Council had an extra Member State? If power and influence were the measure, I would have no problem with such a statement as long as it was not a Malta or an Estonia that one had in mind, but one of the ‘biggies’: a France or a Germany or, perhaps, a United Kingdom. It is difficult to overstate the mark of Jean-Claude Piris on the fortunes of Europe. Cast your mind to any major development, challenge or crisis in recent Union history – whether the Charter of Fundamental Rights or the deliciously bureaucratically named Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the large fingerprints of Jean-Claude Piris will be detected. Never at the forefront, but ever present. It is not only in Praxis that Piris has left his mark. Peruse the pages of the European literature and his writing stands out – it was quite laughable when he tried to hide behind a pseudonym: Justus Lipsius. The consummate political-legal fixer has not only a distinct style, direct with a touch of irony, but is refreshingly politically incorrect, compared with the typically smooth, Barbie-style spin-doctors of the European bureaucracy.

That Europe is in crisis – the travails of the euro actually mask how deep and structural the crisis runs – is a common place. Lisbon?, the Constitutional-Mountain-turned-into-Molehill-except-the-Mountain-was-a-Molehill-to-begin-with, is more the problem than a solution. If you wish to read one of the most incisive analyses of the current circumstance of Europe (grim), you will find it here. If you wish to read an equally incisive analysis of the various institutional options (grimmer), you will find that here too. But Piris is no Cassandra. You will also find one the most incisive analyses of the indispensability of the European construct for the future welfare of European citizens and their Member States. What, then, to do with the willing patient betrayed by the ageing organs? Where is the Viagra going to come from?

They have highly educated populations

On average, EU citizens enjoy a very good education system, which is obviously vital for economic development. Thus, a high proportion of children at the age of 4 in the EU (around 85 per cent) have the benefit of pre-primary educational institutions. Compulsory education lasts for nine or ten years in most EU countries, starting from the age of 5 or 6. Ratios used by statisticians show that the EU-27 average situation is better than in other developed countries (for example, Japan and the United States), be it pupil–teacher ratios or youth education attainment levels. More than three-quarters of all 18-year-olds within the EU-27 remained within the education system in 2007.

However, the situation is far from being perfect. The proportion of the population aged 25–64 in the EU-27 who had a tertiary education in 2008 was under 25 per cent. Some studies have established that ‘an additional year of average school attainment raises productivity by 6.2 per cent and by a further 3.1 per cent in the long run through the contribution of faster technical progress’. With rapidly ageing populations, raising the productivity of the labour force in European countries will increasingly become imperative in order to maintain standards of living. Therefore, the target aimed at by the EU with the ‘European 2020 Strategy’ is to increase the share of the population aged 30–34 who have completed tertiary education from 31 per cent to at least 40 per cent. In 2007, less than half the Member States, mostly among the EU-15, had already reached this target. In comparison with the United States, the situation is not favourable: in 2007, the United States devoted 2.9 per cent of its GDP to education, compared with a mere 1.4 per cent for the EU as a whole; moreover, spending per student in the United States, including public and private contributions, is roughly double that of the EU.

The European Union is in crisis.

At the same time, with the support of its public opinion diminishing, it must try to solve the acute problems of the euro area, while its institutions are not working properly on the basis of their current rules and procedures.

Just like the preceding one, this option would consist in permitting some EU Member States, those that are willing and able, to cooperate together at a faster pace than the other Member States. One of the differences between the two options is that, in the second one, the group of participating states would be established legally, through the conclusion of an international agreement. This ‘additional treaty’ would specify the rules and procedures under which the participating states would decide to cooperate together, while continuing to fully respect the EU treaties.

At first sight, the group could be expected to be composed on the basis of the list of the Member States that have already demonstrated their willingness to go ahead by participating in the euro area. Whether that would be not only a necessary, but also a sufficient, condition is a political issue which would have to be considered by the Member States concerned. Another major closer cooperation is, of course, the Schengen area, and participation in the Schengen area could also be considered as a political condition for acceding to the group by the states that would launch the project. Common views as regards defence issues could also be taken into account.

In order to attain the objectives set out in the treaties, the EU institutions impose obligations on Member States on the basis of the competences that have been conferred on the EU. In areas where no such obligations are imposed, either because the EU does not have any power or because its institutions have decided not to use it, the Member States remain free to act and take decisions. In such a case, they might do this on their own or, if they so wish, in cooperation with other states that may also be EU members. Such a ‘closer’ cooperation is legally possible. It allows those Member States that want to cooperate together to progress on some issues or to develop some policies, whereas other EU Member States do not participate.

A number of Member States do practise closer cooperation in economic, industrial, military, cultural or other fields outside the EU institutional framework. The EU treaties do not forbid this so long as EU law is respected.

Under this option, a number of willing EU Member States, probably on the basis of the present composition of the euro area, would decide to go ahead and develop more intense cooperation in some areas, using all existing legal possibilities to do that. This would neither make it necessary to modify the current EU treaties nor to conclude a new international legal instrument. It could be publicly announced by a Political Declaration of the heads of state or government of the willing EU Member States.

It would depend on the political will of those states to decide to which matters their enhanced cooperation would apply. Decisions would have to be adopted in accordance with the rules of the treaties and within the EU institutional framework; on this basis, they could be adopted and implemented by the participating Member States only. Some cooperation could also possibly be developed outside the EU institutional framework, on the condition of fully respecting the EU treaties and EU law, as well as the rights of the non-participating Member States.

An assessment of the present situation shows that the European Union does not function well and that it is unable to solve its current fundamental problems.

Its political institutions suffer from weaknesses and deficiencies: this is the case for the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament (EP), as well as for the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the European External Action Service (EEAS).

If the assessment of the present situation in Chapter 2 is correct, it means that while Member States will in the future still be in need of the EU, the EU will not be able to help sufficiently, given its present institutional procedures and rules. The logical answer to this dilemma in theory looks obvious: in order to respond to those needs, it would be necessary to modify the present institutions, their procedures and decision-making processes, as well as to try and conceive a more legitimate democratic control. In order to be adequate and to answer effectively the serious present problems and deficiencies, the amendments to the treaties need to be sufficiently bold. In other words, they should take the shape of a substantive revision of the institutional provisions of the current treaties.

Such a revision would be based on the recognition that with twenty-seven heterogeneous members, and the prospect of welcoming Croatia in 2013 (1 July 2013 was chosen during the European Council session of 23–24 June 2011) and possibly Iceland later, the EU has become an entirely new entity. One may add that some or all of the other western Balkan countries might also join the EU, poss-ibly in the 2020s (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia). Some are also referring to Georgia, Moldova and even Ukraine, while Turkey is actually negotiating accession now. Such an entity of thirty to thirty-five members could not work properly on the basis of the present system, whose architecture and procedures remain those that were originally conceived for six Member States that had a comparable degree of economic development and the same political desire to integrate. In order to meet this challenge adequately, one should be much more innovative and creative than were the 2003/2004 European Convention and the 2007 IGC on the Lisbon Treaty.