Chapter 2 covers theory and methodology. In the theory section, I elaborate on the conventional wisdom about authoritarian corruption control, consider several alternative explanations, and then present my argument in full. In the methodology section, I develop my proposed scoring system for anti-corruption efforts, describe how political factors such as discretionary power are assessed, defend my case selection, and give a brief overview of the sources used.

Chapter 4 analyzes how mineral resources shape the state–capital relations in resource-rich regions. It argues that the symbiotic relationship between local state and resource capital can easily become collusive under the resource boom. Through studies of resource-related corruption cases, it demonstrates how the state’s regulation and interference in the resource sector create structural opportunities for rent seeking and collusion between the regulators and regulatees and how the resource windfalls turn local government departments into hotbeds for corruption. Through panel data analysis on the corruption rates of Chinese provinces, it testifies that resource-rich regions are indeed more corrupt than other regions. This chapter suggests that mineral resources amplify the existing loopholes in the Chinese political economic system and highlights the danger of local state capture by resource capital.

Based on the findings of the empirical chapters, Chapter 6 recapitulates the impacts that rich mineral resources generate on the state–capital–labor triad in China. It analyzes in detail the Chinese state’s coping strategies to mitigate the resource curse at local levels. Moreover, it explains why the Chinese state is able and willing to take the observed strategies to contain the resource curse. The key lies in the Chinese Communist Party-state’s strong capacity to penetrate into the economy and the society and also in its top-down monitoring and tight control of the local agents. In the end, this chapter critically evaluates the successes and pitfalls of the China model of resource management.

Physical possession is among the legal standards Chinese judges can apply in child custody determinations: whether a change in the status quo would undermine the best interests of the child. Because children in rural areas overwhelmingly live with their fathers or paternal grandparents, and because judges overwhelmingly apply this physical possession standard, judges’ child custody orders are entirely consistent with the adage, “Possession is nine-tenths of the law.” Women who fled domestic violence often left their children behind in the possession of their abusive husbands. Because defendants, simply by withholding consent, could so easily prevent courts from granting divorces, women frequently bargained away their child custody rights in exchange for their freedom. In both scenarios, courts deferred to the patriarchal order by privileging fathers’ child custody claims. Even when there were compelling and legally justifiable grounds for rejecting the status quo on the grounds that it posed a safety risk to the child, judges nonetheless tended to apply the physical possession standard. Judges had no apparent hesitation to grant custody to perpetrators of domestic violence.

Chapter 2 opens with a description of mineral resource distribution and the development of mining industries in reform-era China. It then examines the impacts of resource endowment on local economic development, with a focus on capital accumulation and investment. Through qualititative studies on mining entrepreneurs and statistical analysis on Chinese provinces, it shows that resource boom in general benefits capital by not only boosting capital accumulation in the mining industries but also generating positive spillover effects on other industrial sectors, especially those labor-intensive ones. However, resource-generated capital tends to impede the investment in high-tech industries and induce speculative investment in real estate, which may discourage industrial upgrading and undermine economic growth in the long run. Therefore, resource boom has rather mixed effects on local economic development.

Chapter 5 analyzes how mineral resources affect local provision of public goods. Through case studies and statistical analysis, it shows that local governments in resource-rich regions tend to spend less on human capital-developing public goods, including education and health care, due to the diminished demand for labor, the myopic decision-making of both citizens and officials, and the shedding of government responsibilities onto mining enterprises. On the other hand, wary of the tension between mining industries and local citizens and driven by the pressure to preserve social stability, the local governments in resource-rich regions spend more fiscal revenue on social security benefits for disadvantaged citizens. The redistribution of the resource wealth from resource capital to labor partially compensates for the latter’s welfare losses. Overall, while resource-rich regions have weak incentives to invest in human capital development, they do spend more on redistributive policies to redress popular grievance and ameliorate resource-triggered social conflicts.

The first part of this chapter is devoted to a computational analysis of judicial discourse in written court decisions. Chinese judges ignored domestic violence allegations in the process of denying divorce petitions. When often justified doing so on ideological, moral, and therapeutic grounds. Although divorce litigation was rife with allegations of domestic violence, they had no discernable effect on the character of judicial discourse in court holdings. Regardless of domestic violence claims, judges focused on couples’ reconciliation potential and provided paternalistic and patronizing relationship advice. Judicial discourse was gendered insofar as judges directed such gaslighting strategies toward women more than toward men. The second part of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of judicial decision-making: (1) the extent and nature of gender inequality in case outcomes, and (2) the effect of domestic violence allegations on case outcomes. Judges took the claims and interests of men more seriously than those of women. Domestic violence did not move the needle toward divorce. Victims of domestic violence, mostly women, were revictimized by judges who ignored their claims.

This opening chapter raises the research questions that motivate this book. It briefly introduces the state of mineral exploration in China and the ensuing impacts on the Chinese economy and society and pinpoints the puzzling existence of a contained resource curse in China. After critically reviewing the existing debate on the resource curse, it proposes an original theory about how mineral resources affect state–capital–labor relations, which can explain the empirical observations in China. This chapter lays out the roadmap of the whole book and explains the research methods and data sources for the empirical analysis in the following chapters.

This chapter picks up where the previous one left off. Included in courts’ toolkit of coping strategies to the problem of caseload pressure is the routine practice of denying first-time divorce petitions and granting them on subsequent attempts. The divorce twofer is a pressure release valve for courts. Denying divorce petitions helps judges clear their dockets more efficiently and thus improves their performance evaluation scores. By enhancing judicial efficiency, the divorce twofer greases the wheels of justice and helps judges clear their dockets, often at the cost of injustice. The benefits judges gain from denying first-attempt petitions are clear: less onerous pretrial and trial formalities, shorter trials, and briefer decisions. China’s judicial clampdown on adjudicated divorce is, more than anything else, courts’ response to rapidly expanding volumes of litigation. China’s ideology of family preservation, which has deep roots but which has been further elevated since 2012, helps enable and justify the judicial clampdown on divorce.