It is impossible to estimate exactly what weight should be given to each of the various factors which have contributed to the conflict between the Communist regimes of Russia and of China, but there can be no doubt that Russia's refusal to assist China to become a nuclear power was one of the most important. According to the Chinese account of the matter, the Soviet Union promised to provide China with “a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture,” apparently as part of an agreement on “new technology for national defence” concluded in October 1957, but went back on this promise and unilaterally annulled the agreement in June 1959. The Chinese People's Republic, nevertheless, went ahead on its own and exploded its first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964; this was followed by China's first hydrogen bomb on 17 June 1967.

“Oppose the strategy of striking with two ‘fists’ in two directions at the same time, and uphold the strategy of striking with one ‘fist’ in one direction at one time.” This is a good year for looking back at the triangular relationship between China, the Soviet Union and the United States—and not only because it is the twentieth anniversary of the People's Republic. For it is also a year which has seen the contradictions in this relationship sharpened to an extreme and almost satirical degree.

Few behavioural attributes rank higher in the Chinese Communist system of values than that of activism (chi-chi-hsing). In apparent continuity with the Leninist tradition, the Chinese Communists have made the activist the archetype of their new political man, and a key operational figure in their system of political control. This analysis is an exploration of the Chinese Communist use of the concept of activism as a political value, and of the role that the activist plays in Party efforts to penetrate and control Chinese society.

The twentieth anniversary of the Chinese Communist regime, unlike the tenth, is an appropriate time for retrospection and appraisal. A decade ago, the revelation of statistical exaggeration during the Great Leap Forward underlined Mao's inability to discover a sure-fire method of economic development. With Soviet-style methods previously found wanting and mass mobilization now proved inadequate also, it was not clear where China would go next economically. Politically, Mao had just faced the first major challenge to his personal authority since the late 1930s. Would the leadership be able to close ranks or would there be further splits? In foreign policy, China had clearly adopted a more militant line. The crucial question, as Khrushchev flew to Peking for the tenth anniversary celebrations fresh from his meetings with Eisenhower, was how the Chinese leadership would react to their guest's advocacy of peaceful coexistence with the imperialist bloc.