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The object of this article is to take a new look at what has been called the “great debate” between Chinese leaders during 1965 and the first half of 1966 arising out of American escalation in Vietnam.
The Blue Shirts during the 1930s became one of the most influential and feared political movements in China. To both contemporaries and historians, however, the Blue Shirt movement has been a shadowy force, known mostly through hearsay, with little solid information regarding its doctrine or its activities. Now, on the basis of memoirs, interviews, and especially Japanese intelligence reports of the 1930s, a rough picture of this secret organization can be pieced together. And the image that emerges is not simply a terrorist organization, but a political faction that reflected the concerns and ideals of many Chinese during the troubled Nanking decade. This study will, it is hoped, not only provide an insight into the nature of Kuomintang rule, but will shed light on a previously unexamined species of the political genus, fascism.
Of all the soviets established in China in the late 1920s, none have received less attention than the Right and Left River Soviets in Kwangsi. Their brief lives, their minor local impact and their relative unimportance in the development of the CCP explains this neglect. But there are two aspects of these two soviets, especially of the Right River Soviet (Yu Chiang Su-wei-ai), which are of interest. The first is the ethnic composition of much of the soviet membership; the second is the way in which these soviets related to the Party Centre, and how they reflected, and suffered from, the shifts in Li Li-san's policies towards soviets in general. The question of relations between Li and the major soviets, and between Li and the Comintern, has been discussed at length (notably by Richard Thornton, in The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, and by Hsiao Tso-liang, in Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930–1934) and needs no further comment here. The aim of this article is to describe the relations between Han Chinese and minority peoples within the soviet movement, and to show how the Centre at Shanghai behaved towards a soviet over which it had a far greater degree of authority than was the case with most of those established in the late 1920s.