Area studies have been under attack for many years as lacking the rigorous methods of disciplined inquiry such as are possessed by economics and political science. However, in the last decade, social scientists have attempted to bridge this academic gap. In the study of Chinese foreign policy, for instance, Charles A. McClelland employed several statistical methods for examining Chinese behaviour in international crises. Similarly, Paul Smoker undertook a serial correlation analysis to examine both the freedom of decision and interaction and reaction of the Indian and Chinese Governments.

The object of this article is to examine changing Chinese attitudes to their place in the world from a Chinese historical and intellectual perspective, in order to provide a basis for anticipating developments in the future attuned more to a Chinese than to a western point of view. The question immediately arises whether such a perspective is in any way relevant to the recent theory and practice of international relations in the People's Republic of China, and what insights, if any, such a perspective may provide for discussing the future. This is a controversial subject concerned with the nature of cultural change, and the extent to which " imprinting" from a long continuity of accepted social and cultural values can psychologically condition people even after a decisive break in that tradition appears to have occurred.

Until the Cultural Revolution, the predominant western view of contemporary Chinese elite conflict was that it consisted of “discussion” (t'ao-lun) within a basically consensual Politburo among shifting “opinion groups” with no “organized force” behind them. The purges and accusations which began in 1965 and apparently still continue, have shaken this interpretation, and a number of scholars have advanced new analyses - sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, sometimes of general application, sometimes applied only to a particular time span or segment of the political system. Of these new views, perhaps the most systematic - and at the same time the one which represents the least change from the pre-Cultural Revolution “opinion group” model - is the “policy making under Mao” interpretation, which sees conflict as essentially a bureaucratic decision-making process dominated by Mao.

The past 15 years have been eventful ones for the Chinese economy. They have seen an ambitious attempt at economic acceleration decline into agricultural crisis, a major reversal of the direction of economic policy, agricultural recovery and resurgent economic momentum. These years have brought major changes to the Chinese economy: whole new industries have appeared; official policy towards such diverse areas as education, income distribution, regional dispersion of industry and economic specialization has shifted repeatedly; the organization of agricultural production has also changed.

As the British historian A. J. P. Taylor once remarked, “In the Cold War apparently even the world of scholarship knows no detachment.” This statement applies with particular force to Korea, which became one of the foci of the Cold War after 1945 and turned into a bitter battleground between the supposedly monolithic World Communism and the western alliance after 1950.

Western social scientists have tended to evade a central issue of the Chinese Revolution. As a consequence, our scholarship has generally misconceived and denigrated the Chinese Communist concepts and practices of mass participation. The issue evaded is twentieth-century China's need for a continuing vanguard to direct the revolutionary change that China's conditions demand. One result of that evasion has been the near-unanimous decrying of China's restrictions on democratic control, restrictions that, of course, are implicit in the very concept of a vanguard.

We were worrying over the continuance of workers' pay differentials and wondering how to recognize the time when communism would arrive.