After 22 years of cold war confrontation, the People's Republic of China and Japan finally established diplomatic relations under the impact of the Sino-American détente. In bilateral terms, the rapprochement had the immediate effect of removing certain artificial political and financial barriers that had impeded the normalization of relations. It also promoted the normal interchange of visits and goods between the two countries. The two-way trade in 1973 reached the $2,000 million mark, or nearly double the volume for the previous year. In conformity with the provisions of the Sino-Japanese joint statement of 29 September 1972, the two governments concluded an undersea cable accord, a memorandum for the increase of resident news correspondents in each country from five to 11, a three-year official trade agreement granting each party most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to tariffs, customs clearance and other matters relating to bilateral trade, and an aviation agreement. Pending the conclusion of a fishery agreement, a navigation accord and a treaty of peace and friendship, the two countries seem to have entered into a more normal relationship that may eventually benefit both.

As much as one-quarter of the contents of the two Wan-sui volumes deals with matters relating either to the theory or the practice of foreign policy. Very little material of this kind had emerged in the earlier “unofficial” collections of Mao's speeches and writings which came to our knowledge after the Cultural Revolution, and this latest acquisition breaks entirely new ground. As far as the “official” record is concerned, we have until now known more of Mao's views on international affairs before 1949 than after the Liberation. During the 1950s there were a few formal statements on Sino-Soviet relations – telegrams, greetings and the like which required very close analysis to reveal the complex web of tensions beneath the surface. There were some brief and fairly stereotyped descriptions of the international scene in Mao's published speeches to Party and Government conferences. The second decade of the People's Republic was served rather better in the “official” record, but only if one regarded the major documents in the Sino-Soviet polemic as either written by Mao or expressing his views. There were some well-publicized reports of Mao's various meetings with Third World visitors in the 1960s though the level of conversation with, in the main, overawed and deferential amateurs clearly never taxed Mao's intellect. One could perhaps have pieced together the scraps of documentary evidence to construct the bare bones of Mao's outlook on the world, but it would have lacked all the flesh and substance now imparted to it by the Wan-sui documents.

Heretofore, analysts have argued that one characteristic of mobilization in China is to provide uniformity in policy direction. This paper sets out to demonstrate that, in at least the public health area, a diverse set of public policies was pursued even in a period as apparently “radical” as the Great Leap Forward (1958–60). The reason for this policy diversity is that different segments of health policy were made in different political arenas, or institutional settings; the pressures, perceptions and resources which characterized one of these political arenas did not necessarily characterize another. The “failures” of the Leap did not simply arise from a ubiquitous “radical” assertion of power but, on the contrary, resulted from the inconsistencies in leadership and programme characteristic of diverse policy-making arenas. Because policy-making responsibility is divided among political arenas, political bargaining and conflict have characterized the allocation to them of different health issues; elaborate strategies have been devised by organizations in order to acquire and /or hold certain areas of policy and unburden themselves of others.

In June 1974, I spent a month in the People's Republic of China as an interpreter and cultural advisor with the herbal pharmacology delegation from the United States Academy of Sciences. While visiting Peking, I requested, among other things, a chance to discuss Taiping historiography with Chinese historians. On 17 June, in Nanking, I was informed that this request had been granted. The next day a meeting was arranged for me with four Chinese Taiping specialists.

Because the Chinese do not publish detailed industrial and economic data, the analysis of the petroleum industry is very difficult indeed. Its defence significance makes it additionally hard to establish a firm picture of the situation. Despite the speculative content of any article on the subject, however, it seems worthwhile attempting to evaluate what information is available on Chinese oil because of the industry's growing domestic and international importance.

The following consists of brief notes culled from information obtained on a visit to Liaoning (Shenyang, Anshan and Dalien), Peking and Canton during May and June 1973.

During a visit to China in June 1973, a group of young civil servants from the École Nationale d'Administration, myself amongst them, had several interesting interviews, particularly with Han-leï and Wang Si-yi, two experts from the People's Bank of China, in Peking. This was, as far as I know, the first time since the Cultural Revolution that visitors have had the chance to gather official information on current Chinese monetary policy and on the role of the People's Bank in the economic life of the country. One can define the Chinese monetary and financial system by the following formula: the People's Bank, the sole autonomous financial institution, receives the deposits of private individuals, enterprises, people's communes and State departments, and it grants loans to enterprises