This paper attempts to assess just how much and in what ways behaviour has changed between the generation that experienced the Son-fan, Wu-fan Campaign in 1951–52 and the generation that pitched itself into the Cultural Revolution of 1966–69. We focus in the first instance on the confluence of the San-fan with a thought reform movement in the schools in 1951–52, in which students “drew a clear line of demarcation between self and family,” often denouncing their parents, and in which a youth vanguard forced their teachers as well to criticize themselves. Impressionistic comparisons between that campaign and the Cultural Revolution of the ways in which adoles-cents tried to establish continuity between patterns of behaviour learned in childhood and adult social-political roles may reveal differences in the direction and nature of their rebelliousness and may reflect changes in family relationships and in socialization patterns.

I had the opportunity to participate in the five major negotiations between China and Japan from 1972 to 1975 (i.e., the talks over the normalization of diplomatic relations, and the aviation, trade, shipping and fishery agreements), and to observe the tactics, both offensive and defensive, used by the Chinese participants. Personal impressions are bound to be biased, but fortunately there are at least two books which give us detailed accounts of negotiations between China and Japan in the post-war period. These are The Record of Fishery Talks between China and Japan and The Secret Memorandum of Sino-Japanese Negotiations. The former, written and edited by the Japan-China Fishery Association, whose leaders negotiated with China in 1955, is a complete record of the first fishery talks between the Japanese fishermen's organization and Chinese authorities. These negotiations centred on the regulations which Japanese and Chinese fishermen were to observe in the East China and Yellow Seas in order to avoid collisions and other accidents. The negotiations also covered some conservation measures, such as the establishment of several conservation zones along the coast of China and seasonal restrictions of the catch of some types of fish.

In the early 1950s Chou En-lai, in his capacity both as premier and foreign minister of the People's Republic of China, strongly advocated that the non-aligned states could be employed to improve China's diplomatic position. To reduce western influence in China's neighbouring states and to maximize Peking's diplomatic flexibility, Chou began to emphasize the relevance and necessity of “winning over” the international middle-of-the-road forces. This new policy, both in theory and practice, demonstrates his political sagacity in refusing to allow dogmatic communist ideological theories to interfere with his realistic assessment of the world situation.

Recent reports from China, based mostly on the travels of North-American and European scholars, have broadened our knowledge of social conditions in that country. In most cases, the journeys of these scholarly visitors have been greatly facilitated by the availability of Chinese guides and interpreters who at times become their main source of contact with the people, especially in non-Mandarin speaking regions. Thus, great strides have been made in our understanding of the new society. But there is another source of traveller's reportage from China — the hundreds of ordinary overseas Chinese, especially those between the ages of 50 and 90, who every day visit their relatives on the mainland — and about whose personal observations and experiences we know very little. Consequently, there are gaps in our knowledge of every-day life in China, especially in the remote countryside of provinces such as Fukien, which are least frequented by delegations from Europe and America.

This is a report on some aspects of the publicity activities of the “planned fertility” (chi-hua sheng-yu) campaign in parts of Kwangtung Province. I shall make special reference to three rural communes, namely, Huan-ch'eng (population: 59,000) of Hsin-hui Hsien, Ta-li (population: 68,000) of Nan-hai Hsien, and Ch'ang-sha (population: 59,500) of K'ai-p'ing Hsien, each of which I visited in December 1976 as a member of the research team of the Social Research Centre of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Based on personal observations and conversation with various individuals during that trip, including officials and ordinary peasants, I propose to describe in some detail the ways in which the principles of planned fertility are transmitted to the masses.

When one becomes an official, the entire family prospers … they host banquets and send presents (ch'ing-k'o sung-li). … One can see no organization. Personal acquaintances (ssu-jen) are employed, factions are active, and there are feudal relationships (kuan-hsi) …

Why were the big and small “fleets” [of Lin Piao's anti-party group] openly able to carry out the schemes of forming cliques, engaging in factionalism, and carrying out conspiracies by such acts as hosting banquets (ch'ing-k'o), sending gifts (sung-li), offering official positions and making promises?

In addition to providing himself with extravagant pleasures, Wang Hungwen used the illegally obtained money and goods to host banquets (ch'ing-k'o), and send presents (sung-li) in order to recruit corrupt cadres and conduct anti-party factional activities. So many filthy political exchanges are just so happily arranged in an atmosphere of wine and women. Eat, Eat, Drink, Drink had already become a gauge by which Wang Hung-wen and his “little brothers” measured political relationships (kuan-hsi).