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Although the state is still a major economic actor in China's cities, it is widely recognized that the rapid expansion of entities outside the state sphere has already fundamentally altered not just the urban economic landscape but also the forces driving the country's labour markets. The extent and consequences of this expansion are in need of much greater scrutiny, however. A number of analysts have made use of available information to clarify employment growth and changes in employment structure since the early years of the People's Republic and the early period of reform. Recent scholarship has also enhanced understanding of the design, implementation and impact of formal labour reforms, such as the labour contract system, and the nature of worker-management relations in a partially reformed environment. But because of the scarcity of data on the non-state economy, this research has tended to focus on the state-owned industrial sector.
It used to be a truism that 20th-century China witnessed one of the great peasant revolutions of world history. The Chinese Communist Party built a popular base in the countryside, and eventually a massive army of peasant soldiers surrounded the cities and drove the urban-based Kuomintang from the Mainland. In the comparative literature, the Chinese revolution was classified as a peasant revolution, and a number of important studies sought to explain the social origins of that phenomenon.
In his survey of the field some years ago, Harry Harding noted that the study of contemporary Chinese politics stood then on the threshold of a third generation of scholarship. While the first generation had been limited by the atmosphere of the Cold War and the second had been overly influenced by the Cultural Revolution, Harding held out hope for a third generation able to surpass its predecessors in both substance and theoretical sophistication. Nearly a decade has passed since the publication of Harding's prescient article and in fact such a third generation can now be discerned - distinguished from the first two not only by the prevailing political atmosphere, but also by its theoretical perspective and access to source materials.
A widely publicized 1983 Chinese survey found 43 per cent of all “specialized households” in a Shanxi county were households of cadres or former cadres. In what sense, if any, is this finding significant? More, generally, what can be concluded about Chinese society, politics and the economy based on findings from survey research conducted there? This article sets out what can (and what cannot) be inferred from the unrepresentative samples of the Chinese population that are the basis for most survey research conducted in mainland China.