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Because this volume focuses on the People′s Liberation Army (PLA), only those threat perceptions directly relevant to the presence of Chinese military force are addressed in this article. The problems of ideological unity, legitimacy of the regime, and other political or economic threats to the People′s Republic are excluded insofar as they do not call on the PLA. Nor are general foreign policy stratagems for dealing with Moscow, Tokyo, New Delhi and Washington under review, let alone regions beyond China′s capacity to project military power.
Since the summer of 1995, Chinese military training opposite Taiwan has received unusual prominence in both the Chinese and foreign media. The senior leadership in Beijing was able to flex its military muscle because of a training programme begun years ago. This limited use of force has sent unmistakable political signals to Taiwan and the world. But, should the Chinese leadership decide to employ the People′s Liberation Army (PLA) in pursuit of its political objectives, is it well trained enough to conduct successful modern military operations?
Defence doctrine is an important indicator of armed forces′ intentions and capabilities. Since the policy of defence modernization was introduced in China in 1973, the war-fighting doctrine and strategic principles of the People′s Liberation Army (PLA) have undergone two major changes. The first change came in the late 1970s. The Maoist doctrine of the “people′s war,” which had been prevalent in the late 1960s and 1970s, was replaced by a new doctrine of the “people′s war under modern conditions.”
A single spark can light a prairie fire, Mao Zedong once proclaimed, and China today is as dry as a tinder-box. Rapid economic and social change is undermining the country′s stability. The authorities are struggling to cope with soaring crime, mass rural migration, rising urban unemployment, simmering ethnic discontent and numerous other problems. At the same time, the Communist Party′s legitimacy and organization is crumbling and the ruling elite waits nervously for ailing paramount leader Deng Xiaoping′s death.