A variety of evidence from different sources and perspectives confirms the trend that, since the 1990s, social protest in China has risen dramatically. Some of the most frequently cited data come from the Public Security Ministry about “collective incidents” (quntixing shijian). According to this source, 87,000 collective incidents took place in 2005, as compared to 74,000 in 2004, 58,000 in 2003, and about 10,000 in 1994. Although this data is relatively reliable, it offers too little information for us to properly analyze the trend of social protest. For example, it is not clear how the Public Security Ministry defines “collective incidents.” It is quite possible that this term is broader than social protests, encompassing other social disturbances such as intervillage strife, but we cannot know for sure.

This book will rely mainly on data collected from the xinfang (letters and visits) system. Such data have two significant advantages. First, although xinfang data are generally regarded as sensitive, they are more accessible than similarly sensitive data from public safety bureaus. Many local xinfang bureaus have published part of their data, and xinfang officials are more willing to talk to interviewers. Consequently, we can know not only the contents of their reports and findings but also get a better idea of how such data have been collected and processed.

The two chapters in Part II have identified a particular institutional configuration that have facilitated and shaped popular protests in China. In Part III, my focus will shift from structure to agency. Despite the obvious importance of structures in explaining historical change, they can only constitute part of the story. As William Sewell remarks, “Structure forms the capacities and provides the resources necessary for human agency, enabling humans to reproduce themselves and their social world, but also enabling them to act in innovative ways and therefore occasionally to modify the very structures that shaped them.” Similarly, Doug McAdam argues, “Movements may largely be born of environmental opportunities, but their fate is heavily shaped by their own actions.” This and the following chapters thus focus on protesters’ strategies and tactics. Indeed, given that the political opportunity structure identified in this book puts a special emphasis on contradictions and ambiguities, protesters’ strategic decisions deserve a particularly important role in the explanations.

Ordinary people are often faced with a dilemma in their contentious interactions with an authoritarian state. To enhance their bargaining power, they need to employ some sort of “troublemaking” tactics such as engaging in disruptive activities or forming autonomous organizations. However, if they go too far, radical tactics may not only alienate their supporters, but also incur state repression. The choice between efficacy and safety appears as a trade-off, and it is very difficult to attain both at the same time. Yet ordinary people sometimes manage to engage in resistance while somehow remaining submissive. Their most common strategy is what James Scott calls “everyday forms of resistance:” Ordinary people carry out covert and individualized resistance while feigning obedience. Can ordinary people also mount public and collective resistance while remaining submissive? Rarely. Yet there are some cases, and China since the 1990s is one of them.