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China's trade with Taiwan has a political motive: winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. The effectiveness of China's economic statecraft can be examined in the Syuejia (Xuejia) case, where Taiwan put up strong resistance to the generous benefits offered by China. This article investigates the political implications of the Chinese-designed contract farming programme in Syuejia and argues that if economic favours are delivered, and positive impressions also created, political attitudes can be revised. Without these two prerequisites, however, replicating the Syuejia results elsewhere and thus disturbing the cross-Strait status quo will be difficult. When put in a theoretical context, the changes in the political landscape of Syuejia illustrate the interplay of economic interests and political identity.
This study adopts a pre-negotiation approach based on Robert Putnam's win-set concept to examine domestic constraints on cross-Strait political negotiation. Survey research of elite opinion in both China and Taiwan and of public opinion in Taiwan is used to estimate each side's win-set (that is, the set of political negotiation outcomes that could win majority approval domestically) during Ma Ying-jeou's second presidential term in Taiwan (2012–2016). The possibility for overlap in win-sets that could provide a zone of possible agreement and the potential for coalitions in favour of negotiation are analysed. The study finds no win-set overlap and limited potential for coalitions favouring negotiation outcomes with the least distance from overlap, concluding that domestic conditions for formal political negotiations between Beijing and Taipei are unlikely to be ripe in the near term.
This book provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a key concept in East Asian security debates, sovereign autonomy, and how it reproduces hierarchy in the regional order. Park argues that contemporary strategic debates in East Asia are based on shared contextual knowledge - that of international hierarchy - reconstructed in the late-nineteenth century. The mechanism that reproduces this lens of hierarchy is domestic legitimacy politics in which embattled political leaders contest the meaning of sovereign autonomy. Park argues that the idea of status seeking has remained embedded in the concept of sovereign autonomy and endures through distinct and alternative security frames that continue to inform contemporary strategic debates in East Asia. This book makes a significant contribution to debates in international relations theory and security studies about autonomy and status, as well as to the now extensive literature on the nature of East Asian regional order.