The PLA has been a key player in Chinese elite politics since 1949. However, a series of developments over the last four years has prompted China watchers to re-evaluate Party–military relations. This paper argues that CCP–PLA relations in the Xi Jinping era are characterized by the centralization of power in a single civilian individual. This centralization is reflected by events such as a new emphasis on the CMC chairman responsibility system, the establishment of new coordination bodies under the top leader, radical reforms to the military command structure, the promotion of Xi's public image as the top leader, and large-scale personnel reshuffes during which Xi's trustees have gradually come to occupy key military posts while his rivals have been removed. For Xi, these measures are an antidote to the principal–agent problem in CCP–PLA relations caused by both information asymmetry and the discrepant interests of civilian leaders and the top brass of the PLA.

This article reviews the decision-making process behind the creation of a new rural pension between the early 2000s and 2009. It finds that although policymaking was initially delegated to the bureaucratic level and hence involved a protracted bureaucratic struggle, the issue was resolved by a fiat imposed by top leaders rather than by bureaucratic compromise as a bureaucratic politics model would suggest. I call this policymaking process “delegation and then intervention.” Although the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS) persistently argued in favour of creating the new rural pension, the Ministry of Finance obstinately objected to it. This study finds that when bureaucratic organizations are in conflict because of their core beliefs, rather than resource allocation, they are less likely to reach a consensus. Faced with a prolonged bureaucratic deadlock, top leaders decided in favour of the MOLSS policy initiative, thereby adopting a progressive measure that would provide a completely subsidized basic pension for the rural elderly.

A truism in strategic studies holds that warfare is highly complex and unpredictable. What appears to be a stable and predictable military balance can be suddenly overthrown by innovative doctrines or cunning strategies. This paper attempts to fill a perceived gap in strategic studies analysis with respect to US–China naval conflict scenarios. The author is concerned that most Western analyses on the subject tend to be simplistic and unduly optimistic. The approach in this paper follows a “Chinese style” in that it examines the Asia-Pacific strategic balance as a series of interacting military campaigns. The results of the analysis yield that the US retains a strong advantage in certain warfare domains, to be sure. Yet, the assumption that the US military has a decisive advantage in the relevant scenarios becomes dubious in light of the potentially devastating blow against US and allied bases that could be made by PLA conventional missile forces. Moreover, a Chinese advantage in the use of offensive mine warfare, when combined with China's ability to prevent US and allied aerial anti-submarine forces from flying, could combine to roll back, or at least significantly limit, Washington's heretofore decisive undersea advantage.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been undergoing a profound transformation in terms of its operational capabilities, both with regard to its hardware as well as its heartware, i.e. the softer aspects of its development including its operational culture and military ethos. These changes have permeated every facet of the PLA – technological, organizational and doctrinal. Despite successive generations of Chinese leaders having declared their adherence to “peace” and “development,” it has become clearer that Beijing's security policy under Xi Jinping has shifted steadily away from “keeping a low profile.” In that regard, the status of the PLA in the domestic and international calculus of China's new commander-in-chief has, unsurprisingly, become more pronounced, with Xi taking noticeably greater interest in harnessing the Chinese Communist Party's coercive forces as his personal domestic powerbase and foreign policy instrument complementing China's hard economic power.

China's establishment of a Central National Security Commission (CNSC) in late 2013 was a potentially transformative event in the evolution of China's national security decision-making structure. Yet, as of mid-2017, few details about this organization and its activities have been released, leading to continuing questions about its likely role and functions in the Chinese system. Based on an analysis of numerous authoritative but under-utilized Chinese sources, this article addresses the rationale, prospects and implications of the CNSC. It argues that the organization is both a fulfilment of a long-held desire by many in China for a centralized, permanent national security deliberation forum and also a reflection of the unique challenges facing China in the 21st century. Contrary to existing analyses, which argue that the CNSC is likely to be focused primarily on domestic security tasks, the article contends that it is more likely to play a major role in both internal and external security affairs. Moreover, the article argues that if certain obstacles can be addressed, the CNSC may have broad implications in areas ranging from China's crisis response capability to the role played by the Chinese Communist Party general secretary in the national security decision-making process. The conclusion recaps the findings and suggests avenues for further research.