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Since the United States committed to withdraw from the UN Paris Agreement on climate change, international observers have increasingly asked if China can take the lead instead to raise global ambition in the context of a world leadership vacuum. Given the country's increasing economic and strategic focus on sustainable and low-carbon innovation, China might seem well placed to do so. However, much depends on the direction of governance and reform within China regarding the environment. To better understand how the government is seeking to make progress in these areas, this article explores key political narratives that have underpinned China's policies around sustainable development (kechixu fazhan) and innovation (chuangxin) within the context of broader narratives of reform. Drawing on theoretical insights from work that investigates the role of power in shaping narratives, knowledge and action around specific pathways to sustainability, this article explores the ways in which dominant policy narratives in China might drive particular forms of innovation for sustainability and potentially occlude or constrain others. In particular, we look at ecological civilization (shengtai wenming) as a slogan that has gradually evolved to become an official narrative and is likely to influence pathways to sustainability over the coming years.
In recent decades, China has transformed from a relatively egalitarian society to a highly unequal one. What are the implications of high levels of inequality for the lives of children? Drawing on two nationally representative datasets, the China Family Panel Studies and the China Education Panel Survey, we develop a comprehensive portrait of childhood inequality in post-reform China. Analyses reveal stark disparities between children from different socio-economic backgrounds in family environments and in welfare outcomes, including physical health, psychosocial health and educational performance. We argue that childhood inequality in China is driven not only by the deprivations of poverty but also by the advantages of affluence, as high socio-economic status children diverge from their middle and low socio-economic status counterparts on various family environment and child welfare measures.
China sometimes plays a leadership role in addressing global challenges, but at other times it free rides or even spoils efforts at cooperation. When will rising powers like China help to build and maintain international regimes that sustain cooperation on important issues, and when will they play less constructive roles? This study argues that the strategic setting of a particular issue area has a strong influence on whether and how a rising power will contribute to global governance. Two strategic variables are especially important: the balance of outside options the rising power and established powers face, and whether contributions by the rising power are viewed as indispensable to regime success. Case studies of China's approach to security in Central Asia, nuclear proliferation, global financial governance, and climate change illustrate the logic of the theory, which has implications for contemporary issues such as China's growing role in development finance.
China and India have been conducting dual-track climate diplomacy. Under the UN track, both countries have built new coalitions while maintaining their traditional one to facilitate their increasingly weakened negotiating positions. Both countries have been bandwagoning non-UN climate arrangements initiated by the United States and the European Union (EU). Under this dual-track climate diplomacy, China and India have made some significant compromises, that is, both countries have agreed to voluntarily mitigate their GHG emissions and put their actions under legally-binding review procedures. Thus, China and India’s climate diplomacy has shifted away from free-riding to burden-sharing, which has been shaped by their two-level pressures. Domestically, the hot debate on whether they should undertake GHG mitigation actions has resulted in domestic support for actions. In addition, the tangible profits both countries accrued from their participation in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have stimulated both countries to make compromises. Internationally, both countries seeking great power status makes them react to pressures stemmed from the international climate protection norms, social isolation, and social opprobrium. Moreover, both countries’ asymmetrical interdependence on developed countries, especially the United States and the EU, for transferring climate mitigation-related technologies has led them to make compromises.
China and India’s energy and climate policy behavior has been puzzling, that is, although both countries have proactively adopted policy measures to address these two issue-areas in accordance with their domestic priorities, they have had to adjust those proactive measures out of external pressures. To solve this puzzle, I put forward my two-level pressures argument and develop four propositions on China and India’s energy and climate policy behavior. In addition, I identify the gaps in the existing literature on China’s energy security and climate change, on global energy and climate governance as well as on China and India in global energy and climate governance. Moreover, I explore the levels-of-analysis debate in IR, which forms the foundation for my two-level pressures analytical framework, account for the theoretical and empirical rationale for selecting China and India as two case studies, and identify four contributions and introduce the structure of this book.
Energy security is a top priority for China and India, given the fact that both countries’ top leaders have rhetorically attached great importance to it as well as the fact that energy security has been written into both countries’ five-year plans. Accordingly, both countries have taken proactive policies at the domestic level to enhance their energy security, including developing renewable energy, expanding nuclear energy, enhancing energy efficiency and reducing energy intensity, in addition to establishing strategic petroleum reserves. The main difference between China and India’s domestic energy policies is that the former has employed more governmental involvement and regulations or a more top-down approach associated with Chinese authoritarian system. In contrast, the latter (or India)’s policy measures are more market-driven or a “bottom-up” approach associated with its democratic system.
China and India have been proactive and reactive state actors in the international system, which has been shaped by both countries’ two-level pressures characterized by wealth, status and asymmetrical interdependence. To maximize their wealth, China and India have been proactively developing their economies so both countries have become two of the fastest growing economies in the world. To fuel their fast economic growth, China and India have become highly dependent on imported oil especially that from the Middle East, which has led both countries to face energy insecurity stemmed from potential supply disruptions and high and volatile oil import bills. With their increased energy consumption, China and India have become the world’s largest and third largest greenhouse gas emitters, which have led both countries to face climate change that has negative impacts on their energy security. In order to seek great power status in the international system, China and India have had to not only accumulate both hard and soft status markers but also deal with the systemic pressure stemmed from their asymmetrical interdependence on the United States and its allies for exporting markets and energy supplies.
China and India’s policies to address energy insecurity and climate change have had significant implications for global energy and climate governance. First of all, both countries’ domestic and international policies on these two issue-areas have broadened energy and climate governance beyond the realms of the existing global energy and climate institutions or regimes. In addition, China and India may achieve energy security and emission reductions independently of the performance of the existing energy and climate regimes based on their own national and international policy rules, principles, norms, and procedures, which significantly calls into question the effectiveness, legitimacy, and appropriateness of the existing global energy and climate governance. A further implication is that restructuring the existing global energy and climate institutions or regimes so as to fully integrate both China and India is the only way to achieve the ultimate goals of global energy and climate governance, namely globalized energy security and a stabilized climate.
China and India’s domestic climate policy has been reactive. Both countries take measures to address climate change at the domestic level only when they are faced increased pressures stemmed from their dual-track climate diplomacy discussed in Chapter 5 and from epistemic communities. Under external pressures, China and India have set up institutions and formulated policies to address climate change. However, climate change is not a priority for China and India so both countries subordinate it to energy security. Two-level pressures have shaped China and India’s domestically proactive energy policy and reactive climate policy. At the domestic level, in order to seek wealth, both countries have adopted a low-carbon development strategy to maximize their energy security and economic growth while climate mitigation is only a co-benefit of their transition to a low-carbon economy. At the international level, China and India have tried to seek great power status through becoming leaders in the global renewable energy industry while both countries have asymmetrically depended on the US and EU for not only markets but also the transfer of advanced clean energy technology to develop renewable energy.
China and India have behaved very similarly in terms of address energy insecurity and climate change in spite of their widely different domestic attributes. Both countries’ energy policies, domestic and international, have contributed to global energy security. Both countries have had to alter the trajectory of their proactive energy and climate diplomacy in reaction to external pressures from state and non-state actors based on both countries’ rational calculations of cost and benefit, and both countries have shifted away from free-riding to burden sharing in global energy and climate governance. Two-level pressures analytical framework has supplemented Putnam’s two-level games and Neoclassical Realism, which is applicable to China and India’s behaviors in other policy issue-areas that entail global public goods (or bads) as well as to other emerging powers’ energy and climate policies. China and India’s proactive and reactive energy and climate policies, domestic and international, suggest that both countries will rise peacefully in the international system.